



Ankara Üniversitesi Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi
Araştırma Dizisi No: 29

**PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC SUPPORT
FOR TURKISH MEMBERSHIP**

Özgehan ŞENYUVA

Ankara- 2008

Özgehan ŞENYUVA

Public Support for European Integration and Public Support for Turkish Membership

ISBN: 978-975-482-778-1

©Ankara Üniversitesi Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi, 2008
Tüm Hakları Saklıdır.

Yayıncı izni olmadan, kısmen de olsa fotokopi, film v.b. elektronik ve mekanik yöntemlerle çoğaltılamaz.

Ankara Üniversitesi Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve
Uygulama Merkezi Araştırma Dizisi

Editör

Doç.Dr. Çağrı ERHAN

Editör Yardımcısı

Yrd.Doç.Dr. Burça KIZILIRMAK

Genel Yayın Koordinatörü

Uzm. Elçin ÇİĞNER CENGİZ

Ankara Üniversitesi Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve
Uygulama Merkezi Araştırma Dizisi No: 29

ANKARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ BASİMEVİ

İncitaşı Sokak No:10

06510 Beşevler / ANKARA

Tel: 0 (312) 213 66 55

Basım Tarihi: 04/07/2008

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Turkey's relation with the European Union is a long rooted and complex issue that involves a large set of variables. Since the Association Agreement of 1963, numerous studies have been published focusing on different aspects of Turkey - Europe relations. However, introduction of the role and importance of public opinion in Turkey – Europe relations is a rather new phenomenon. Until early 2000s, Turkey – Europe relations have been dominantly analyzed from legal, economic and diplomatic perspectives. However, as this study argues, the importance of public opinion as a variable within Turkey's bid for European Union membership is increasing in each day. Therefore, I believe that this study, which examines the determinants of the Turkish public support for European Union, constitutes a humble, yet significant contribution to the study of public opinion in Turkey.

This book is based on my PhD studies that I have conducted in the Centro Interdipartimentale di ricerca sul cambiamento politico (CIRCaP) - Centre for the Study of Political Change of University of Siena-Italy. I have had the opportunity to present the initial results of my analysis in different academic platforms, and benefited from the constructive feedback I have received. The findings of the survey of the data collected on Turkish Public opinion and Turkey's bid for European Union membership from late 1990s until 2004 were also printed as an article in the Spring 2006 edition of *Perceptions*. However, only this publication includes entire analysis and findings.

I would like to use this opportunity to once again extend my sincere appreciation to Prof. Ali Çarkoğlu, who has generously shared his survey data and contributed significantly at every step of this study, and Prof. Pierangelo Isernia who has supervised my PhD studies and introduced the amazing world of Public Opinion studies. I also would like to thank Prof. Atila Eralp for supporting me in my academic up bringing and providing me with many opportunities for broadening my horizon. Last, but not least, I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Çağrı Erhan for making this publication possible.

Dr. Özgehan ŞENYUVA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	III
1. INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR TURKISH MEMBERSHIP	1
1.1. European integration and public opinion	1
1.2. Turkish bid for membership and the Turkish public opinion	3
1.3. Purpose of the study	6
1.4. Theoretical considerations and hypothesis	7
1.5. The outline of the thesis	9
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT LITERATURE	11
2.1. The notion of “Support” in European Integration studies	11
2.2. The Value, Utilitarian and National identity models in the study of support for European Integration	12
Value Model	13
Challenge to the Value Model: The Utilitarian Approach	17
The increasing importance of national identity as a determinant of support.....	21
2.3. Other approaches in the study of support for the European Union	22
2.4. Studies on Turkish Public Opinion and European Union Membership	26
3. ANALYSIS OF SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP IN TURKEY	35
3.1 Introduction of the data used	36
3.2 Image of the European Union in Turkey and evolution of support for Turkey’s membership to the European Union	37
3.3. Explaining support for European Union membership in Turkey	46
3.3.1. Conceptualizing support toward the European Union in Turkey	46
3.3.2. Value model explanations of support for European Union	47
3.3.3. Utilitarian model explanations of support for European Union	59
3.3.4. National identity and support.....	69
3.3.5. Religiosity and support	75
3.4. Conclusions	80
4. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS	81
4.1. Introduction	81
4.2. Variables in the model.....	81

4.3. Analysis.....	85
4.3.1. Cognitive indicators.....	85
4.3.2. Attitudinal indicators.....	86
4.3.3. Expectations.....	91
4.3.4. Demographic and socioeconomic indicators.....	91
4.4 General points and discussion.....	92
CONCLUSIONS.....	95
REFERENCES.....	103
APPENDIX.....	111
FIGURES & TABLES.....	115

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR TURKISH MEMBERSHIP

1.1. European Integration and Public Opinion

The rejection of the European Union Constitution by voters in France and the Netherlands in 2005 came as a surprise to the committed Europhiles. Some commentators even considered it as a rebuke by the public of the decision makers living in their ivory towers. As the controversy around the recent referendums has once again demonstrated, public opinion plays a significant role in shaping the scope and nature of the European integration. The impact of public opinion is felt in the more “routine aspects of citizen politics: lobbying, public protest, and elections” (Gabel 1998, p.3).¹ With the massive objection to Turkey’s membership in certain EU member states such as Austria, it is also possible to argue that public opinion is becoming more influential in shaping the further enlargement of the EU.

In the past research on European integration and public opinion, there have been different models developed to deal with the importance of public opinion. A model that is often cited is the “permissive consensus” by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), which argues that data on public opinion can not be taken as a reliable guide to the future of the Community.

Positive indicators simply suggest to us that policy makers can probably move in an integrative position without significant opposition...conversely significant opposition and persistent social cleavage do not necessarily mean that integrative steps can not be taken, but rather that the opportunities for blocking them are greater. Once again, we are discussing the problem of the hostile or congenial context as constraining or facilitating but not

¹ For a further discussion on impact of public opinion see also: Eichenberg and Dalton (1993); Anderson (1998).

determining the growth of the Community system. (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, pp. 41-42).

As indicated, 'permissive consensus' model does not ascribe an important role to public opinion. In this model, public opinion is not considered as decisive, and it does not allow for any impetus toward integration or disintegration.

As a challenge to the limitations set by 'permissive consensus' notion, Inglehart (1977b) argues that one must take into account the differences of stratification within an opinion distribution, differences in the value that correlates to an opinion, and differences in the macro political context. Thus, three categories of variables; skills, values and structure have a bearing on the relevance of public opinion. To start with skills, the process of cognitive mobilization produces skilled participants and increases the relevance of public opinion.²

In the category of values, Inglehart (1977b) argues that the elite is less likely to be able to take a very dominant leading role if an issue touches deeply held values. Finally, the relevance of the public opinion, according to Inglehart, depends on structural factors. One example presented is the competitive context; if the EU issues become a part of the competition between political parties, the public opinion on the issue gains a great deal of relevance.

The challenge raised by Inglehart against the negative approach to the relevance of public opinion has been supported by other research as well. The studies conducted (Shepherd 1975; Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Inglehart and Reif 1991) have all based their arguments on the conditionally positive assessment of the relevance of public opinion. By now, Judging from the massive amount of studies published on public opinion and European integration, one is safe to argue that the importance of the public opinion in European affairs is an established and recognized fact. Moreover, with the ever-growing impact of the EU on the daily lives of citizens of the EU member states and the candidate countries alike, one can argue that the importance of public opinion is growing in parallel. Scholars, and somewhat less reluctantly, the European and domestic elites of the EU member states, have come to realize the significant role of public opinion in shaping the scope and pace of European integration (Słomczynski and Shabad 2003, p. 504).

² At this point, in a way Inglehart presents an operationalization of Deutsch's notion of a politically relevant stratum and Rosenau's point about enhancement of analytic skills due to the communication and education revolutions (Sinnott 1995, p. 26).

The nature of public opinion toward the European Union in candidate countries is also crucial. Slomczynski and Shabad (2003, pp.504-505) offer three reasons for this importance; first, although not constitutionally required, there have been and will be referendums about becoming a member or not once the negotiations are completed and closed. Second, as the case of new member states has demonstrated, EU membership becomes an integral part of partisan debates and electoral appeals. Third, for Central and Eastern European countries, EU membership is highly linked with the consolidation of the new democratic system and the market economy.

Almost all of the three reasons for the importance of the public opinion toward the EU in the candidate countries hold true for the Turkish case.

1.2. Turkish Bid For Membership and The Turkish Public Opinion:

In the last decade the number of the European Union member states has increased from twelve to twenty five. As enlargement continues Bulgaria and Romania are counting down the days before they join and Croatia is getting ready to start the negotiations. However, no country within the enlargement process has been laced with such controversy and created a debate on such a scale as Turkey. Despite being the second country to sign a membership agreement as early as 1963, which included a clause stating that Turkey would eventually become a member, it has taken forty years for the negotiations to start. It has been a bumpy and interesting journey both for Turkey and the other European states.³ Judging from the ongoing debates, the Turkish process is not likely to get any smoother either. Apparently, Turkey's membership is a rather sophisticated formula that involves much more elements than other candidate countries. There are numerous issues that are feeding the debate and creating doubts on many minds in Europe. Some of these issues include the size of Turkey and its vast population, the majority of its citizens being Muslims, its problems with the distribution of wealth, and the gigantic disparities between the East and the West of the country. All these issues merit discussions on their own. However, what is important is that Turkey's membership to the European Union is a complicated matter and therefore all actors involved should be dealt with uttermost care. The novelty of the Turkish case is that the public appears as a more involved and influential actor compared with the inclusion of other candidate countries. Turkish membership has attracted more interest in the European public debate, and demonstrated that public opinion should be taken into consideration at different stages. The same situation has become

³ It is very difficult to pin point one study that provides a comprehensive picture of all components of EU-Turkey relations, despite the massive number of the published works on the subject. However, one would benefit from the works by Eralp (1993; 1997); Arat and Baykal (2001); Çarkoğlu and Rubin (2003); Brusse and Griffiths (2004); and Birand (2005).

much more relevant in Turkish political sphere since the start of the negotiations in October 2005.

The issue of the Turkish membership to the European Union in the major academic studies is pre-dominantly referred to an 'elite project'. Conventionally, the process of European integration at large is seen as being driven by elite actions. In Delanty's (1995) argumentation, construction of a European identity and efforts for strengthening and dissemination of this identity have always been an elite and top-down process. This holds true for the candidate states within the enlargement process as well. The Turkish political elite, since the early years following the establishment of the Republic (even during the last period of the Ottoman Empire), have always identified their primary goal as 'westernization' with lean to becoming more integrated to the European political system by adopting certain values and practices. The membership to the European Union is considered as the final threshold of the ongoing 'westernization' project and as the final destination. The views of Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) on a "permissive consensus" provided by the European citizens to the elites for the European integration is seemingly adaptable to the enlargement and to the specific issue of Turkish membership.

The Turkish political elite have always defended the discourse of 'doing all that is necessary for the benefit of people'. The European Union, too, has often been presented and defended as the ultimate opportunity to improve the economic and socio-political well-being of the Turkish public. However, history has shown that the political elite have had to face the public on certain issues regarding the European Union membership process. In such cases, the permissive consensus was disturbed. The question of the death penalty is a striking example. The parliament passed a reform package in the summer of 2002 in which the death penalty was abolished. Meanwhile, a public survey carried out just before the bill was discussed in the parliament showed that only 38 % of the public supported the abolishment of death penalty (Çarkoğlu 2003). The political elite had to push it through against popular opinion. The discourse was, once again, that it was done for the benefit of the people, who had to make certain sacrifices for the achievement of the ultimate goal. In the background of the passage of the bill in the parliament, there was the crisis of the domestic politics. Turkish domestic politics have entered to the summer of 2002 in a chaotic state. The shaky tri-party coalition government composed of Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP (*Democratic Left Party*), Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP (Nationalist Action Party) and Anavatan Partisi-ANAP (Motherland Party) was going through difficult times due to the deterioration of the health condition of the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and the resignation of the leading figures from DSP,

including the popular Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem. Following the resignations, the coalition government has lost its majority in the parliament and the decision for an early election in autumn was taken. It appears that by making a breakthrough in the EU membership process with comprehensive changes in the legal, social and political framework, the outgoing parliament aimed at overcoming the bottleneck the country was going through by using the EU as an anchor. This situation has brought to the forefront that the decision makers were willing to challenge Turkish public opinion in cases of conflict regarding the EU membership process.

In addition, the passage of the package in the parliament and the political debate surrounding it also marked the entry of the European debate into the Turkish politics. As Çarkoğlu (2004, p.20) also argues, prior to summer 2002, Turkish political elite has been reluctant in adopting the necessary adjustments in the legal and political system for EU membership, despite the massive support for EU. With the most comprehensive reform package in summer 2002 and the following improvement of relations with the EU after the elections in November 2002, EU membership gained further importance in Turkish politics. As European debate became important, the position of Turkish public opinion vis-à-vis the membership also came into the equation.

The importance of Turkish public opinion should not be limited to the concern about how it might side in the event of a referendum on membership in the future. Turkey's candidacy for EU membership requires an extensive set of policy adjustments and legal and institutional changes. Most of the issues involved are too technical and sophisticated for the average citizen to actually form an opinion about. However, they also constitute the basis of many highly "sensitive issues" that are debated on the public agenda, e.g. the abolishment of the death penalty and the use of languages other than Turkish (Çarkoğlu, 2003). If Turkey is to deal with reforms in order to meet all the necessary criteria for membership to the EU, it will inevitably require active public support for such drastic political changes. However, as Inglehart (1977b) argues, the public opinion is more likely to challenge the elite lead when proposed changes involve deeply held values. Therefore, the public support is especially crucial in the implementation of these political changes. This importance of public opinion places the related research high in the academic agenda, or at least it should do so.

Unfortunately, in the academic sphere, there exists a considerable lack of empirical studies investigating this sometimes paradoxical interaction between the Turkish political elite and the public opinion on the process of Turkish membership to the EU. It is striking that too little or no attention is given to disseminating information about available data and, more critically,

to the collection of any systematic data on Turkish public opinion on the issue of the European Union.⁴ In fact, the lack and insufficiency of systematic studies on the public opinion in general may be considered as a strong indication that the public opinion itself is not considered as an important political determinant. The major attention in Turkish academic circles has always been on the ‘real processes’ of the accession (fulfillment of the membership criteria, legal harmonization, accession negotiations, etc.). Therefore this study intends to address a major need in the academic field to shift the focus on to the public opinion.

1.3. Purpose of The Study

In methodological terms, this research represents one of the first attempts to link the international studies on public support for the European Union with the Turkish public opinion toward the membership. Furthermore, on a larger perspective, this study aims to contribute to the study of the relation between public opinion and the European integration, as Turkey offers interesting insights to public opinion in relation to membership process.

To evaluate the determinants of support for Turkey’s entry into the European Union, this study will use the secondary analyses of existing data collected by different sources in different time periods.

The research has two main objectives. First is rather in descriptive nature, aiming to portray the level of support in Turkey for the European Union membership and the overall image of the EU. Second objective is more explanatory as it is the investigation of the determinants of citizen support in Turkey for European Union membership.

To achieve these objectives, I will use two similar survey data collected in 2002, and compare the determinants of support. The first of these surveys is one of the earliest Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) carried out in Turkey. The field work of CCEB 2002.2 took place on between September-October 2002 and a random sample of 1000 (N) Turkish citizens aged 15 and over have been interviewed (European Commission CCEB 2002.2 report).⁵ This survey includes the typical set of questions on the image of the European Union, the vote in a hypothetical referendum and a large set of demographic and socio-economic questions.

The second survey (Hereafter Çarkoğlu *et.al.*)used is conducted by a team of academics from Boğaziçi University, Istanbul in cooperation with

⁴ A striking example is that Turkey has only been part of Eurobarometer surveys since 2001

⁵ A much detailed information on CCEB 2002.2 and Çarkoğlu *et.al.* regarding their data collection and sampling is presented at chapter three.

TESEV, a Turkish NGO dealing with socio-political subjects.⁶ The field work of this survey took place on between May-June 2002. A total of 3060 (N) Turkish citizens aged 18 and over have been interviewed face to face (Çarkoğlu 2003). This survey includes a wider range of questions on religion and national identity, in addition to the similar questions with CCEB on European Union related issues.

Having the possibility to compare two data sets conducted at similar periods presents a unique opportunity. This opportunity stems from the time period they cover. 2002 is considered as a turning point in Turkey's quest for full membership to the European Union because of a comprehensive legislative adjustment package that the Turkish parliament passed (Birand 2005, pp.426-427). As Çarkoğlu (2004) underlines, this package included many controversial elements ranging from abolition of death penalty to teaching of and broadcasting in native languages other than Turkish; that is, effectively lifting the ban on the use of Kurdish in broadcasting and education. The package and its contents were surrounded with immense political debate before, during and after its approval by the parliament. The two surveys used in this study have been conducted within the political atmosphere created by this package, thus they reflect the Turkish public opinion at a very crucial and historically important stage.⁷

In addition, as it will be demonstrated in chapter two, the practice of data collection in Turkey is not well established and the available data is very scarce and unexplored. Therefore, analyzing two surveys in a comparative manner is a significant opulence.

1.4. Theoretical Considerations and Hypothesis

In this research, I test the validity of several hypothesis drawn from the research on the determinants of citizen support for integration in the member countries of the EU.

In this regard, I follow primarily the relative impact of the three types of explanatory variables. First, the utilitarian calculations of the costs and benefits associated with Turkey's membership to the EU; second, the political values and level of cognitive skills and finally, the level of attachment to national identity and nationalist values.

The emphasis on economic determinants of support is derived from the Utilitarian model which is developed in the early 1990s. As Gabel (1998a, p.

⁶ The survey was conducted by Prof. Ali Çarkoğlu, Prof. Refik Erzan, Prof. Kemal Kirişçi and Prof. Hakan Yılmaz. TESEV: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation

⁷ The survey by Çarkoğlu *et.al* was conducted in May-June 2002; the package was passed by the Parliament on August 2, 2002 and the CCEB 2002.2 was conducted in September-October 2002.

40) writes, “membership in the EU requires national economic adjustment that introduces new opportunities, competition and uncertainty for citizens depending on their personal economic assets.” As a result of this adjustment, the citizens are made aware through personal experience or cueing from political elites and mass media that there will be winners and losers in the membership process (Slomczynski and Shabad, p. 506). As a consequence of this awareness, the support for integration would be based on utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits. Therefore, the individuals who perceive that they will gain from EU membership and possess expectations of personal benefit will be more supportive of integration than those who do not expect to benefit from membership (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998a). Within this line of thought I argue that the support for Turkey’s membership is a result of perceived personal and country benefits, and focuses on potential gains. Hence, I expect that the individuals who believe that they will benefit from Turkey’s membership to the EU will be more supportive of the membership than those who do not have expectations of gain.

However, the research on public support for the EU has not focused solely on utilitarian concerns. As a matter of fact, the utilitarian approach emerged as a criticism of the Value model, which was considered “the” explanation of public support for the EU until 1990s. The model laid its focus on two important notions, the values and the cognitive mobilization of an individual. As the argument goes, the individuals with higher levels of cognitive mobilization are considered to be more supportive of the EU, as more information one receives about the EU, the less threatening the EU becomes (Inglehart 1970). Furthermore, the individuals who have a value system that emphasizes democracy and self development over issues like physical and economic security are more favorable toward further European integration (Inglehart 1977a). Inglehart (1977a) also argues that the individuals –post-materialists- giving importance to issues like democracy and environmental protection possess sophisticated and developed values and they are more capable of relating to politics at a more abstract level than the ones who focus on material needs –materialists-. As the European integration is a rather abstract concept, the individuals with more post-materialist values would be more supportive of the European integration. Within this perspective, in Turkish case, I expect that the Turkish citizens who have higher cognitive skills and who are more committed to democratic values and rights are more supportive of Turkey’s entry into the European Union.

The third explanatory variable derives from a very recent model on support for the European Union. It is argued that people do not necessarily

calculate the costs and benefits of the EU in their own lives when thinking about issues of European integration, but rather contemplate on the potential threats posed to the integrity of the nation state and to the nature of national identity (McLaren 2002, 554). The argument goes that it is the level of one's attachment to the national identity that determines the level of support for the European integration (Carey 2002). The individuals with high levels of attachment to the national identity and with high levels of commitment to the nationalist values are less likely to support the European Union, as it is perceived as a potential threat. Within this perspective, I argue that for the Turkish citizens with strong national identities, the European Union membership poses a threat to the nation state, thus their level of support is lower than the citizens with less national attachments.

With these expectations, I pose a number of specific questions with respect to the analyses of the determinants of public support for the EU membership in Turkey. These questions can be listed as follows:

- Does the Turkish public support Turkey's membership to the European Union?
- How has the Turkish public opinion changed over time?
- What are the main socio-politic, geographic and individual characteristics of the citizens who support membership?
- Which of the existing theories on support for European Union membership can be utilized to explain the Turkish case best?
- Is "National identity / Nationalism" a sufficient model by itself for explaining the public support for EU integration?

1.5. The Outline of The Study

As a first step, in chapter two, I will present and discuss the relevant literature on public support for the European Union and evaluate the applicability of major theories on the support to the Turkish case. To start with, I will briefly analyze the evolution of the notion of *support* within the frame of European integration studies. This brief discussion will be followed with a review of the literature. In this review, I will go into detailed description and explanation of the major three models on public opinion and European integration, namely; the Value, the Utilitarian and the National identity models. In addition, other approaches to the study of public support for European integration will also be presented. Again in this chapter, I will present the findings of a survey I have done on the practice of data collection on European issues in Turkey, and I will review the characteristics of the studies that focused on Turkish public opinion and the European Union membership.

In chapter three, I will introduce the methodology and data. In this chapter, I will also present the variables that will be used in my analysis. After the introduction of the data and the methodology, I will analyze the evolution of support for European Union membership over time and provide some secondary analysis on a variety of issues related with the individual support for Turkey's entry to the European Union. This chapter starts with a look at the image of the European Union in Turkey, as a positive image can be considered as an indicator of support. In the first part of the chapter I will try to answer three major questions: First, what is the image of the EU in Turkey; second, how has it changed over time (is there any trend? In which directions?). And finally, how responsive are the trends to political events and elite debates?

The second part of chapter three will focus on bivariate analyses of main explanations of support in Turkey. These explanations will be derived from the three major approaches to the public support for European integration; value, utilitarian and national identity models.

The major determinants of support for Turkey's membership at an individual level will be presented and assessed in chapter four. I will use multivariate analysis of the two data sets I have, CCEB 2002.2 and Çarkoğlu et.al., in order to determine and discuss the support for EU membership.

In the final chapter the findings will be discussed and potential areas for future research will be highlighted.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT LITERATURE

Before going into detail about past research and findings on support for European integration, it is useful to make a brief evaluation of the past scholar research on two crucial aspects, the notion of ‘support’ and the significance of public opinion regarding the European integration process.

2.1. The Notion of “Support” in European Integration Studies

The term of “support” used in this analysis is drawn and adapted from Easton’s conceptualization, in which he distinguishes between diffuse and specific support. In simple terms, diffuse support represents a generalized evaluation, while specific support denotes an output directed evaluation.

The uniqueness of specific support lies in its relationship to satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities. Whereas the diffuse support refers to the evaluation of what an object is or represents- to the general meaning it has for a person- not what it does. (Easton, 1975, p. 437, 444)

Easton’s model has also similarities with the approach by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), in which they attempted to conceptualize orientations toward a (rudimentary) international political system, the European Community.

Concerning the modes of orientation, Lindberg and Scheingold present ‘utilitarian’ and ‘affective’ support. Utilitarian support is very close to Easton’s ‘specific’ support. Utilitarian support is based on some perceived and relatively concrete interest. On the other hand, affective support indicates, “a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, p. 40). At this stage, the notion of ‘affective’ support is almost identical with Easton’s ‘diffuse’ support.¹

When the notions of support presented by both Easton and Lindberg and Scheingold are brought together, it is seen that Easton’s notion of ‘specific support’ is in the same lines with Lindberg and Scheingold’s notion

¹ For a more detailed presentation and discussion of both Easton’s and Lindberg and Scheingold’s conceptualizations, see Niedermayer and Westle (1995).

of “utilitarian” basis of support. The similarity rises from the fact that both modes are based on rational rather than affective judgments, based on concrete interests and cost benefit considerations. In addition, both of them are considered as sensitive to short term variations.

However, Niedermayer and Westle (1995, p. 49) present the differences between these two approaches,

Whereas Lindberg and Scheingold’s more generalized concept of support is defined as being only ‘affective’, Easton’s concept of support is defined as value based and/or affective belief in the legitimacy of an object. Whereas Lindberg and Scheingold’s category of affective support does not deal with the stability of support, ‘diffuse’ support as specified by Easton should not fluctuate greatly overtime, at least not with regard to the objects ‘political community’ or ‘regime’.

As Easton’s approach presents a broader scope, his concepts of ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support will be utilized in further analysis of related components.

2.2. The Value, Utilitarian and National Identity Models in The Study of Support for European Integration

The analysis draws from a well-established body of scholarship examining the determinants of public support for European integration in member state countries. The main challenge is to apply these theories to the candidate countries, in particular to the Turkish case. Three general models: value, utilitarian and national identity are taken as the major framework of analysis. Historically, one of the first explanations to be examined by public opinion scholars, the value perspective, argues that political values and cognitive capabilities affect a citizen’s ability to form concrete opinions about abstract and distant institutions, such as the EU (e.g., Inglehart 1970, 1977a). The utilitarian perspective suggests that individual attitudes result from a cost-benefit calculation in the context of welfare losses and gains associated with integration (e.g., Gabel, 1998a). The national identity model emphasizes the relation between the support for the European Union and level of nationalist sentiments. (Carey 2002).

Value Model

In regards to studies aiming to explain the relation between public support and European integration, the foremost and common explanation has been the approach developed by Ronald Inglehart, and his theory of ‘Silent Revolution’. Up until the 1990s, Inglehart’s theory was considered as ‘the’ explanation for public support for European Integration.

Inglehart’s argument links social developments and significant developments experienced by the industrialized Western European states with political changes as core reasons for support of European integration (Inglehart 1970; Inglehart 1977a; Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1987). All in all, Inglehart and colleagues put forward two determinants that shape the public attitude toward the European integration: Value orientation and level of political skills. According to Inglehart (1978, pp.66-97; 1977a, p.5 and pp.334-352), any specific attitude toward integration is a function of these two characteristics.

With regards to value orientation, Inglehart’s famous formulation of materialist versus post-materialist is in effect. Materialists are the people who give more priority to things related to economic and physical security; while on the other hand, post-materialists are the ones who prioritize the fulfillment of intellectual needs, the need for belonging, the strive for independence and self-actualization (Inglehart 1977a).

Within this dichotomy, Inglehart (1977a, pp.57-60) argues that thinking and projecting on Europe is more of an intellectual act that fits more to post-materialists, while materialists are more preoccupied with physical and economic needs, with no time and interest to reflect on abstract projects. In other words, materialists are less cosmopolitan than the post-materialists. Therefore, post-materialists, who are more engaged with intellectual activities and in search of a cosmopolitan vision are more supportive of the European integration project (Inglehart, 1977a, pp. 330-341).

The other characteristic that Inglehart relies on is the level of political skills. This is where the term ‘cognitive mobilization’ comes into play. In his article, “Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity”, Inglehart (1970), puts forward the argument that, in post WWII Europe there existed a social mobilization. Current social dynamics are allowing for an ever growing degree of integration among an increasing numbers of Europeans, and carry them into further networks in a cosmopolitan communications networks. The question Inglehart raises is, into what sort of network are they being integrated; a national or supranational? Inglehart (1970, pp. 50-62) argues that in the contemporary West European setting, rising levels of exposure to formal education and mass communications tend to favor integration at the European, as well as the national, levels.

According to Inglehart (1970), social mobilization is a broad process and has different stages. The Western European countries long ago completed various important ones: basic industrialization, widespread literacy, mass military service, and universal suffrage.

But Inglehart puts forward the idea that the most important stage of all, *cognitive mobilization*, is still going on. Inglehart (1970, p. 47) defines cognitive mobilization as “the process that increases the individual’s capacity to receive and interpret messages relating to a remote political community.”

Cognitive mobilization increases the ability to relate to more remote roles and situations, thus it has important implications for European integration. As European Institutions are more remote than national ones and have a more indirect effect on citizens’ lives, public support for European Integration would require a higher cognitive mobility (Inglehart, 1970, p. 49-52).

Inglehart’s propositions were developed in due time. In an article published almost two decades after the breakthrough study on cognitive mobilization, Inglehart, Raider and Reif (1987), assessed the evolution of public attitudes toward European integration in the period of 1970-1986. They attempted to distinguish between “Affective support” and “Utilitarian support” for the European integration. The concept of ‘affective support’ is derived from Easton’s formulation of ‘diffuse support’. Easton views mass support for a political system as the result of positive governmental outputs, and in time a series of beneficial outputs may build a reservoir of ‘diffuse support’ that is not contingent on immediate payoffs, but can be traced back to favorable outputs from an earlier time (Inglehart et al, 1987, p. 140). On the contrary, “Utilitarian support” is a calculated appraisal of immediate costs and benefits of membership to the community.

Inglehart and colleagues (1987, pp.140-142) argue that public support for European integration is an ‘affective’ one rather than a ‘utilitarian’ analysis of costs and benefits. In light of the outcomes of their analysis, Inglehart and colleagues (1987, p. 143) re-stated their argument that, “those with higher incomes, education and higher status occupations are – throughout the community- more favorable to unification and make more positive assessments of membership than those of lower status”.

The value oriented approach did not stay all indifferent to the importance of economics either. Inglehart and Rabier (1978), in their article titled “Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity: Public Opinion Trends,” began to include the role of economics in their approach. Their analysis of the public opinion survey data reveals a positive correlation

between support for community membership and a given nation's level of industrial production at a given time point. They also found a negative correlation with rates of inflation where long term influences dominate the short term immediate economic effects. They once again repeat their argument that the long-term factors are: the length of membership, presence of post-materialist values and high levels of cognitive mobilization.

The decade following the foundation of the EEC in 1958 created an atmosphere of prosperity and high expectations. These levels of prosperity were (rightly or wrongly) attributed in part to membership into the European Community. In return, there were high levels of support for European integration among the citizens of the original six members. This high support expanded across the political spectrum overcoming the Left-Right divide; even in Italy and France where these lines were most sharply present (Inglehart and Rabier 1978, p 67). (Figure 1 "The evolution of support for European unification, 1952-1978) (p.68).

Inglehart and Rabier do follow the argument of major theorists working in the area of integration, such as Ernst B. Haas, Karl W. Deutsch, Phillippe Schmitter, who believe that "favorable economic payoffs are conducive to – and perhaps even essential to- the processes of national and supranational integration" (Inglehart and Rabier 1978, p. 69).

Inglehart and Rabier (1978) stick to the Eastonian contemplation of mass support for a political system in their analysis. This was especially the case during the economic crises of early 70s. David Easton saw the support as a result of positive governmental outputs, thus giving importance to the notion of "diffuse support". As indicated, a series of beneficial outcomes may build up a reservoir of diffuse support, and the favorable economic outputs are the most obvious and appreciated ones in creating diffuse support (Easton 1975, pp.124-126).

So by using the differentiation between affective and utilitarian support, Inglehart and Rabier (1978, p. 70) argue that, "unfavorable economic conditions seem to have engendered a decline in the prevalence of positive assessments of membership, but they have not prevented the growth sense of European Community solidarity."

Length of membership factor and diffuse support is greater in original members as they have benefited from positive economic outputs over the past many years. The support levels of new members have also shown greater volatility over time, as if they were more responsive to current influences.

Inglehart and Rabier (1978, pp. 72-74) link the ups and downs of public appraisal of membership in the European Community to the changes in

industrial production by using the Index of Industrial Production, and they argue that public opinion follows with a one year delay. As a case in point, Irish opinion regarding their own integration has not much changed over the years because economic problems such as unemployment and low per-capita income were already present. "It is the changes from one's accustomed condition that influence public appraisals of the benefits of membership in the Community". (Inglehart and Rabier 1978, p. 73).

Inglehart and Rabier (1978) attempt to prove this argument by introducing other economic indicators like index of industrial production. They reinforce the above mentioned argument by analyzing the correlation between mass support and inflation.

However, Inglehart and Rabier remain loyal to their original standpoint by arguing that, "The economic context is important. Nation-specific effects, apparently linked with long term membership are even more important" (Inglehart and Rabier 1978, p. 76). They measure the long term trend by arguing that within the period of 1970s, despite the economic crisis, the sense of community solidarity increased, "...the sheer passage of time under common supranational institutions may tend to instill the habit of viewing things from a broader perspective than that of a nation-state, even in the absence of material awards" (Inglehart and Rabier 1978, p. 76).

In the fall 1977 survey, the number of respondents who indicated that "membership was a good thing" was declining compared to the previous years. However, in all countries pluralities, even majorities in some cases agreed that membership would prove to be useful in the future. When asked, "*and do you think that (your country's) membership in the common market is a good thing, bad thing, or neither in the light of (your country's) future in the next ten or fifteen years?*", in the case of UK, the people who said that membership was a good thing (35 per cent) was less than people who believed that it would prove to be useful in the future (48 per cent).

Although the work by Inglehart and Rabier (1978) merits certain attention for the quality of its arguments and its innovative character, one has to keep in mind two major challenges of the study. The first shortcoming is the fact that it is rather outdated. It mainly handles the European Community of 1978, with nine members and with a much more limited scope and existence. Second, the main design and application focused on public support in already established member states. But if carefully handled and filtered, the argumentations brought about can also be utilized for analyzing the public opinion for candidate countries.

Challenge to the Value Model: The Utilitarian Approach

The prevailing school of thought, which incorporated the concepts of the cognitive mobilization and value change to explain public support for European integration, did not go unchallenged. One of the most critical steps was the work of Joseph Janssen (1991), titled "Post Materialism, Cognitive Mobilization and Support for European Integration". In this study, Janssen tested Inglehart's theory of 'Silent Revolution' to explain cross-national differences in development of support in time. Under the light of his findings, Janssen rejects post-materialism and cognitive mobilization models as main determinants of public support. He argues that post-materialism is irrelevant and cognitive mobilization has effects only at the individual levels. Janssen agrees with Inglehart on the relation between values and skills on the one hand and cosmopolitanism on the other. However, on the issue of public support, he claims that post materialists are more positive about European integration than materialists because they have, on average, much higher skills, and not because they have different values. Thus, he argues that, "Inglehart's theory is of almost no use in explaining attitudes toward integration and cross-national differences in support." (Janssen 1991, p. 443).

Following the challenges to Inglehart's model, starting in 1990s studies on public support and the European Union have been dominated by economic and rational cost-benefit explanations. The studies in this line may be grouped under the title of 'Utilitarian Model'. The studies of Matthew Gabel and a number of collaborators have based their starting point on the David Easton's work based on a utilitarian cost-benefit approach which supports European integration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998a; 1998b). The main argument of Gabel was that "individual's level of support is positively related to her nation's security and trade interests in European Community membership and her personal potential to benefit from liberalized markets for goods, labor and money." (Gabel and Palmer 1995, p. 3).

The relationship between economic conditions and a citizen's support for national political institutions is well established in the literature (Lewis-Beck, 1986; Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, & Lafay, 1991). One way of understanding the relationship between utilitarian variables and EU support is through an individual's perceived economic well-being. An individual's ability to evaluate whether they will gain or lose from membership is viewed through the perceptions of their current economic reality. Consistent with the conclusions derived from economic voting models, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) hypothesize that not only objective economic measures but also perceptions of personal economic well-being influence the public's

evaluations of political issues. Their findings demonstrate that personal economic evaluations are positively related to support for integration. Gabel and Whitten (1997) test this relationship by examining evaluations of household financial situations and support for the EU. Similarly, they also find that support for integration is positively related to a citizen's perceived household financial wellbeing.

The utilitarian model would argue that those individuals possessing negative evaluations of their household financial situation are more likely to favor any development or step that might bring about an improvement. Consistent with this argument, it would be possible to expect that economic perceptions are an underlying factor in forming attitudes about European membership.

In the study of Christopher Anderson and Shawn Reichert (1996) titled "Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the EU: A Cross-National Analysis", the argument focused more poignantly on the relation between economic benefits and public attitude toward the European Union. Anderson and Reichert first made the distinction between *direct* and *indirect* economic benefits associated with EU membership and later on they examined how these benefits affect support for further integration. In their formulation, direct economic benefits refer to payments made by EU to member states or individuals; while indirect benefits refer to economic advantages associated with membership to the European Union, such as trade, professional mobility, etc... (Anderson and Reichert 1996, pp. 233-234). As a result of their multivariate, cross-national analysis, they concluded that individuals living in countries that benefit more from EU membership display higher support for their country's participation in the EU (Anderson and Reichert 1996, pp. 240-243). Moreover, they have also argued that those individuals who benefit personally are also more supportive of the integration project.

These individual level results are also supported by longitudinal aggregate-level evidence. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), for instance, using macro economic variables such as inflation, unemployment and economic growth, examined whether support is influenced by national economic performance. Their hypothesis is derived from economic voting models, which highlights the relationship between economic conditions and evaluations of national governments. They argue that the very same model can be applied to the European Union. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993, p. 512) recognize the fact that the public's level of knowledge concerning the EU may be limited, but they argue that the "considerable impact that the EU has on economic welfare should be a fact recognized by the European public".

Nearly all of the economic explanations of support for the EU take the above proposition of Eichenberg and Dalton and assume that individuals are able to recognize the implications of European integration and how it affects them. Anderson (1998) demonstrates that, in virtually all measures of knowledge and awareness of basic aspects of the integration process, citizens are not particularly so well informed. Anderson (1998) puts forward the argument that citizens use proxies, such as system support or government support, when they lack sufficient information to form opinions about the EU.

Deriving from the outcomes of his analysis, Anderson (1998) argues that individuals who are satisfied with domestic political institutions are more likely to support European institutions. The research by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) has presented contrasting outcomes. According to his argument, the level of support for EU is higher where the levels of support for national politics are lower.

To continue with the discussion on the role of economics, Inglehart and Rabier (1978, p. 69) argue that “favorable economic payoffs are conducive to –perhaps even essential to- the processes of national and supranational integration”. Nye (1971, p. 83-84), also points out that it is important that economic benefits are perceived to flow from integration. Dalton and Eichenberg (1993) developed this argument and suggest that at the base of any utilitarian model of public support for the European Community must be considerations about its economic performance.

In their extended analyses, Bosch and Newton (1995) examine whether the citizens evaluate the EC in terms of their material interests or in terms of their ideal interests. They assert that economic interests are among the most important material matters; ideal interests include such things as world peace, European cooperation, social justice, and environmental protection.

The important contribution by Bosch and Newton (1995, p. 75), however, comes as a result of their recognition that there is no hard and fast distinction to be drawn between economic and non-economic, or between the material and the ideal. They further develop this argument:

Nor there is a simple dichotomy between ‘narrow materialism’ and ‘high minded idealism’. More to the point, mass opinion about anything as large and complex as the European Community is highly likely to be based upon a mixture of different factors and dispositions, ranging from naked economic self-interest, through sociotropic calculations of an economic nature, to considerations of an idealistic kind. Moreover, the mix of different reasons for supporting or opposing the EC may well change over time in

different countries according to different social, political, and economic circumstances. (Bosch and Newton 1995, p. 75)²

Bosch and Newton (1995) continued their analysis with a series of tests to measure the relation between support for the European Union and economic indicators. The variables they utilized were, *Net payments/receipts per capita from EC funds, GDP per capita; Growth of real GDP per capita; and economic image of the EC.*³

In their conclusion, Bosch and Newton (1995, p. 101) fail to put forth a final argument on the issue and their finding portray an inconclusive picture. They show that support for the EC is not generally or powerfully determined by economic considerations:

So far as economic variables do appear to be associated with support or opposition to the EC and European unification, they seem to have different effects in different countries and in different years.

However, they do not go as far as arguing that an economic evaluation of support for European integration does not exist. On the other hand, they also raise criticism about the studies that put emphasis on economic impact (i.e. Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). They argue that these studies “seem either to be generalizing about short term effects, which, although significant at the time, tend to be smoothed out by long term trends, or to be using a narrower range of control variables than the range employed in the present study” (Bosch and Newton 1995, p. 101). These criticisms should be noted, even though they alone are not strong enough to lead to a total disregard of the previous studies.

At the individual level, the findings of Bosch and Newton (1995) do deserve special attention. They put forward the hypothesis that support seems to be associated stronger with social and attitudinal variables of a non-economic nature. In their regression analysis, optimism about the coming year, left-right orientation, education, and satisfaction with life in general appear to be more closely associated with support than income, class, or unemployment (Bosch and Newton 1995, pp. 98-101).

The analysis and findings of Bosch and Newton (1995) also confirm the “familiarity breeds content” hypothesis, by showing that support tends to increase slowly and unsteadily over the long term. But they also challenge the argument first put forward by Inglehart (1970, 1977a) that support grows because an older and less favorable age group is replaced by a younger and

² For a detailed presentation and argumentation of ‘sociotropic’ approaches, see, Lewis Back 1986, Lewin, L. 1991.

³ The economic image of EC is the percentage of respondents in each country presenting a primarily economic image of the EC minus the percentages presenting primarily political image.

better disposed one. Bosch and Newton (1995, p. 102) conclude that “it seems that the population as a whole is growing slowly but steadily more supportive”.

All the arguments raised by the utilitarian model do not and should not lead to the conclusion that it is mutually exclusive with the value model. In terms of occupation and education, the “cognitive mobilization” argument complements rather than rivals the utilitarian explanation. Scholars argue that individuals possessing a high level of “human capital” are better equipped to reap the benefits of integration (Gabel, 1998). Primarily, these include occupations that are advantaged by the liberalization and integration of markets. A survey carried out in 1957 and 1962 in the six member states demonstrated that business groups were consistently more favorable to the common market than were agriculture and labor groups (Shepherd, 1975, p. 204).

The increasing importance of national identity as a determinant of support

While the non-utilitarian and utilitarian approaches have dominated the literature on support for European integration, McLaren (2002) brought about a new focus by underlining the impact of nationalism and perceived cultural threat. In her argumentation, she demonstrated that the perceived cultural threat from other cultures is a major determinant of support and antipathy toward further integration.

McLaren (2002) puts forward the argument that the propositions of utilitarian and value models miss the main core of what shapes citizens’ opinions on the European Union. She argues that,

Antipathy toward the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive mobilization, post-materialist values, or evaluation of national government, but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures. (McLaren 2002, p. 553)

In the line of thought and the statistical analysis of McLaren, people do not only decide by taking into account rational cost/benefit calculations, or their values, but also the impact on national identity. As the European integration project in general is conceived as a threat to the nation state by undermining its integrity, this in return affects people’s opinion in their approach toward the European Union. The more an individual is concerned about the fate of the nation state, the less likely that individual would be to support the European Union. The nationalist sentiments are also linked to concerns about one’s own culture. Integration brings about a greater opportunity for exposure to other cultures through, among other things, immigration and emigration. This, according to McLaren (2002, pp.554-

555), leads to a certain hostility toward other cultures as certain individuals perceive this exposure as a threat to their own culture. In relation to previous models explaining support, McLaren concludes that her findings support the propositions that point to the use of proxies in opinion formation and support the more utilitarian arguments as well. Thus, she argues that national identity perspectives and utilitarian perspectives act as a complementary rather than an alternative explanation.

However, on the issue of national identity, Carey's (2002) article "Undivided Loyalties", constructed the first solid attempt to directly use national identity to explain attitudes toward the European integration. Taking on forward from the analysis of McLaren, Carey contended that the feelings of national identity are highly important in an individual's choice of whether or not to support the EU.

National identity for Carey (2002, p. 391) is defined as "the intensity and the type of the relationship towards the nation". Based on this definition, he argues that national identity relates to the intensity of positive attachments to the nation. According to Carey (2002, p. 391), "the stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics." As the European Union has an increasing role in shaping the economics and politics of its member states, Carey posits that the stronger feelings of national identity lead to lower levels of support for the European Union.

2.3. Other Approaches in The Study of Support for The European Union

Taking the salience of the EU to most EU citizens and the low level of information about its policies and effects into consideration, a group of scholars decided to focus on other determinants of support. Anderson (1998), for example, is critical of approaching EU support as a function of economic calculations, and argues that considering the lack of knowledge and information on the part of EU citizens on EU (or in this case, the candidate citizens), the citizens are likely to use "proxies" in evaluating the issue. In his view these proxies are based on perceptions about the national government. As Anderson (1998, p. 573) put forward, "...how can mass publics be simultaneously ignorant about integration and act in a self-interested rational fashion when it comes to economic benefits to be secured from the integration process?". As an alternative, the political orientations and behavior, such as party preferences, evaluations of the incumbent government and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy itself, have started to be analyzed as direct determinants of orientations toward the EU.

Anderson (1998, p. 573) went ahead to directly link the support between party politics and domestic politics,

...attitudes about the advantages and disadvantages of integration are likely to reflect other...political beliefs that are result of citizen's experiences with domestic political reality. As a result, economic effects, which typically have been modeled to have a direct effect on integration support, may in fact be mediated by attitudes towards domestic politics.

What can be concluded from this line of thought is simple enough: individuals who support political parties that politically endorse EU integration, those who approve the performance of the incumbent government and those who are satisfied with the way their democracy is functioning are likely to be more positive about the EU than other citizens (Slomczynski and Shabad 2003, pp. 504-505). However, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), put forward his findings which show an opposite understanding: specific problems in the functioning of national political systems lead to more support for a Europe-wide system of government, presumably because individuals see the EU as a remedy for such problems. Kritzinger (2003), also agrees with Sanchez-Cuenca, and argues that the evaluation of the EU is a function of the evaluation of the performance of the nation state. She argues that, "the EU is used as a proxy for symbolic protest against the present national political and economic situation" (Kritzinger 2003, p.237).

However, these explanations all appear to have certain challenges to their applicability to candidate countries in general and to Turkey in specific. First challenge rises from the lack of division in the level of party politics. All political parties in Turkey, with the exception of very marginalized ones at extreme left and right, are in favor of Turkey's membership to the EU (Birand 2005). Second, it is very difficult to establish a link between the EU and the political satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the citizens. As Turkey is not yet a member and the negotiations have only recently started, the public is not in a position to use national proxies to form opinions regarding the EU. At this stage only the arguments of Sanchez-Cuenca and Kritzinger on the image of the EU as a remedy for solving the national problems appear to have a limited applicability. Following the economic crisis of 1999 and 2001 in Turkey, the EU membership process has been started to be viewed as an important anchor for economic stability. Furthermore, the dissatisfaction of certain ethnic and political groups (i.e. Kurds) with the current political system also creates a high level of support for EU membership within these groups, with the expectation that the EU membership process will produce a more adequate political environment for them. However, as the main previous studies focus on member states, and use integration instead of membership as the main notion, a direct application of their model is not very plausible for the Turkish case. At this point, the issue comes back to a

major distinction: the difference between a member state and a candidate state.

Candidacy versus membership

In so far, the models examined have been focusing on the determinants of support for European integration. It is clear that the attitudes of citizens of member states toward further integration can potentially pose radical differences with those of citizens from a candidate country. Above all, when analyzing the attitudes of citizens from a candidate country, many of the variables utilized by the *value oriented* and *utilitarian* models of support are absent. Among these, the most important one is the *evaluation* perspective. Contrary to all the studies mentioned, questions dealing with an evaluation of the benefits of membership, both at an individual and national level, are not included in any studies focusing on a candidate country. Any perceptions of a citizen from a candidate country on “benefit from membership” are perceived benefits rather than experienced, and the notion of *expectation* is crucial for candidate countries.

Bosch and Newton (1995, p. 102) argue that support for integration has a more diffuse and idealistic nature than that for membership. Membership is associated more with *benefits*. However, these benefits are more of a sociotropic rather than pocket book notion, as the analysis of Bosch and Newton (1995) demonstrates; variables such as household income and employment/unemployment are weakly related to EC support, whereas variables such as anticipated national benefits of an economic, political and diplomatic kind are more strongly associated. Thus, it may be argued that the benefit in question is more of an improvement of living conditions in general, rather than a direct calculation of individual benefits.

For Turkey, EU membership also has a political dimension linked with the strengthening of democracy and political institutions. One can uncover certain similarities in this aspect with the second enlargement of the EEC (Portugal, Spain and Greece). As Wallace (1990) argues, although economic benefits were certainly part of their cost-benefit calculations, these newly democratizing countries applied for membership in order to stabilize and consolidate their new political institutions. Accession was considered as a way to decrease their chances of reverting back to authoritarian regimes. Even though the case for Turkey is more of a consolidation of democracy rather than democratization, the argument remains valid considering the anchoring of the democratic reforms.⁴

⁴ Turkey today can be considered as a more democratic country than Greece, Spain and Portugal at the time of their candidacy when compared with different notions such as years of uninterrupted democracy, continuous free elections, etc.. In the time of their candidacy, both

In his analysis of the second enlargement, Tsoukalis (1981) presents the link with EU membership and political dimension. On ratification of Portugal's democratic constitution in 1976, the Soares government stated that the continued political stability of Portugal was closely linked to its political and economic integration with the EC. Public discussions further emphasized this point by suggesting that the EC was a "means to consolidate this new regime" (Tsoukalis 1981, p.117).

The Spanish accession involved a similar consensus around the utility of integration for democratic consolidation. During the transition period following Franco's death in 1975, all political parties remained in agreement over membership in the EC. While the political debates were infused with different expectations of membership, parties agreed (except on the extreme left and extreme right) that membership in the EC would help to consolidate the new democratic regime. As Tsoukalis (1981, p. 122) puts forward, "Europe became almost a symbol of democracy for most Spaniards".

In the case of CEE countries, what the EU has represented was not much different for Spain or Portugal. The EU membership represented the reinforcement and permanence of the new political and economic systems and represented an assurance that there would be no returning to the undemocratic past. European integration as such becomes the bridge to democratic dreams as symbolized in the West. Yet, for the practical knowledge of what exactly this democracy entails, CEE citizens rely on personal experience from the democratic reforms in their country. As Mishler and Rose (1997, p. 6) argue, the citizens of these new democracies "have little experience in the workings of democratic institutions and even less formal training in abstract democratic norms and principles" and thus public support is "experiential".

In Bosch and Newton's (1995) findings, Spain and Portugal have demonstrated that the economic expectations appear to play an important role in stimulating EC support, but not necessarily more important than political and social factors. In an analysis of the 1985 Eurobarometer survey, Bosch and Newton (1995, pp. 99-100) showed that in Spain and Portugal those who expected economic benefits also supported membership ($\gamma = 0.70$ and 0.87 respectively). But there is also close association between expectations for economic, political, and diplomatic benefits and support for EC membership ($\gamma = 0.70, 0.54,$ and 0.61 for Spain; and $0.87, 0.78,$ and 0.83 for Portugal). In short, those who expected their country to benefit

Spain and Portugal as well as Greece were working on re-establishing democracy after extended periods of authoritarian regimes (For Greece the duration of the authoritarian regime was much shorter compared with Portugal and Spain).

economically from EC membership also expected it to benefit politically and diplomatically.

This last argument brings us back to our main research question, the determinants of Turkish public support for European Union membership.

At this stage it is important to take a look at the studies and research that have taken place in Turkey, which specifically focus on Turkish public opinion. In order to better demonstrate the difference between Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in terms of data collection, some information on the studies and research conducted in CEE countries will be presented in the following section.

2.4. Studies on Turkish Public Opinion and European Union Membership:

Despite heated public discussion on the issues of Turkish membership to the EU, as mentioned before, the studies dealing with Turkish public opinion are quite limited. The majority of the research is directed toward the ‘real processes’; focusing on meeting of the criteria, economic and political capabilities, democratization and reform-making processes.

The main reason for the feeble literature on Turkish public opinion is the lack of quantitative research and almost non-existent collection of data. This shortcoming of data collection has led the creation of superficial and inadequate comments lacking statistical support that try to extrapolate what the opinion is.

In order to further demonstrate the lack of data on Turkish public opinion regarding European Union membership, a survey has been conducted as a part of this study. The survey has been carried out at three levels: First, with studies conducted in academic circles; second, data collection through private research companies in Turkey; and finally the work of the European Commission itself. Major data archives such as PEW or ICPSR (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research) have also been scanned for any available data on Turkish public opinion concerning the European Union. The findings are as follows:

a- Academic initiatives

Under this title, the data collected by initiatives led by academics were examined. The results are presented in Table 2.1. The main criterion for this section was the presence of one or a team of academics leading the study for academic purposes.

At first glance, the difference between the studies presented here and the ones in the following section may appear ambiguous due to the role played by NGOs and/or foundations. However, it was believed necessary to

make a distinction between studies that have been led by academics in cooperation with certain NGOs or foundations, and the ones that have been realized by academics on behalf of NGOs/foundations. The major difference stems from the fact that the studies presented here have been the source of numerous academic publications and the data and results have been mostly made available for academic purposes. On the other hand, even though the results of most of the studies in the second part have been presented to the public, a diffuse academic analysis or publications based on these data were not identified.

Table 2.1. Academic data collection

Year	Initiator	Sample	N	Cooperation ⁵
1993	Y. Esmer	Istanbul	434	X
1994	Y. Esmer	Konya	364	X
1994	Y. Esmer	Istanbul	570	X
1996	N. Erder	Nationwide	2.396	TUSES
1998	N. Erder	Nationwide	1.800	TUSES
2001	M Müftüler Baç L M McLaren	Turkish Grand National Assembly	61 MPs	X
2002	N. Erder	Nationwide	1.850	TUSES
2002	A Çarıkođlu, R Erzan, H Yılmaz K Kiriřci	Nationwide	3.060	TESEV
2002	A Çarıkođlu U Ergüder E Kalaycıođlu	Nationwide	1.984	Sabancı University
2003	A Çarıkođlu Ü. Ergüder E Kalaycıođlu	Nation wide	2.039	Sabancı University
2003-2004	N. Erder	Nationwide	1.806	TUSES
2003	H. Yılmaz	Nationwide	2.500	Open Society Inst. / Bođaziçi University

The pioneer studies that appeared first in the literature are the ones carried out by Yılmaz Esmer in 1993 and 1994. In his studies, despite the shortcomings in sampling, Esmer established the first practices of collecting data focusing on the European Union.⁶

⁵ TUSES: Turkish Social Economic and Political Studies Foundation; TESEV: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation; DISK: Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey, IKV: Economic Development Foundation.

⁶ Esmer's samples in his studies are not representative of the nation due to extremely limited geographic sampling focusing on one or two cities only (Esmer 1997).

Necat Erder on the other hand, used the practice of over time data collection. In cooperation with TUSES, data on EU was collected in 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2003/04, and he has produced several publications.

However, the survey by Çarkoğlu, Erzan, Kirişçi and Yılmaz in 2002 brought the issue of public opinion on the process of EU membership into the spotlight. Not only did the members of the research team produce numerous publications derived from the collected data, but the study has also been abundantly cited and its findings have dominating affect in the field of public opinion studies in Turkey.

The academics who took part in this extensive research have continued in their data gathering efforts. Both Çarkoğlu, together with Ergüder and Kalaycıoğlu, and Yılmaz were engaged in research activities in 2003 and 2004, even though the number of publications from these data sets has been less than the previous study, at least for the moment.

Among these studies, the survey by McLaren and Müftüler-Baç stands out because of its focus group which is composed of the Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). They initiated a first by systematically collecting data on the legislators' perspectives on the membership issue. The perspectives of the current members of the TGNA, who may be considered as the most progressive on reforms adopted, are yet to be disclosed.

Overall, the academics have had greater opportunities to amass data over the past few years. However, until very recently, the data collected in Turkey has suffered from a major problem of sampling. All data in Turkey is collected via face to face interviews. However, as the household numbers at street levels were not available until very recently, the collected data, including the two data sets that are used in this thesis, have had deficiencies. The random probability of the sample is disturbed after the neighborhoods level, as the designers of the surveys do not have the information on the number of residences on each street and how many people are residing in each of them. This also creates problems with the control of the data after the interviews are completed. So, when dealing with public opinion data from Turkey dated prior to 2005, one should be aware of these deficiencies.

When looked at the academic literature developed from the above mentioned data collections, we see Yılmaz Esmer's contributions (1997), which were based on provincial surveys conducted in 1993 for Istanbul and 1994 for Konya and Istanbul. Even though neither of the sample sizes (N of 434; 364; 570, respectively) nor the geographical balances are satisfactorily representative, his study produced important initial analysis and academic interest. Following the pioneer research of Esmer; Necat Erder and

associates initiated in 1994 a series of data collection efforts. They carried out a series of nationwide surveys in 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2003 with a more representative sample size (N of 2,396; 1,800; 1,850 and 1,806 respectively).

The findings of both studies have led to the creation of a minimal portrait of the support for Turkish membership to the EU. They have both suggested that more educated, less religious, more leftist constituencies are supportive of EU membership. In a simple manner, the findings had the hint of utilitarian mode of explanation of support, as they pointed out that the potential winners of transition were more supportive. However, as Çarkoğlu (2003, p. 173) points out, “since all of these explanatory factors are correlated, it is unclear which one (or ones) constitutes the dominant and significant factor influencing the preference for EU membership.” Such a shortcoming brings up the necessity for well-designed and carefully conducted multivariate analysis; a major aim of this research is to meet this need.

The only exception to the lack of multivariate analysis is Ali Çarkoğlu’s study, “Who wants full membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for EU membership” (2003). In this study, Çarkoğlu has managed to produce multivariate statistical analysis on the recent trends and dynamics of public opinion toward EU membership. Çarkoğlu developed his analysis while taking part in the administering of public opinion surveys that took place all around Turkey in 2002 and in 2003. Thus, rather than conducting a secondary analysis, he managed to construct appropriate questionnaires and analyze the outcomes to reach conclusions.

The study of Ali Çarkoğlu produced reflections on the relationship between the demographic, socio-economic and political characteristics of individuals and their level of support for EU membership. The most important contribution is his analysis on the party politics, the constituency, and how it affects support for the EU. In addition, he provided a first by analyzing the geographic distribution of opinion on the EU. Çarkoğlu (2003) also analyzed the notion of “sensitive issues”, which covers topics such as the abolishment of death penalty and use of languages other than Turkish, which are considered to create potential conflictual opposition within certain segments of the society.

Despite all the strengths mentioned of the study by Çarkoğlu, it still falls short of investigating the nature of Turkish public opinion in a conceptual manner with regards to the dominating theories on public

opinion. He lays his main attention on the relation between party politics and support, and overall individual characteristics. However, it is possible to find the evidence of utilitarian hypothesis in Çarkoğlu's (2004) recent work, "Societal Perceptions of Turkey's EU Membership: Causes and Consequences of Support for EU Membership?" In this study, Çarkoğlu has demonstrated that the level religiosity, pro-EU attitudes and Anti-Democratic values are significant attitudinal bases for preferences about membership, while party choice differences are insignificant in explaining support for EU membership in a referendum. As a result of multivariate analysis, Çarkoğlu (2004) has shown that the individuals who believe that their lives will change in positive manner with membership are more likely to vote in favor of membership than others. His analysis also yield to the result that age is inversely related with support, indicating that the older a citizen gets, the odds of him or her to vote yes in a referendum increases. As another indication, he also found out that the Kurdish speakers are more likely to support EU membership than those who do not. This is another implication of potential winners versus losers of membership, which will be discussed in detail in chapter three. But in short, Çarkoğlu's (2003; 2004) works are the first analysis that can be reviewed in a conceptual manner, and it may be argued that his findings mainly fall in line with utilitarian model's propositions, even though he does not establish such a direct link in his writings.

b- Private companies

29 private research companies have been surveyed for this study. This was conducted through e-mail communication, literature and press reviews, and internet research. However, it is a high probability that more companies collected further data than the ones presented in the table. Some of the companies, justifiably, have denied provision of information due to client privacy. As well, some were reluctant to cooperate, while others requested payment for providing further information on their data. The results are presented in Table 2.2.⁷

⁷ The research made for the European Commission as a part of Candidate Countries Eurobarometer have been omitted from the table.

Table 2.2. Data by private companies

Year	Company	NGO/think tank	Sample	N
1999	Bilesim TR &International Research Association (INRA)	IKV	Nationwide**	1.000
2002	Input	Center for Advanced Strategy	Urban Sampling – 14 cities	2.007
1989	Makro	Istanbul Chamber of Commerce(ITO)	ITO members	2.400
2003	Makro	DISK	DISK member workers	?
2000-2001-2002-2003	TNS PIAR	X	Countrywide**** (18 provinces)	2.000 cc. in each wave
2003-2004	TNS GLOBAL-TREND POLL	X	Countrywide***, repeated each month	2.000 cc.
1994-2002	Strateji-Mori “Turkey’s Pulse”	X	Countrywide Repeated regularly	1.250 cc. each

* This study has also been carried out in 10 other European countries.

** This study is a part of a multi-country survey conducted by a group of companies and coordinated by TNS FACTUM in 11 candidate countries (excluding Malta and Cyprus)

*** This is a monthly trend poll omnibus survey, which includes a question on support on EU membership

As seen in the table, there seems to be an increase in the number of surveys carried out in the last few years. This trend is parallel to the initiatives in the academic circles. However, content-wise the data collected by the private companies in Turkey were not used efficiently for in depth analysis or keeping a sound record of the Turkish public opinion and its changes over time. All these data were collected for private purposes rather than academic research, and it is almost impossible to find examples of any scientific work based on these studies. The results of these data were only superficially presented in the media, and these analysis did not go further than a few cross tabulations and superficial polling.

c- The European Commission and the Eurobarometer

Even though the European Commission has been collecting data on public opinion all around Europe for some time, Turkey only became included in 2001. In October 2001, the European Commission began conducting opinion polls in Turkey through contracted local research companies, which carried out the work within the framework of the “Candidate Countries Eurobarometer”, which replaced the previous “Central and Eastern Eurobarometer”.

Since 2001, the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer has been collecting data twice a year in 13 countries, Turkey included. Following the accession of 10 countries starting with May 2004, the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer includes only Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.

There appears three main problems with the Eurobarometer data on Turkey which hinders the production of in depth analysis by the researchers working on Turkish public opinion. First, it is related to the availability of the data. Despite the very late inclusion of Turkey into the Eurobarometer surveys, for some reason, the first part of the collected data on Turkey were made public only in late 2004, which is about 4 years after its collection. As Turkey's relations with the EU has gone through very significant progress within 2001-2005 (with the adoption of the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis in 2001 till the launch of the negotiations at the end of 2005), the data covering this period offers very interesting insights which is still yet to be analyzed. Second problem regarding the Eurobarometer data is the sampling problems which is due to the difficulties of data collection in Turkey. This is a shortcoming for all kinds of data collected in Turkey. And finally, the problem with Eurobarometer data is the nature of questions. The questions are not designed meticulously enough to profoundly investigate Turkish public. On concrete example is the question on religiosity. The Eurobarometer aims to measure the concept by asking on "attendance to religious services", which may be considered sufficient enough for Christianity, but for Islam, in which the believers are not required to go mosque, there is a need for more in depth questions that ponder on the political dimension of Islam.

Brief comparison with Central and Eastern Europe: Two examples

A comprehensive analysis of all the data collected in other candidate countries, especially the ones on Central and Eastern Europe is well beyond the limits of this thesis. However, it is possible to present some examples and draw some points in order to shed some light on the contrast with the Turkish case.

For European Union data collection in Central European Countries, the European Commission has been very scrutinizing through the use of the Eurobarometers, coordinated efforts, and the long practice of data collection in these countries.

To implement and coordinate efforts, the Central European Opinion Research Group (CEORG) was developed. It is a research foundation consisting of three major public opinion research institutes in the Czech Republic (Centrum pro vřzkum veyejerho mřenění - Public Opinion Research Center of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences,

CVVM), Hungary (Társadalomkutatási Intézet - Social Research Centre, TÁRKI) and Poland (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej – Public Opinion Research Center, CBOS).

All these centers have been engaged in public opinion studies and data collection in their respective countries for some time, (CVVM since 1950s), and all of them are mainly publicly funded organizations. Their research provides the main stream of data for further and advanced analysis on public opinion studies in these countries. The presence of such a body in Turkey, unfortunately, is non-existent.

The CEORG takes the practice to an international – comparative level. It acts as an umbrella organization for “comparative surveys conducted by its member organizations and to unify public opinion research methodology and reporting standards in the three countries so that it can provide credible and comparative data concerning public opinion on important local as well as European social and political issues.”⁸

The European Commission itself also portrays a specific interest in data collection in Central and Eastern European Countries starting immediately following the fall of the iron curtain. The European Commission started collecting data in the autumn of 1990, and annually there on after, within the frame of “Central and Eastern Eurobarometer”. While the newly joined EU member states (with the exceptions of Cyprus and Malta) have always been a part of CEEB, in some years its scope has extended to as many as 19 countries, including countries such as Armenia, Georgia or even Kazakhstan. The data sets from these studies are made available in archives for further analysis.⁹ Major part of the publications on public opinion studies regarding Central and Eastern European countries is, in fact, based on this data.

Considering the scope and level of public opinion studies in CEE countries, it comes as no surprise to note that governments of these countries lay a great deal of importance on the public opinion toward EU matters. The Hungarian government, for instance, launched its national communication strategy as early as 1995 (Balazs 2002). The aim of the strategy was to inform and prepare citizens for the opportunities and challenges of the process of EU membership. Needless to say, efficient collection of data and analysis of public opinion formed the backbone of the developed strategy and its implementation.

⁸ Retrieved from Central European Opinion Research Group Foundation web page on 28/05/2004: www.ceorg-europe.org.

⁹For more information see http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm

ANALYSIS OF SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP IN TURKEY

In this chapter, the relation between certain explanatory variables put forward by different models and the support for membership will be analyzed. These analyses will form the background for the next chapter in which prediction of support for European Union membership will be tested by using logistical regression models.

My exploration of the support for EU membership in Turkey will be composed of the following stages. First, I will start with examining what is the image of the European Union in Turkey. Following that, I will analyze how the support has changed over time and if there is any trend.

As the next step, I will start from the proposition that support at the individual level is a function of political and economic conditions. Thus, I will utilize the different explanations of support that have been provided by different studies, mainly by the value, utilitarian and national identity models. At this stage, I will provide bivariate analysis using the vote in a referendum for membership as the dependent variable.

In this chapter and chapter four, the data collected by a group of academics from Boğaziçi University in cooperation with TESEV (hereafter Çarkoğlu et.al.), Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.2¹ (hereafter CCEB 2002.2), and World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys from 1990, 1996 and 2000² will be utilized in addition to the secondary analysis of data collected by different studies.

¹ Obtained from ICPSR, www.icpsr.umich.edu ; European Commission. Directorate-General Press and Communication, *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.2* study no: 4062

² Obtained from ICPSR, www.icpsr.umich.edu, European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association (2004), *European And World Values Surveys Integrated Data*

3.1 Introduction of The Data Used

In this study I will be using two nation wide representative surveys. The first one, which will be referred as Çarkoğlu et al., is conducted by a group of academics from Boğaziçi University in cooperation with TESEV, titled *Turkish Public Opinion and EU membership*. Its fieldwork was carried out by Frekans Research Company between May 18 and June 4 2002. 202 interviewers, 26 supervisors and 9 project experts took part in the project. The survey consisted of 3060 face to face interviews conducted in urban and rural settlements around Turkey with interviewees of 18 years of age or older. The expected margin of error is +/- 1.8 at 95% confidence interval. The interviews were held in 17 provinces and their 25 districts. The neighborhoods, streets and the building numbers in which those interviews were held were selected randomly. The interviews in rural areas were held in 176 randomly selected villages. Based on the number of electors in 1999, the interviews were held in the following provinces: Adana, Ankara, Balıkesir, Burdur, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Gaziantep, İstanbul, İzmir, Kars, Malatya, Samsun, Sinop, Şanlıurfa.

The second data comes from CCEB 2002.2: *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.2*. It has been conducted on between September 2, 2002 - October 15, 2002 for all candidate countries and 2 September – 26 September for Turkey in specific. For Turkey, 1000 face to face interviews have been carried out. Its sample is consisted of citizens aged 15 and over residing in the 13 countries applying for European Union membership: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. There are two exceptions. In Estonia, the survey covered permanent residents aged 15 and over. In Cyprus, the survey only covered citizens living on the southern part of the island. For the purpose of the study, the Turkish cases have been selected. The basic sample design applied in all Candidate Countries is a multi-stage, random (probability)³ one. In each country, a number of sampling points were drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density. For doing so, the points were drawn systematically from each of the "administrative regional units", after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the Candidate Countries Region

File, 1999-2002, Release I [Computer file]. 2nd ICPSR version study no. 3975 and Inglehart, Ronald, et al. (2000), *World Values Surveys And European Values Surveys, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, And 1995-1997* [Computer file]. ICPSR version study no 2790..

³ The random probability for Turkey is problematic due to lack of information for residences. Even though the reports of the Eurobarometer claims to have random probability, the drawback of sampling problems in Turkey should be kept in mind.

according to the EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent; if there are no such regions, NUTS 3 or equivalent regions for sampling are used) and according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses were selected as every Nth address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random. All interviews were face-to-face in people's home. The expected margin of error is +/- 1.9 at 90 % confidence interval.

Overall, the two data sets that are used in this thesis have significant inherent differences. First of all, as they are conducted by totally different institutions, the question wordings are quite different from each other. Furthermore, there are significant differences regarding *target populations*, *expected margin of errors* and *fieldwork timing*. These differences are presented below:

Table 3.1. Comparison of Çarkoğlu et. al. and CCEB 2002.2

	Target population	N	Fieldwork period	Expected margin of error
Çarkoğlu et. al.	18 years and above	3060	May 18-June 4 2002	± 1.8 at 95 %
CCEB 2002.2	15 years and above	1000	2-26 September 2002	± 1.9 at 90 %

As seen in Table 3.1, these two data are not exactly comparable with one another, mainly due to the difference in their target populations. While Çarkoğlu et.al. has interviewed citizens of 18 years of age and above, the CCEB 2002.2 has surveyed a younger group as well, selecting their target group as 15 years of age and older. However, as indicated before, these two data sets offer a unique opportunity to tap the Turkish public opinion at a very critical time juncture, as Çarkoğlu et.al. is conducted just before the passage of the comprehensive adjustment package in August 2002, while the CCEB 2002.2 has been realized right after the passage. Considering the amount of public debate on European Union membership built around the adjustment package, these two data creates the opportunity to be able to investigate the determinants of support for EU membership at the time of this debate and in a way to compare the outcomes at two different times. However, the reader should be aware of the differences mentioned above between the two data sets.

3.2 Image of The European Union In Turkey and Evolution of Support for Turkey's Membership to The European Union

In this part, I will analyze the general feelings toward the EU and evolution of Turkish public support for European Union membership over

time. To do so, I will use a secondary analysis of existing data collected by different sources over different time periods.⁴

The Image of the European Union in Turkey

In his already classical book “The nature and origins of mass opinion”, Zaller (1992) posits that opinion is a composition of information and predispositions. Thus, it is considered useful at this stage to take a look at the image of the European Union in the minds of Turkish people, before proceeding to the determinants of support. To do so, I will start with the outcomes of the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer which includes a direct question on the image of the EU in the eyes of the citizens of candidate countries.

For Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, when asked in its surveys from 2001 to 2004 the following question: “*And, in general, do you have a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image of the European Union?*”, the public’s response was mainly positive.

Table 3.2. Image of EU for Turkish respondents (CCEB data)

	October 2001	September-October 2002	May 2003	October November 2003	February March 2004
very negative	9	6	8	7	4
fairly negative	17	17	19	12	8
neutral	16	19	16	23	25
fairly positive	38	40	39	38	42
very positive	13	13	11	16	14
DK/NA	7	5	7	4	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)

All figures are rounded percentages by column.

The level of responses which see EU as positively (fairly positive + very positive) portrays a stabile pattern over the three years span, ranging from 50 per cent to the highest of 56 per cent. What is also noteworthy is that the negative image of the EU tends to decrease from 26 per cent in 2001 to only 12 per cent in 2004. However, this 14 point difference is not reflected as an increase in the positive side, but with a 9 point increase in the neutral camp. This change indicates that people with a negative image of EU

⁴ March/April 1996, May 1998 and April 2002 data are taken from Erder (2002, pp. 35-39); November 2001, May-June 2002, October 2002 and Jan-Feb 2003 data are taken from Çarkoğlu (2003, p. 5); November 1999 data is taken from Bilesim int and IKV (2000, p. 14)

have been going through a change, but have still not been convinced enough for changing from negative to positive. The Don't know /no answer category does not present a significant change over time, which can be interpreted that the changes in other categories are conscious side shifting, rather than getting confused.

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer also includes an important question that aims to reveal the predispositions of the public about the European Union. When the respondents have been directed the question:

Q: When you think of the European Union, what comes first to your mind? (open ended-record verbatim response)

Turkish respondents mainly revealed that the first thing that comes to mind is the economic aspect of the Union. In CCEB 2002.2 the most referred three subjects were listed as follows⁵:

	Percentage
Economy, positive:	16
Issues, positive:	7
Emotional or Image Positivism:	5

Table 3.3. Categories applied in the analysis of open-ended questions ⁶

Positive categories	Negative categories	Neutral categories
Integration helps Economically positive Unspecified positive statements based on emotions or general image perception ("General positive") "Bright future" Enhanced (military) security Traveling, visa, movement of labor Issues, policies – positive Other, positive	Economically negative, protectionism, unspecified negative emotions, hostile statements Hate speech, unspecified negative statement Loss of political independence "Colonization" Issues, policies - negative Identity issues, nationalistic or xenophobic attitudes Skeptical about accession Skeptical about benefits Other, negative	Factual or neutral statements Country-specific issues Other, undecided (statements that can hold both positive or negative meanings)

Despite the positive standing of the European Union in the public domain in Turkey, there is also another important dimension which stands out in any approach to the analysis of the Turkish perspective of the EU: the religion. When the respondents were directed the question: *Is EU a Christian club or there is a place for Muslim countries like Turkey?*⁷, half of them (50 %) indicated that they consider EU as a "Christian club", while only 41 per


⁵ Candidate Countries Eurobarometer full Report number 2002.2, retrieved from <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion>.

⁶ European Commission 2000, p. 49

⁷ Çarkoğlu *et.al*, Q16.

cent conveyed that they believe in EU “There is place for Muslim countries like Turkey”:

Figure 3.1. Is EU a Christian Club? (Çarkoğlu et.al.)



All figures are rounded percentages

Considering how often Turkey’s pre-dominantly Muslim population in contrast to the pre-dominantly Christian member states is mentioned recently in almost every debate related to Turkey’s membership, the question of religiosity as a determinant of support for EU becomes significant. At this point it should be noted that half of Turkey’s population have expressed their view of the EU as a Christian club, in which there is no place for a Muslim country like Turkey. Thus, it is important to see if this image has an impact on their decision to support membership or not. Therefore, the issue of religiosity and its impact for EU membership will be discussed more in detail in the coming sections.

To summarize, Turkish public has a positive perspective toward the European Union, and this positive perception remains to be stable overtime and present a gradual decrease on the negative side with the improving relations. However, CCEB does not cover the 1997-1999 period, during which the relations between Turkey and the EU went through very rough stages. At 1997 European Summit, Turkey was excluded from the list of candidate countries, leading to the suspension of relations with the European Commission by Turkey. Thus, it is not possible to asses the public response to such difficult situation by using CCEB. However, the Christian club notion also points to a certain feeling of differentiation or a sense of otherness, on the basis of religion. But in the first look, this sense of differentiation does not seem to overcast the positive standing of the European Union in the eyes of Turkish people.

Support for Turkey's European Union membership and its evolution over time

Turkey's membership to the European Union has been a debated issue for a long time. However, as indicated in chapter two, the practice of data collection on public opinion on the issue is rather new. However, the existing data still provide sufficient information on what is the level of support for EU membership and how it has evolved through time. Table 3.4 is a joint table of the findings of surveys conducted at different times between 1996 and 2003 by Turkish researchers. Although I have placed all findings in one summary table, I am aware of the fact that it is not possible to build comparative series without identically worded questions. However, the table is constructed with predominantly two questions: "would like Turkey to be a member of EU" which is used by Erder (1996, 1998 and 2002), and whether the respondent "would vote in favor of EU membership if a referendum were to take place in Turkey", which is used by Çarkoğlu et. al. (2004). Even though the findings of these surveys are not necessarily comparative, they are sufficient to be used to see the overall evaluation of the support for EU membership in Turkey.

Table 3.4. Support for EU membership – Summary Table (Data from Turkish researchers)

	March-April 1996	May 1998	November 1999	November 2001	April 2002	May-June 2002	October 2002	Jan-Feb 2003
Question wording⁸	Would like Turkey to be a member of EU	Would like Turkey to be a member of EU	Would you tell us if you would like to see Turkey among the EU member states	Would vote in favor of EU membership if a referendum were to take place in Turkey	Would like Turkey to be a member of EU	Would vote in favor of EU membership if a referendum were to take place in Turkey	Would vote in favor of EU membership if a referendum were to take place in Turkey	Would vote in favor of EU membership if a referendum were to take place in Turkey
Would support Turkey's membership	55	62	86	74	58	64	65	74
Would not support Turkey's membership	16	17	7	17	27	30	24	19
NA	29	21	7	9	15	6	11	7
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(2.396)	(1.800)	(1.000)	(3,086)	(1.807)	(3.060)	(2.028)	(2.083)

⁸ Translations by author from Turkish. Original forms are : "Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olmasını ister misiniz?" (Erder 1996, 1998 and 2002); "Bugün Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne tam üyeliği hakkında bir halk oylaması yapılacak olsa siz Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliği için mi, yoksa bunun karşısında mı oy kullanırdınız?" (Çarkoğlu 2001, 2002, 2003); "Türkiye'yi Avrupa Birliği'ne üye ülkeler arasında görmek isteyip istemediğinizi söyler misiniz?" (Bileşim and İKV, 1999)

All figures are rounded percentages by column.

As it is seen by the results of the cumulative table, the support for Turkey's membership to EU have always remained over 50 per cent over time, but has shown susceptibility to the turbulent relation between the EU and Turkey. Ali Çarkoğlu (2004) provides an historical review of the trends in Turkish public support by utilising the results of the same surveys. It is an important contribution as it is the first attempt to present and analyze an overall picture. However, Çarkoğlu's analysis falls short of making an conceptual analysis regarding the models used in explaining support.

When the overall developments in public support for Turkey's entry into EU is analyzed, several aspects emerge. First of these aspects is the observation that the support remains over 50 per cent regardless of time and question wording. Second, the support level is fluctuating over time. There is a 16 per cent difference among the support between April 2002 and January – February 2003, with the same question wording. If the impact of different question wording is ignored, the support has shown a decrease of 28 points between November 1999 and April 2002, and 16 per cent increase between April 2002 and January-February 2003. So the support is not stable and predictable. And finally, there is a constant decrease of the percentage of no opinion category. Çarkoğlu (2004) explains this with the level of alertness of the mass public to the issue of EU membership. The public appears to be more attentive to the issue especially after 1998, and have been taking more clear positions.

The highest level of support was reached at November 1999 with 86 per cent, just one month before the Helsinki summit in which Turkey was granted the official membership status⁹. One possible explanation for such a high support may be the influence of the media. The Turkish press has dealt with the issue extensively in the months before the Helsinki summit and majority of them followed a very pro-EU policy, emphasizing the opportunities of the EU membership and potential gains for Turkey (Koç 2004, pp. 84-104). The support seems to take a sharp plunge in April 2002 with 58 per cent, before starting again to rise gradually. This drop also constitutes the lowest level of support in the time under analysis. Erder (2002, p. 36), explains this phenomena by linking it to the heated debate in Turkey in the first 6 months of 2002 about EU membership. He (Erder 2002, p. 35) argues that, the survey took place in a setting in which EU was discussed in the public in such an intensive and comprehensive way which was unprecedented for a foreign policy matter since the Korean War, and the

⁹ All chronological events for the EU-Turkish relations are based mainly on Erdemli (2003) and Birand (2005).

public was naturally affected and polarized in the issue. Please note that the period from April to October 2002 is also the highest in terms of opposition to European Union membership.

It is useful to state here that the public debate in the period of 2002 is also highly related to the administrative reform package that the government passed in the summer of 2002. This package included controversial elements which Çarkoğlu (2003) named as “sensitive issues”, such as abolition of death penalty or effectively eliminating the ban on the use of Kurdish in broadcasting and education. Even though on the surface there has always been a consensus on European Union membership among the political elite, when this membership transformed into concrete issues and radical changes in the legal system, the Turkish public faced for the first time open criticism and objection from certain political leaders and groups. However, as Çarkoğlu (2004) clearly demonstrated, the public opinion seems to be getting over the heated debate on these ‘sensitive issues’ and getting back on the high waves of support for membership. This pattern falls pretty much in line with the classical argumentation by Albert Dicey (1962, p. 41) made as early as 1905, in which he argues that “laws foster and create opinion”. Çarkoğlu (2004) investigated if the public remembered the reforms that the EU adjustment package of August 2002 included in the surveys they carried out in November 2002 and January-February 2003. In the results, the respondents who claimed to remember were 25 per cent and 17 per cent respectively (Çarkoğlu 2004). Following the passage of the legislative reform package in August 2002 and the national elections in November 2002, the support for EU membership started to increase steadily. As a matter of fact, Turkish public proved to have the most positive image of the European Union when top of the mind reactions about the EU was asked in a field study done in September-October 2002 by the European Commission under the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2002.2 report, p. 50). When asked “Taking everything into consideration, what will the European Union have brought in ten years’ time for the European citizens?”, 70 per cent of Turks responded with positive evaluations, compared to only 1 out of 10 Turks who had negative views, while 7 per cent indicated neutral responses. It is also an interesting point that in 2002 the Turkish public had the highest level of positive evaluations, which was 12 points higher than the average of the overall candidate countries.

At this stage, it is useful to continue with the findings of the Eurobarometer. As indicated before, the European Commission has been conducting public opinion surveys in Turkey as a part of Candidate

Countries Barometer starting from October 2001. The results of findings on 2001-2004 are presented in Table 3.5¹⁰

Table 3.5. Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union would be...? (CCEB DATA)

	October 2001	September October 2002	May 2003	October November 2003	February March 2004
A good thing	59	65	67	67	71
A bad thing	18	13	11	10	9
Neither good nor bad	14	18	14	18	13
DK/NA	9	4	8	5	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)
Candidate countries average of support	59	61	64	62	70*

All numbers are rounded percentages by column; * average of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey

As the figures in Table 3.5 demonstrate, Turkish public opinion has been very supportive of the EU and evaluated Turkey's membership as a "good thing". It is also noteworthy that Turkey has always remained above the average of 13 candidate countries¹¹. Please note that in 2004, the average of candidate countries showed a sharp increase due to the fact that it was calculated by taking only Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, all which showed high levels of support compared with Central Eastern European countries.

Table 3.5 also reveals that support in Turkey follows a steady pattern of increase, in parallel to the improvement of political-social relations between Turkey and European Commission as a result of rapid and drastic democratic reform packages being passed one after another. The improvement of Turkey's efforts for meeting the necessary Copenhagen criteria is also linked with the political stability being established following the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development party, hereafter AKP) victory in November 2002 elections and capacity of forming a single party government after a decade of coalition governments. AKP proved to be

¹⁰ Applicant Countries Eurobarometer 2001.1, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.2, Candidate countries Eurobarometer 2003.2, Candidate countries Eurobarometer 2003.4, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1

¹¹ Candidate countries, in which the Eurobarometers have been conducted are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Turkey. In 2004 CCEB, candidate countries are only Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania as other 10 countries have been labeled as new EU member states.

highly committed to the membership task, and it has confirmed this commitment with the radical changes in Turkish legislation. This commitment and reform process brought Turkey to a unprecedented point in December 2004, when the European summit, following the advice of the Commission, decided to start negotiations with Turkey in 2005 (Birand, 2005). As Table 3.5 suggests, in the beginning of 2004, almost three out of four Turkish citizens believed that membership to the EU would be a good thing.

Another dimension of measuring the support utilized by the Candidate Countries Barometer is asking the question “And, if there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of (country)’s membership of the European Union, would you personally vote for or against it?” This question proves to provide an important insight as well. When it comes to actual voting, one can speak of a possible “bandwagon” effect, as illustrated in Table 3.6:

Table 3.6. Vote in the referendum for EU membership (CCEB data)

	October 2001	September October 2002	May 2003
would vote for	68	71	72
would vote against	20	18	16
would not vote	4	2	2
DK/NA	8	9	10
N	(1.000)	(1.000)	(1.000)
CC average	65	69	72

All figures are rounded percentages

In parallel to the previous data presented, Table 3.6 shows that in case of a referendum to approve membership in Turkey, the Turkish public would vote very much in favor, and this pattern, which shows a steady increase over time, matches to the improving relations with the EU. Once again, Turkish public opinion remains as one of the highest among the candidate countries, and remains over the average level of support among all 13 candidates in the time period in question.

All the accumulated data presented, either collected by Turkish research centers or the European Commission, point in the same direction: Turkish public opinion is in favor of Turkey’s membership to the European Union.

Under the light of this information, I will proceed to the bivariate analysis to analyze the support among different public opinion sub groups, in

the search of the determinants of this support within the theoretical framework presented in the first chapter, namely within the *value model*; *utilitarian model* and *nationalism model*.

3.3. Explaining Support for European Union Membership in Turkey

3.3.1. Conceptualizing support toward the European Union in Turkey

As presented in chapter two, there exist several different approaches to conceptualize the support for European integration. In this study, I will be focusing on and applying the explanations provided by the value, utilitarian and national identity models. At relevant points, I will draw from sub explanations proposed in similar studies dealing with other candidate countries. In my bivariate analysis in this chapter, I will use certain variables adapted from the value, utilitarian and national identity models. These variables and the models they are derived from are presented in table 3.7:

Table 3.7. Conceptualization of the support for EU membership in Turkey

Model	Variable
Value	Level of knowledge on EU and its institutions
	Level of cognitive mobilization
	Commitment to democracy and Human rights
	Materialism vs. Post Materialism
Utilitarian	Potential winners and losers of membership
	Personal expectations from membership
National identity	Level of nationalism

In addition to the explanations of these models, I will also investigate the impact of religiosity as a determinant of support. Turkish membership brings upon a new phenomena unprecedented in previous enlargements, which is the religious difference. I will try to see whether religiosity is an significant determinant for Turkish public on the issue of membership or not.

Party preferences and its effect on public opinion on whether to support the membership or not is not included into the analysis. As indicated earlier, there exists a strong consensus on EU membership in Turkey, as membership to the EU is considered as the final step in the ongoing westernization project. Except for a few marginal parties on the Left and Right, there is virtually none Euro-skeptic party in Turkey, especially under the time frame subject to analysis in this study. Following his multivariate extensive analysis, Çarkoğlu (2004, pp.23-25) also accepts that once controlled for attitudinal, demographic and other variables, party choice is insignificant in explaining support for EU membership in EU referendum.

In the bivariate analysis in this chapter and in the multivariate analysis in chapter four, I will use the vote in a referendum for membership as the dependent variable, except for the analysis of materialism and post-materialism in Turkey. The reason for this is the absence of the referendum question in world value surveys, the main data for measuring materialism/post-materialism.

However, in order to evaluate the materialism/post-materialism dimension of the *value* model, the data from world values surveys will be used to demonstrate if Turkey can be considered as a materialist or post-materialist society. At this point, the analysis will be done at an aggregate level, based on Inglehart's argument that post-materialist societies are more supportive of European integration.

In the discussion of each variable, I will also present the rationale and relevance of each variable, followed by a discussion of the relevant literature and studies from similar cases. Following the presentation of the operationalization, I will present the relation between support for European Union membership and each variable.

3.3.2. Value model explanations of support for European Union

Level of Knowledge on the European Union and its reflections on the support

Investigating the Turkish public's level of knowledge (both perceived and measured) is important to evaluate the reasons of both support for membership and the high level of the positive image of EU. Are they due to the fact that Turks are well-informed and acquainted about the EU?

When the massive literature on public opinion studies have been examined, the mysterious relation between knowledge and forming opinions occupies a great deal of attention. Among the different approaches in the literature on public opinion, one position stands out: having a great deal of knowledge is not an absolute precondition for forming opinions. The public tends to resort to different sources when they feel they lack knowledge on an issue. As Walter Lippmann (1946, p.59) wrote in his classic treatise, *Public Opinion*:

Each of us lives and works on a small part of the earth's surface, moves in a small circle, and of these acquaintances knows only a few intimately. Of any public event that has wide effects we see at best only a phase and an aspect...Inevitably our opinions cover a bigger space, longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly observe. They have, therefore, to be pieced together out of what others have reported and what we can imagine.

This becomes especially true for the European Union, which proves to be a complex structure that is beyond a traditional, local, or national frame.

Indeed, Gibson and Caldiera (1995), have clearly demonstrated that EU citizens are not very knowledgeable about the European Court of Justice. The level of information about other EU institutions in the member states is not very high either (Anderson, 1998). In their study of the referendum of the Maastricht treaty in Denmark, Siune and Svensson (1993) have argued that the public opinion can act in a rational and knowledgeable way when circumstances change. However, they (1993, pp. 109-110) have also admitted that no systematic effect of level of information exists on the relation between people's attitudes to integration and their votes in 1992 referendum. Thus, the basis of attitudes toward the EU have been started to be searched on other notions than the knowledge of the organization.

The "symbolic politics" approach argues that the people's attitudes toward particular political issues often stem from their reactions to certain symbols. These reactions are based on either what the individuals learn since early childhood or on instinctual reactions to certain ideas or proposals, and therefore, the citizens of the EU member states could also be acting on certain other symbols when they lack information (McLaren 2002, p. 555).


The level of knowledge concerning the EU in Turkey and the relation between this knowledge and support is handled on two different levels. While Çarkoğlu et.al. aims to directly measure the perceived level of knowledge on the necessary conditions that Turkey has to meet as a candidate country, CCEB 2002.2 and other CCEB studies look directly to the level of knowledge about the EU and its institutions. CCEB 2002.2 and other CCEB studies also go one step further and attempt to measure this knowledge by asking simple factual questions.

In Çarkoğlu et.al., the following question was directed to the participants:

Q: What is your level of knowledge on the Copenhagen criteria that Turkey needs to fulfill to become a member of EU?

The responses were measured by using a 10 unit scale, where 1 means no knowledge at all and 10 indicates a high degree of knowledge. The results are presented in Figure 3.2:

Figure 3.2. Perceived level of knowledge on Copenhagen criteria (Çarkoğlu et.al.)



The outcome of the study gives quite a clear picture. While more than half of the respondents have indicated that they know nothing about the Copenhagen criteria (57.2 per cent), around 85 per cent of the respondents have given a score of 5 or less. The mean score is 2.7.

When the outcome of this is compared with the CCEB studies, the result is confirmative of Çarkoğlu et.al.. Despite using different wording in the question, the results appear to consistently show a low level of knowledge.

Q: “How much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies and its institutions?” (1 Know nothing at all – 10 knows a great deal),

Table 3.8: Average scores of level of knowledge (CCEB DATA)

	cceb 2001.1		cceb 2002.2		cceb 2003.2		cceb 2003.4	
	Turkey	CC average	Turkey	CC average	Turkey	CC average	Turkey	CC average
Average score	3.69	3.99	3.8	4.05	3.77	4.21	3.89	4.17

In the 4 different rounds of the study, Turkey remained the lowest among the 13 candidate countries. In a scale of 1 to 10, Turkish respondents rated their own level of knowledge, in average, 3.69; 3.8; 3.77 and 3.89 respectively. The score for 2002.2 (CCEB 2002.2), 3.8, is higher from the finding of Çarkoğlu et.al., 2.7, even though both studies took place at very

similar time periods. There are two possible reasons for the 1 point difference. First, in the wording of the questions, respondents tended to feel more secure when they were given a general question about the European Union, its institutions and policies, instead of a more narrow and specific question on the *Copenhagen Criteria*, as it is the case in Çarkoğlu et.al.. The second reason has to do with the timing. While the field study for Çarkoğlu et.al. was done before the passage of the major reform package in summer 2002, the surveys for CCEB 2002.2 were conducted after the legislation had been passed in Parliament, in September October 2002. One can argue that people in general became more informed and interested on the issue of the European Union following the heated and extended debate in the political sphere before, during and after the passage of the legislation.

As indicated before, starting with 2002, the CCEB studies went one step further in measuring the level of knowledge, and asked a series of factual questions to the respondents:

Q: For each of the following statement about the European Union could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false? (Correct answers in parenthesis)

The EU is made of 15 states (T)

The European Community was created after WWI (F)

The European flag is blue with yellow stars (T)

There are 15 stars on the European flag (F)

The HQs of the EU are in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg (T)

The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the EU (T)

There is a President of the EU directly elected by all the citizens (F)

The EU has its own anthem (T)

There are no borders between the EU (T)

The results are as follows:

Table 3.9. Trivia results (number of correct answers) (CCEB DATA)

	cceb 2002.2		cceb 2003.2		cceb 2003.4	
	Turkey	CC average	Turkey	CC average	Turkey	CC average
Average score	2.79	3.33	2.59	3.56	2.68	3.71

(0= no correct answers – 9= all correct)

Similar to the trend concerning the perceived level of knowledge, the Turkish public appears to be the lowest informed among the candidate countries. Out of 9 questions, Turkish respondents correctly answered on average 2.79 questions in 2002; 2.59 questions in first half of 2003 and 2.68 questions in the second half of 2003.

Table 3.10. Level of knowledge and vote in referendum (Çarkoğlu et.al.)

		Would vote for Turkish membership to EU	Would vote against Turkish membership to EU	DK/NA	Total
<i>Level of knowledge</i>	Don't know at all	61.7	30.9	7.4	100
	Don't know	72.8	23.4	3.8	100
	Average	63.7	32.5	3.8	100
	Fair	76.4	20.6	3.0	100
	Know very well	62.0	31.5	6.5	100

All figures are rounded percentages by row; Pearsons Chi Square: 37.690. (N=3,060), Cramer's V: .079 (p< .001)

In the bivariate analysis of the level of knowledge and vote for membership in a referendum, using Çarkoğlu et.al., it appears that increased levels of knowledge does not lead to a direct vote in favor. The low Cramer's V score (.079) also indicates that the relationship between these two variables is a fairly weak one. However, at this stage, one should keep in mind that the knowledge under question is a perceived one in Çarkoğlu et.al.. It can be argued that the people who claim to know a lot about Copenhagen Criteria might not possess that much of knowledge after all. This issue brings about another shortcoming in the organization of the questions in Çarkoğlu et.al.. It would have been better to include a series of trivial questions on the EU or the Copenhagen Criteria as CCEB does, in order to be able to control the validity of self claimed knowledge. Only by then one could have reached a more solid measure and assessment of the impact of knowledge on the support for EU membership.

However, when CCEB 2002.2 is put under investigation, a more directional trend can be observed within the relation between the perceived level of knowledge and a vote in a referendum. As seen in Table 3.11, the respondents that are believed to possess more knowledge on the institutions and functioning of the EU tend to vote more in favor of membership. There is a 23 point difference in voting yes to membership between the ones who declare to "know very well" (88.9 per cent in favor of membership) and the ones who declare to know nothing at all (65.7 per cent in favor).The Cramer's V score for CCEB 2002.2 data is also higher (.114) than Çarkoğlu et.al. (.079) pointing to a stronger relation. But, it is necessary to once again

underline the difference in wording between the questions for Çarkoğlu et.al., which asks perceived level of knowledge on *Copenhagen Criteria* and CCEB 2002.2, which asks about the EU, its institutions and its policies.

Table 3.11. Level of knowledge and vote in referendum (CCEB 2002.2)

		Would vote for Turkish membership to EU	Would vote against Turkish membership to EU	No vote/DK	Total
<i>Level of knowledge</i>	Don't know at all	65.7	20.7	13.6	100
	Don't know	73.3	17.8	8.9	100
	Average	77.8	16.5	5.6	100
	Fair	80	15.2	4.8	100
	Know very well	88.9	7.4	3.7	100

All figures are rounded percentages by row; Pearsons Chi Square: 25.656. (N=981) Cramer's V .114 (p< .005)

The Post-materialist/Materialist values in Turkey

As demonstrated, the Turkish public supports membership to the European Union, despite the public's prevailing lack of knowledge about the specific details surrounding the Copenhagen criteria and EU's institutions and policies in general. The proposition of Inglehart (1971; 1977a) argues that the societies with high post-materialist values display a high level of support for European integration. Thus, if Turkey has high post-materialist values, it can be used to explain the high level of support for integration with the European Union.

In order to measure the post-materialist/materialist values in Turkey, the World Values Survey studies of 1990, 1996 and 2000 are used (Inglehart, Ronald, et al., 2000 and European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 2004). The Materialist/Post-materialist values are constructed according to the 12 item index developed by Inglehart (1997, p. 389).

The index is based on all 12 items in the Materialist/Post-materialist values battery; it simply sums up the total number of post-materialist items that were given high priority (i.e. ranked as either first or second most important in its group of five items). Accordingly, scores ranging from zero (none of the post-materialist items were given priority) to five (all five of the post-materialist items were given high priority). (range = 0-5) (Inglehart 1997, p. 389). Then the Materialist/Post-materialist values results for Turkey have been calculated for 1990, 1996 and 2000. The results are as follows:

Table 3.12. Post-materialist/materialist values in Turkey

Values	1990	1996	2000
	Percentages (%)	Percentages (%)	Percentages (%)
Materialist 0	6.3	7.6	6.9
1	17	21.9	17.2
2	32.2	30.1	31.5
3	24.4	25.4	26.4
4	14.3	11.2	13.6
Post-materialist 5	5.8	3.8	4.3
	Mean /std. deviation 2.41 / 1.26	Mean /std. deviation 2.22 / 1.23	Mean /std. deviation 2.35 / 1.23

As the figures in the table shows, Turkey is a more materialist country rather than post-materialist. In the constructed index, it is seen that the majority of respondents placed higher values on materialist items. In 1990, 55.5 per cent of the respondents considered only 2 or less of the post materialist items as being of high importance. On the other hand, only 5.8 per cent of the respondents placed all 5 post-materialist items at high importance. In the second wave, which was carried 6 years later, the balance seems to have changed, leaning more toward the materialist side. In 1996, there was a clear decline in the percentage of respondents who placed 4 or 5 post-materialist items at high values. It decreased from 20.1 per cent to 15 per cent, while the percentage of people who placed 1 or less increased to 29.5 from 23.3 in 1990. In the 2000 wave, the mean score for Turkey showed a slight increase from 2.22 in 1996 to 2.35 in 2000. There may indeed have been an increase in post-materialist values in those 4 years. However, Turkey still remains as a predominantly materialist society.

Despite the fact that in 1990, 1996 and 2000 waves of the World Values Survey were carried out earlier than the two data sets utilized in this study, the dominance of materialist values in Turkey and the values are not likely to have faced any radical change in the 2 years between the last World Values Survey wave and the date of the data sets used in this research. As such, it is difficult to posit that Turkish public displays a high level of support for European Union membership because it has high Post-materialist values. In Turkey, materialist values still prevail and the value approach seems to fall short of explaining the reasons for the high level of support for European Union membership.

In the relation between the high levels of support for the EU among post-materialists, Janssen (1991) argues this relationship is likely to be based on the higher levels of cognitive mobilization among the post-materialists,

not on the fact that their values are different. Indeed, he continues, it is possible that materialists would be more favorable toward European integration because the process itself has been and remains regarded as one of economic integration, which is perceived as likely to provide material gains. Therefore, it becomes obligatory to continue the search for other reasons to account for Turkish support for EU membership outside the value model.

Another proposition by Inglehart (1977) is that the younger population carry more post-materialistic values than the older population. As later on I will investigate the impact of age on support for EU membership, it is useful at this stage to demonstrate the distribution of post-modern/modern values into different age categories in Turkey. If the younger population is more post-materialist than older one, as Inglehart argues, we might also expect an inverse relation between age and support according to Inglehart’s propositions.

Table 3.13. Age and Post-materialist/materialist values in Turkey

	1990		1996		2000	
AGE	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
15-29	2.63	1.17	2.49	1.23	2.54	1.23
30-49	2.40	1.32	2.21	1.23	2.35	1.21
50-50+	2.01	1.22	1.63	1.03	1.98	1.21

Table 3.13 is constructed with mean scores of 3 different age groups by using the 12 item materialism/post-materialism index. The index scores were from 0 to 5, where 0 marked “materialist” and 5 marked “post-materialist”. As seen in the table, Turkish case falls in line with Inglehart’s argument that younger segments of the population are more post-materialist than older ones. Over the three years that the world values survey has been carried out, the youngest age group, 15-29 has always portrayed more post-materialist stand than the older groups. For 1990, the 15-29 group has a mean score of 2.63 out of 5, while it is 2.40 for 30-49 age group and 2.01 for 50 years of age and above. The difference is the biggest in 1996, when the youngest group has a mean score of 2.49 and the oldest group has 1.63 out of 5. The picture did not change in 2000, while the oldest group has increased its mean score to 1.98, and the 15-24 also increased to 2.54.

These results indicate that Turkey appears to be no exception to Inglehart's proposition on the relation between age and post-materialistic values. However, if the other proposition by the value model is also valid, the younger people should also be more supportive of the EU membership and the age should be inversely related with support. I will deal with the validity of this proposition in the coming sections when I analyze the impact of age on level of support.

Commitment to Human Rights and Democratic reforms

A commitment to democracy and the presence of well established and functioning democratic institutions is one of the most important requirements in the Copenhagen Criteria for becoming a member of the European Union. The functioning of democracy in Turkey has been one of the most controversial topics in its relations with the EU, especially in the first half of 1990s. Commitment to meet the Copenhagen criteria brought along a huge set of necessary policy and legislation changes.

For Central and Eastern European countries, Thomas Christin (2003, p. 14), hypothesizes and demonstrates that,

Individuals with positive attitudes toward the country's democratic development are more likely to have positive attitudes the European Union, while those with negative attitudes toward the country's democratic development are more likely to have negative attitudes towards the EU.

On another dimension, he also focuses on basic rights and freedoms, "individuals with positive attitudes towards the defense of human rights are more likely to have positive attitudes towards the European Union, while those with negative attitudes towards the defense of human rights are more likely to have negative attitudes toward the EU." (Christin 2003, p.14).

In order to conceptualize the commitment to democratic reforms, two indicators have been utilized: A composite index using a set of extensive questions in Çarkoğlu et.al., and a direct question on approval of the democratic reforms, asking:

Q: In your opinion, the changes made in Turkey for harmonization with the EU membership were beneficial or harmful to the country? (1= Very harmful-10= Very beneficial)

The results have been collapsed to a 5 item scale for analysis.

The reform approval index is a sum of a series of variables.¹² The question asked was:

Q: There are some changes that Turkey must realize to be able to enter to the EU. Would you tell me to what degree do you approve each of the following changes? (1: Strongly disapprove – 10: Totally approve).

The changes asked were:

1. *Establishment of necessary conditions for freedom of thought and freedom of expression*
2. *Abolishment of death penalty for all crimes and persons*
3. *Abolishment of the laws preventing citizens from receiving education in their native languages*
4. *Abolishment of the laws that prevent broadcasting in citizens' native languages*
5. *Decreasing the role of military in Turkish political life*
6. *Establishment of necessary conditions for freedom of religion and belief to cover all of the religions and sects.*

To create the measure, the answers to each of the above questions were summed together resulting in a range of a maximum of 60 points and a minimum of 6 points.¹³ These points are then converted into percentage in order to determine the percentage of agreement within the total maximum agreement.¹⁴ For this the following formula has been utilized:

$$I = \left[\frac{\left(\sum_1^6 X_i \right)}{60} \right] \times 100$$

and the results are broken according to the following grounds:

¹² Throughout the study, all indexes have been built additively. In order to measure the applicability of additive method for creating indexes, I have checked the frequency distributions of each index created, as a heavily skewed distribution would have an impact on the multivariate analysis. It has been observed that each index created has a mainly fair distribution, which allowed the usage of additive method. In addition, I have conducted a test of reliability for each index created and presented the results along with the presentation of the index.

¹³ The alpha score for Reform approval index in the scale reliability analysis is 72.2 % with the probability of .000 in the Hotelling's T-Squared

¹⁴ The main reason for converting the indexes into percentages is to be able to compare one index with one another.

Strong approval	81-100
Approval	61-80
Neutral	41-60
Disapproval	21-40
Strong disapproval	0-20

When applied to a cross tabulation with the dependent variable, vote in the referendum, the results appear to confirm initial expectations:

Table 3.14. Support for Democratic reforms and human rights (Çarkoğlu et.al.)

		Would vote for Turkish membership to EU	Would vote against Turkish membership to EU	DK/NA	Total
Changes made for membership were beneficial or harmful?	Very harmful	44.1	50.9	5	100
	Harmful	64.9	30.7	4.4	100
	Neither harmful nor beneficial	61.6	28.6	9.8	100
	Beneficial	68.2	26.4	5.4	100
	Very beneficial	80.1	16.3	3.6	100
	Strong disapproval	40	52	8	100
	Disapproval	58.4	33.6	8	100
	Neutral	61.2	32.2	6.6	100
	Approval	63	30.9	6.1	100
	Strong approval	74.8	21.5	3.7	100

All figures are rounded percentages by row; Pearsons Chi square:232.077 and 60.825 (respectively) (N=3,060) Cramer's V scores are: .198 (p< .001) and .103 (p< .001) (respectively)

First of all, the measures of association indicates that there is a relation between the support for democratic reforms and the nature of the vote in a possible referendum. However, the low Cramer's V scores for both indicates that the relationships are fairly weak (.198 for Approval of changes and .103 for approval of general democratic reforms required by EU). However, one should note that the relationship between approving the changes already made by Turkish government and vote for membership appears to be stronger than the relationship between approval of reforms at more general terms. This difference raises questions on the difference between support to a real policy change compared with the support for general policies which are not realized.

The individuals who believed the changes were beneficial and strongly approved of the set of democratic reforms for enhancing basic rights and freedoms appear to be the highest group to support EU membership. While

74.8 per cent of the respondents who strongly approved of the democratic reforms indicated that they would vote for membership in a referendum, this figure drops to 40 per cent among the strong disapproval group. On the other side, among the respondents who found the set of democratic changes in the legislation very harmful, 50.9 per cent indicate that they would vote against Turkey's membership.

An important observation that is noteworthy at this point is that despite a variation between commitment to democratic reforms and approval of changes and the support for membership, almost all groups display a major support for the EU cause. Even at the lowest levels of approval of reforms and changes, the support for membership is 44.1 per cent and 40 per cent respectively.

Cognitive mobility and support

In the massive amount of work produced by Inglehart (1970, 1971) and with Rabier (1978), a theory of cognitive mobilization is suggested in addition to post-materialism and materialism scheme. Theory of cognitive mobilization asserts that as increases in education and access to information take place, citizens develop a more cosmopolitan outlook, which benefits support for European integration (Inglehart and Rabier 1978, p. 86). A higher level of cognitive mobilization increases an individual's capacity to receive and process messages related to remote political objects, and the European Union is considered to be among the remotest (Inglehart 1971).

The level of cognitive mobilization in Turkey is measured by using the CCEB 2002.2, which applies the model developed directly by Inglehart.

The model proposed Inglehart and Rabier's (1978, p. 88-89) acted as the basis for the construction of the cognitive mobilization index, and the cognitive mobilization indicator is based on responses to two questions. They are:

Q: When you get together with your friends, would you say that you discuss political matter frequently, occasionally, or never?

and

Q: When you, yourself, hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? (if yes): does this happen often, from time to time or rarely?

The reasoning of Inglehart and Rabier (1978, p.88) in using these items as indicators of skills "is that those who know and understand something about political life are most likely to discuss it; and those most skilled in argumentation are most apt to attempt to persuade others to adopt their opinions." According to this model, the responses are classified as follows:

Respondents giving affirmative answers to both questions are labeled as high and marked with ++ and respondents giving negative answers to both questions are labeled --. Middle categories are constructed consequently.¹⁵

Table 3.15. Cognitive mobility and support for membership (CCEB 2002.2)

		Would vote for Turkish membership to EU	Would vote <u>against</u> Turkish membership to EU	No vote - DK/NA	Total
level of cognitive mobility	high (++)	72.7	23.3	4	100
	(+)	77.4	16.9	5.6	100
	(-)	74.3	15.8	9.9	100
	low (--)	64.4	17.3	18.3	100

All figures are rounded percentages by row; Pearsons Chi square: 35.562. (N=993).

Cramer's V: .134 (p< .001)

As Table 3.15 shows, in the Turkish case the cognitive mobility theory presents an unclear outcome. Unlike the initial expectations, the respondents with a high level of cognitive mobility do not represent the highest level of support for membership. While the amount of respondents with a high level of cognitive mobilization who said they would vote for membership is 72.7 per cent, respondents with two lower levels of cognitive mobilization also display a high level of support, 77.4 per cent and 74.3 per cent, respectively. However, it is also true that the ones with the lowest level of cognitive mobilization also display the lowest amount of support with 64.4 per cent.

It is also noteworthy that in all subgroups, the clear majority of respondents are in favor of Turkey's membership. This is particularly in line with almost all of the previous analysis.

3.3.3. Utilitarian model explanations of support for European Union

Winners and losers of membership and support for EU

In their classic article, "Understanding variation in public support for European integration" (1995), Gabel and Palmer bring an additional approach to the analysis of support, by introducing the concept of *human capital* into the picture. In their human capital hypothesis, Gabel and Palmer (1995, p.7), assert that support for the EU varies consistently with cross-sectional differences in an individual's potential benefit from the economic policies and nature of the EU. Moving from this assertion, they put forward the idea that occupational skills and educational levels are positively related to the potential benefits of EU policies and therefore support for European integration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995, pp.6-8). When this notion is applied to the case of Turkey and membership, it can be argued that the individuals

¹⁵ The use of symbols + and - is borrowed directly from CCEB 2002.2.

with a higher level of skills in terms of occupation and with higher levels of education would be better prepared to benefit from Turkey's membership. For this reason, it is expected that well-educated Turkish citizens with language skills, and higher socio-economic status, would be more optimistic about their potential benefits from Turkey's entry to the EU. There is evidence to support this argument both from the studies of candidate and member states. In a 1987 Eurobarometer survey, 68 per cent of professionals thought that the EC would create job opportunities, and only 54 per cent of manual workers thought so (Gabel and Palmer 1995, p 7). For candidate countries, by analyzing the pooled Candidate Countries Eurobarometer between 1991 and 1996, Thomas Christin (2003) demonstrated that the potential winners of membership, the well educated, skilled individuals with high socioeconomic standing were more supportive of EU membership. Raivo Vetik (2003), in his analysis of the Estonian case, hypothesizes that the opposition to EU membership primarily exists among disadvantaged groups (with lower socioeconomic status), and corroborates his hypothesis with data analysis. Further examples and evidence for the human capital hypothesis that potential winners of membership being more supportive can also be found in the studies of Slomeczynski and Shabad (2003); Szczerbiak (2000); Anderson and Tverdova (2000) and Cichowski (2000).

Gender is also included as a variable in the analysis. The mainstream argument is that women are among the 'losers' in market liberalization because of their position in the labor market (Gelleny and Anderson, 2000). Carey (2002, p. 396) also utilizes the concepts within the literature that puts forward the argument that women are less interested in foreign policy, have more compassionate and less competitive values, and are more economically vulnerable to economic integration.

The inclusion of age in the model reflects the expectation that younger citizens have a more cosmopolitan outlook and possess higher post-materialist values, and thus are more likely to be positively disposed towards European integration (Inglehart and Rabier, 1978). An inverse relationship is therefore expected between age and support for the EU.

The speakers of Kurdish are included within the analysis as well. Turkish citizens with Kurdish origin are among the groups that benefit most from the democratic reforms that guarantee individual rights and freedoms. As the first reform package passed in 2002 summer included provisions such as usage of languages other than Turkish in broadcasting and some other similar items, the Kurdish speaking population also started to benefit from Turkey's bid for membership right away.

Self-perception of the direction of change in life following Turkey's membership is also included within the analysis in order to see the effect of

personal assessment on support. This item is measured in the recoded response to the following question in Çarkoğlu et.al.:

Q. What kind of a change will take place in your life if Turkey becomes a full member of the European Union? (1-change in a very bad way – 10-change in a very good way)

The construction of socio-economic index is a complex weighted calculation that brings together several questions in the survey. A detailed description of the items included in the construction can be found in Appendix A. The results of the bivariate analysis are presented in Table 3.16:

Table 3.16. Demographics and Winners/losers of membership (Çarkoğlu et.al.)

		Would vote for Turkish membership to EU	Would vote against Turkish membership to EU	DK/NA	Total	Measure of association (Cramer's V)
Gender	Male	66.1	29.4	4.5	100	.079*
	Female	61.9	29.8	8.3	100	
Age	18-24	65.3	30.2	4.5	100	.048**
	25-39	62.8	31	6.2	100	
	40-54	64.7	28.1	7.2	100	
	55+	63.2	27	9.8	100	
Education	Illiterate	55.9	32.4	11.7	100	.111*
	Literate	55.2	25.3	19.5	100	
	Primary school	58.8	33.9	7.3	100	
	Middle school	66.2	29.8	4.0	100	
	High school	68.2	27.4	4.4	100	
University or higher	74.1	20.2	5.7	100		
Urban-rural	Province centre	65.4	28.7	5.9	100	.038***
	District center	66.9	26.7	6.4	100	
	Village	60.7	32.2	7.1	100	
Socio economic status	Low	57.1	30.2	12.7	100	.079*
	Lower middle	61.9	31.7	6.4	100	
	Middle	67.1	28.1	4.8	100	
	Upper middle	68.6	25.8	5.6	100	
	High	71.2	22	6.8	100	
Speaks Kurdish	Yes	71.5	24.1	4.4	100	.063**
	No	62.8	30.5	6.7	100	
Life change in EU	Very bad	13.6	80.7	5.7	100	.388*
	Bad	30.7	62.7	6.6	100	
	Same	63.1	27.9	9.0	100	
	Good	84.6	12.6	2.8	100	
	Very good	90.7	7.4	1.9	100	
Language skills	Speaks at least one foreign language	69.5	25.3	5.3	100	.067**
	Speaks none	62.1	31	6.8	100	

All figures are rounded percentages by row (N=3,060) (* p <.001, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.10)

The results display a clear outcome; in line with the previous findings, the Turkish public shows a clear support for membership, despite variations within sub groups.

In terms of winners versus losers of membership, unsurprisingly the potential winners are more in favor of membership, even though in different degrees. The most significant measure is in the self-perception of direction of life change. The ones who expect that their lives will change in a very good way after membership tend to vote in favor (90.7 per cent) much more than those who believe that their lives will change very badly (13.6 per cent). The high score of Cramer's V (.388) also points to a strong relation between the two items. Higher socio economic status also indicates a higher level of tendency to vote for membership compared with the lowest socio economic status (71.2 per cent and 57.1 per cent respectively).

In line with the initial expectation, the male population supports Turkish membership (66.1 per cent) more than the female population (61.9 per cent). However, one should note that the female respondents are not more euro skeptic than male respondents (29.4 per cent male, 29.8 per cent female). The difference stems from the 'don't know' category, which confirms earlier argument that females are less interested in foreign policy than males. While 8.3 per cent of the female participants fall under 'Don't know/No answer' category, this is only 4.5 per cent for male participants.

Education also stands out as another factor that seems to be an effective determinant of support. The increase in education level corresponds to an increase in tendency to vote for membership. While 74.1 per cent of university or higher level graduates indicate that they would vote for Turkey becoming a member, this figure drops to 55.2 per cent among the primary school level.

Knowledge of Kurdish is another significant factor. 71.5 per cent of the Kurdish speaking respondents told that they would vote for Turkey becoming full member, and this figure drops to 62.8 per cent among the respondents who do not speak Kurdish. In terms of languages, the participants of the survey who stated that they can speak at least one foreign language are slightly more in support of membership (69.5 per cent) than of those who do not speak any foreign languages (62.1 per cent).

Items of urban rural/differentiation and age appear to be unclear indicators. Under all sub groups in age variable, the majority indicates

support. The initial expectation was that age would be negatively related with support, young people being more supportive. However, it appears that there is a minor or no difference between different age sub groups. The amount of support among the youngest group, 18- 24 years old, which is 65.3 per cent, is almost equal to the amount of support among the sub group of 40-54 years old, which amounts to 64.7 per cent. Thus, the argument of the value model that younger people tend to support EU more than the older ones due to their higher post-materialistic values seems to be invalid.

Living in an urban or rural area does not seem to be influential either. 65.4 per cent of the respondents who live in province centers indicate support, while 66.9 per cent of the ones living in district centers do so. Even though the respondents living in villages indicate the lowest level of support (60.7 per cent vote in favor), which is in line with the initial argumentation, the differences and the distributions are not sufficient enough to present a clear picture.

Expectations from membership and support

Not being far from the classical economic theory of voting, utilitarian/economic explanations of attitudes toward the EU or support for membership are based on the suggestion that citizens evaluate the individual or collective costs and benefits of being (or becoming) a member of the European Union (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995). An important point here would be the non-significance of level of information among citizens, as the cost benefit is not necessarily rational but rather perceived. However, if we take the low level of information of Turkish citizens have on both the European Union itself and the membership criteria, in terms of what is expected from Turkey (both demonstrated as self evaluation and the measurable through quizzes by the CCEB), then one can argue that they rely on certain cues or cognitive shortcuts, which makes the image of the European Union a more important factor. On top of that, the perceived benefits and gains of EU membership become much more important. What do the citizens believe they will get from membership?

Expectations are measured by Çarkoğlu et.al. by using an index of the responses to the question:

Q: What would be two most important benefits of joining the EU?

The answers are grouped under political and economic categories, according to their nature. The answers and their groupings are as follows:

Political


Decrease in bribery and corruption; improvement of democracy and increased involvement of citizens; increase in social peace; increased power of Turkey in International arena; equal and fair treatment of citizens by state

Economic

Free movement of Turkish citizens in the EU countries; economic development and decrease in unemployment and cost of life

So, the respondents who indicated two of the political benefits are grouped under the political expectants group and the respondents who indicated two of the economic benefits are grouped under the economic expectants group. Finally, the respondents who chose one of each were put under mix group.

Figure 3.3: Expectations and support (Çarkoğlu et.al.)



All figures are raw percentages

Among the sample, it appears that the respondents who indicated pure economic expectations are the minority (13.8 per cent), while more than half of the respondents stated mixed expectations from Turkey's membership (55 per cent). However, it is obvious that the respondents with pure economic expectations are the ones who are most committed to fulfill membership. 68.2 per cent of the participants with economic expectations indicated that they would vote for membership in the case of a referendum, compared to the 63.3 per cent of the respondents with political expectations.

In order to have a clearer understanding of the expectations of the Turkish public from Turkey’s membership to the EU, it is beneficial to look at the outcomes of different studies as well.

To conceptualize the expectations in his series of studies, Erder (2002, pp.36-37) constructs the *economic* label by collapsing all responses that include, “decrease in unemployment”, “free movement of labor”, “easier visa procedures”, “increase in technological progress”. Responses that include “Improvements in democracy and human rights”, “increase in education quality”, “improvements in the quality of politics”, and “improvement in the quality of legal services” are grouped under the title of *social, political, cultural and legal*.

Table 3.17. Expectations from EU (Erder Data)

	Erder 1998		Erder 2002	
	all sample	who would vote for membership	all sample	who would vote for membership
Economic	45.8	72.0	38.9	63.1
Social, political, cultural and legal	11.4	17.9	18.6	30.8
Turkey's international prestige increase	3.7	5.8	5.8	9.6
Other	2.1	3.3	1.5	2.5
DK/NA	3.6	5.6	1.8	3.0
N	(1,800)		(1,800)	

The total is over 100 as each respondent had multiple answers.

The results of Erder’s study (2002) clearly demonstrates that the majority of the Turkish public would support Turkish membership into the EU due to their high economic expectations from membership. Even the ones who would not vote for membership demonstrate expectations of an economic nature. The percentage of the ones whose expectations are of an economic nature among the ones who would vote in favor of membership were as high as 72 per cent in 1998 and 63.1 per cent in 2002. The respondents among the ones who would vote for membership with social, political, cultural or legal expectations, on the other hand were 17.9 per cent in 1998 and 30.8 per cent in 2002.

Table 3.17 also shows a declining trend in the economic expectations, and an increase in other variables. Erder (2002, p. 37) explains this trend by an increase in the level of knowledge of respondents, thus obtaining a more realistic approach over time. This can be seen in the increase of the percentage of the respondents with political, social and cultural expectations

from 17.9 per cent in 1998 to 30.8 per cent in 2002. Another indicator of this realism trend is the increase in the expectation of Turkey’s increasing prestige in the international arena. There is a 4 per cent increase from 5.8 per cent in 1998 to 9.6 per cent in 2002.

The results of the Transatlantic Trends, another major study that also includes Turkish case also indicate a very similar trend.¹⁶ In order to measure the nature of expectations, the following question was asked:

Q: What is the main reason why you think Turkey's membership of the EU would be a good thing? (only asked to respondents who have indicated that ‘Turkey’s membership of the EU would be a good thing’)

As the Transatlantic Trends study took place in 10 other European countries, it also provides the possibility to take a glance at the difference in Turkey’s expectations from its membership compared with expectations in other European countries.

Table 3.18. Expectations from Turkey’s EU membership (Transatlantic Trends Data)

	Europe 7 (N=1989)	Europe 9 (N=2602)	Turkey (N=730)
It would help the EU promote peace and stability in the Middle East	33	32	8
It would have a positive effect on Muslim communities in other European countries	19	21	8
Turkey's membership would be good in economic terms for EU/TURKEY	14	13	70
Turkey's membership will strengthen moderate Islam as a model in the Muslim world	26	26	8
[Other SPECIFY]	4	4	2
DK/NA	4	4	3
Total	100	100	99

All figures are rounded percentages

Europe 7: 2004 Results for “Europe” based on seven European countries: United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland and Portugal.

Europe 9: 2004 Results for “Europe” based on the 9 European countries surveyed in 2004 (Europe 7 plus Slovakia and Spain).

¹⁶ See the report Transatlantic Trends 2004 and related data at www.transatlantictrends.org

Among the responses given to the question, the Turkish public clearly stands out with the emphasis on the economic dimension of Turkey's membership. 7 out of 10 Turkish respondents indicated that Turkey's membership to the European Union would be a good thing in economic terms. On the other hand, it appears that public opinion in other European countries focuses much more on the political significance and importance. Both for the respondents from Europe 7 and Europe 9, economic aspect rank the lowest among reasons for Turkey becoming a member (14 per cent and 13 per cent respectively).

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, on the other hand, investigates more of the aspects surrounding personal benefits from membership. When the Turkish participants to the study were directed with a question about personal benefits from Turkey becoming a member, the respondents who had positive expectations clearly outnumbered the respondents with negative expectations.

Q: Do you think that (COUNTRY) becoming a member of the European Union would bring you personally...?

Many more advantages / More advantages As many advantages as disadvantages More disadvantages Many more disadvantages (Don't know / No opinion)

Table 3.19. Personal expectations and membership (CCEB data)

	cceb 2001.1		cceb 2002.2		cceb 2003.2		cceb 2003.4	
	Turkey	CC average	Turkey	CC average	Turkey	CC average	Turkey	CC average
Many more advantages +More advantages	50	42	62	47	61	48	59	43
As many advantages as disadvantages	17	23	14	22	11	20	18	24
Many more+ more disadvantages	17	14	16	14	13	14	13	15

All figures are rounded percentages by column

The expectations reached a high in 2002, when 62 per cent of the participants indicated that Turkey's membership would bring them personally many more and more advantages, and in the same year the Candidate Countries average score was 47 per cent. Another issue is that the part of the Turkish public who believes that membership will bring them disadvantages is decreasing over the years. While 17 per cent indicated that

membership would bring them many more and more disadvantages in 2001, this figure dropped to 13 per cent in 2003.

When these results are applied to a bivariate analysis with a vote for membership in a referendum, the outcomes also indicate that the respondents with expectations of benefit overwhelmingly support membership.

Table 3.20. Personal expectations and support (CCEB 2002.2)

	Would vote for Turkish membership to EU	Would vote against Turkish membership to EU	No vote - DK/NA	Total
many more advantages	95.4	2.7	1.9	100
more advantages	90.7	4.1	5.2	100
as many advantages as disadvantages	52.3	28.5	19.2	100
more disadvantages	23.8	65.5	10.7	100
much more disadvantages	19.7	76.1	4.2	100

All figures are raw percentages by row. Pearsons chi square: 457.955 (N=934)

Cramer's V: .495 (p <.001)

What is observed in the Table 3.20 is a clear trend of increase in support for membership with an increase of perceived personal benefits from membership. The high Cramer's V score (.495) also indicates a strong relationship between the personal expectations from membership and vote for membership. This pattern also fits very much to the previous analysis of winners versus losers. Almost all of the respondents who believe that Turkey's membership will bring them many more personal advantages state that they will vote for membership to the EU (95.4), while this figure drops to 52.3 per cent among the respondents who believe that membership will bring as many advantages as disadvantages. However, the opposition for membership is much less in the same group, 28.5 per cent, and it has the highest level of No vote or Don't know's. The opposition for membership increases tremendously among the group of respondents who believe that membership to the EU would bring them much more disadvantages and reaches as high as 76.1 per cent.

While confirming the argument that the winners from membership are more supportive of the membership, these results also point to the direction that a majority of the Turkish public believes that Turkey's membership to the EU would bring them personal advantages, and therefore, Turkey appears to be the candidate country with highest level of expectations of personal benefits.

3.3.4. *National identity and support*

As argued in chapter two, the national identity is an important element in explaining attitudes toward the European Union (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002). The main argument is that stronger feelings of national identity lead to lower levels of support for the EU (Carey 2002, pp. 397-399).

However, there exists a certain difficulty for a clear measurement of national identity, nationalism and patriotism. The difficulty stems primarily from the conceptual lack of clarity and consensus to their meanings. The simple measurement used in this study is a mixture of emotional nature of patriotism and the more cognitive meaning attached to nationalism. As highly influenced from Çarkoğlu (2003, pp.179-180); *Patriotism* is taken as “love of country” and simple attachment to one’s homeland, on the other hand, *Nationalism*, is taken as a relative evaluation of one’s country with respect to other countries or international groups. Clearly these two concepts are highly related with each other, nationalism naturally covers an emotional attachment to one’s own country. However, patriotism does not extend to the levels of nationalism over all issues, such as a belief in superiority of one’s country over others (Çarkoğlu 2003, p. 179). The attitudes toward EU membership specifically may be related to nationalism, as Carey (2002) argues, but the effect of patriotism per se is not covered in the literature.

Despite the fact that these two concepts are different from each other, making a clear distinction of them in the data analysis is not so straightforward. The measurement used in this analysis follows Çarkoğlu (2003), and it reflects traits of both nationalism and patriotism. In his words,

...since the main objective here was to define sub-groups of public opinion constituencies that significantly differ with respect to their preferences towards EU membership and related policies. The overlapping segments of patriots and nationalists were thus targeted here rather than the aspects differentiating one from the other. (Çarkoğlu 2003, p. 180)

Thus the measure of Nationalism/patriotism is constructed as a composite index of the following variables in Çarkoğlu et.al.¹⁷;

Q: Now I will read you some statements. ...Would you please listen to these statements and tell me how much you agree or disagree with them by giving a point from 1 to 10?

1-Does not agree at all 10-Fully agree

1. I am proud to be a Turk
2. Seeing the Turkish flag excites me
3. I would not like to live in EU countries if I have the opportunity
4. Turkey enjoys a natural superiority in relations with neighbors
5. Too many foreigners are living in Turkey
6. The functioning of religious temples such as churches for the worship for foreign residents in Turkey would not bother me*
7. I would not like to have a European neighbor
8. Tourists are damaging the cultural structure of our country
9. I would rather use Turkish products even if they are more expensive and of lower quality
- 10.I would not object to my daughter marrying a European*
- 11.It is against our national interests to establish business partnerships with Europeans

In the measure, the total of all the responses would get minimum 11 points and maximum 110 (the variables marked with * have been reversed due to negative question wording). Following, the results are converted into percentages of degree of nationalism & patriotism within the total maximum degree. For this I have used the formula:

¹⁷ The 11 items in nationalism/patriotism index have been subjected to principal components analysis. The data was tested for suitability for factor analysis. Inspection of the correlation matrix presented many coefficients of 0.3 or above. The Kaiser Meyer Oklin value was 0.74, above the recommended value of 0.6, and Barlett's test of sphericity reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. Principal components analysis presented three components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, explaining 27.9 per cent, 14.1 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. However, when the screeplot was inspected, it revealed a very clear break after the first component. Even though it is not a clear simple structure, the variables clearly qualified for being used in a scale. In addition, The alpha score for Nationalism/patriotism index in the scale reliability analysis is 71.0 % with the probability of .000 in the Hotelling's T-Squared.

$$I = \left[\frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{11} X_i \right)}{110} \right] \times 100$$

Then the categories are grouped according to the following criteria:

Very nationalist/patriotic	81-100
Nationalist/patriotic	61-80
Middle	41-60
Low nationalist/patriotic	21-40
Lowest nationalist/patriotic	0-20

Following the argument put forward by Carey (2002, p.399) this study posits that, individuals with high nationalist/patriotic sentiments are less likely to support Turkish membership and the individuals with low nationalist/patriotic feelings tend to strongly support Turkish membership. In other words, increased nationalist and patriotic sentiments are expected to correlate negatively with support for EU membership.

This expectation derives from the contextually sensitive issues which inspire and fuel the Turkish nationalist sentiment. Cyprus, ethnic minority rights (mainly Turkish citizens with Kurdish origins) and the disputes with Greece over Aegean Sea are all potent aspects of the nationalist identity.¹⁸ Especially on Cyprus and conflicts in the South East, the patriot sentiments, which normally tends to be more flexible than nationalism, goes parallel with nationalist sentiments due to the high level of casualties, and therefore, has undermined the differences between different constituencies (Çarkoğlu 2003, p. 180). Within the Turkish political scene, some of the EU member states, the European Commission and other institutions have often been accused of providing open moral or material support to the armed separatist movement in the South East of Turkey and this has remained as a major objection point to EU membership at large.¹⁹

¹⁸ For more information on the reflection of these sensitive issues in Turkish political sphere, see. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (1999).

¹⁹ As a matter of fact, this suspicion of a link between the EU and ethnic separatism remains up until today. PM Erdogan in a speech on 17th April 2005 even went ahead to claim that EU was coming up with demands that are aimed on “dividing the unity of the country” (headlines of national daily newspapers *Radikal, Hürriyet and Aksam*). For a strong and clear nationalist rejection of the EU and deeply rooted accusations of support for ethnic separatism, see the daily commentaries over the period of 1999-2004 of columnist Emin Çölaşan from *Hürriyet* and 2003-2004 of Ümit Özdağ from *Aksam*, both very popular daily newspapers.

To examine the effect of nationalism on Turkish public opinion toward the EU, the nationalism/patriotism index is placed into a bivariate analysis with support for membership, measured once again in the form of voting for membership in a possible referendum.

Table 3.21. Nationalism & Patriotism and support for EU membership (Çarkoğlu et.al.)

		Would vote for Turkish membership to EU	Would vote against Turkish membership to EU	DK/NA	Total
<i>Degree of nationalism & patriotism</i>	<i>Very nationalist & patriotic</i>	42.7	54.8	2.5	100
	<i>Nationalist & patriotic</i>	53.7	38.1	8.2	100
	<i>Middle</i>	72.7	22.1	5.2	100
	<i>Low</i>	79.8	18.4	1.8	100
	<i>Lowest nationalism & patriotism</i>	83.3	14.8	1.9	100

All figures are rounded percentages by row; Pearsons Chi Square: 193.465 (N=2,787)

Cramer's V: .186 (p<.001)

The results presented demonstrate a significant relation (Cramer's V score .186) between Turkish nationalism and the support for the European Union membership. In line with the expectation and Carey's hypothesis, when the degree of nationalism/patriotism is increased, the level of support for membership decreases. While 83.3 per cent of the respondents who scored lowest in the nationalism index indicated that they would vote for membership to the EU, only 42.7 per cent of the respondents with the highest nationalism ranking declared that they would vote in favor. This issue becomes especially true when voting against is taken into consideration. While 54.8 per cent of the respondents with a high degree of nationalism stated that they would vote against membership, on the other hand the 'no' votes declined sharply with the decline in the degree of nationalism, to as low as 14.8 per cent among the lowest nationalist group.

Another possible approach to observe the relation between nationalism and the level of support is using the self identification concept. In CCEB 2002.2, the respondents were directed with the following question:

Q: In the near future you see yourself as.....?

(Turkish) only /Turkish and European / European and Turkish / (European) only.

In 2002, the responses from Turkish public were distributed as follows:

Table 3.22. Self identification (CCEB 2002.2)

(Turkish) only	49.3
Turkish and European	43.7
European and Turkish	3.2
(European) only.	3.8
Total	100

All figures are rounded percentages. (N=934)

Clearly, the nationalist sentiment in Turkey is very high, with almost 9 out of 10 Turkish respondents identifying themselves as either Turkish only or first Turkish and then European.

If these results are applied to the tendency to vote in favor of or against Turkey's membership, the following results are obtained:

Table 3.23. Self identification and vote for membership (CCEB 2002.2)

		Would vote for Turkish membership to EU	Would vote against Turkish membership to EU	DK/NA	Total
Self identification	(Turkish) only	58	29.3	12.6	100
	Turkish and European	90.9	4.2	4.9	100
	European and Turkish	86.7	13.3		100
	(European) only.	86.1	11.1	2.8	100

All figures are rounded percentages by row; Pearsons Chi Square: 133.295. (N=934)

Cramer's V: .267 (p<.001)

Once again in line with the Carey's argumentation, a strong national identity leads to a decrease in support for the EU. The respondents with strong personal identification are the lowest among those who would vote in favor of membership with 58 per cent, while the respondents with some European identification reached as high as 90.9 per cent.

However, it is important that one should pay attention to the still high level of support among the highest degree of nationalism/patriotism and stronger self identification. The amount of respondents who indicated that they would vote in favor of Turkey's membership to the EU was 42.7 per cent among the highest degree of nationalism/patriotism in Çarkoğlu et.al. and 58 per cent among the strongest self national identification in CCEB 2002.2. This is still a considerably high level of support, close to and even more than half of the respondents under focus. Despite the negative relationship between the degrees of nationalism/patriotism, it is not a sufficient factor to prevent voting in favor by itself.

As a final note on nationalism, the perception of the European integration as a potential threat to the national identity should not be ignored.

As McLaren (2002) argues, the individuals who perceive the European integration as a threat to their national identity are less likely to support further integration. The issue of “threat” or “fear” of loss of identity, however, has not been investigated thoroughly in the past.

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer has included such an item only in its 2003 survey, which became an internal part of the consecutive surveys. The exact question wording is as follows:

“Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you-personally- are currently afraid of it, or not ?”

- An increase in drug trafficking and international organized crime
- Joining the EU will cost [COUNTRY] too much money
- More difficulties for [NATIONALITY] farmers
- The end of [NATIONAL CURRENCY]
- Our language being used less and less
- The transfer of jobs to countries which have lower production costs
- A loss of power for smaller member states
- The loss of national identity and culture
- The loss of social benefits
- Richer countries paying more than others

From the list offered, the top three responses related to national identity for each year for Turkey and the average scores of the candidate countries are as follows:

Table 3.24. Fears related to building of Europe (CCEB Data)²⁰

	CCEB 2003.2		CCEB 2003.4		CCEB 2004.1		EB 62*		EB 63*	
	Turkey	CC	Turkey	CC	Turkey	CC	Turkey	CC	Turkey	CC
Our language being used less and less	51	35	53	35	53	41	59	41	62	43
The loss of national identity and culture	46	30	51	32	49	37	52	38	58	43
The end of national currency	48	42	50	44	49	42	57	47	54	46

All figures are rounded percentages. *Following the official membership of 10 of the 13 candidates in May 2004, the CCEB has been

²⁰ Eurobarometer 62, October-November 2004; Eurobarometer 63, May-June 2005.

merged with the standard Eurobarometer. The candidate countries in EB62 and onwards are Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey.

Among all the candidate countries, Turkish public stands out for its main concern related to the national identity. Turkey always remains above the average of the candidate countries.

The fear of abandoning the language is increasing steadily over the years. Within the two year period between 2003 and 2005, the percentage of people who fear that Turkish being used less and less has increased from 51 per cent to 62 per cent, which is almost 20 points higher than the average of candidate countries in 2005.

The fear of the loss of national identity and culture is also increasing by time. While in 2003 only 46 per cent of the participants have indicated such a fear, in 2005, this figure has increased to 58 per cent. Although the economic condition of Turkey makes it very difficult to join the Euro zone even if the membership is achieved, there appears a certain confusion among the respondents regarding the national currency. Despite the lack of a concrete plan for the adoption of the Euro, more than half of Turkish respondents have indicated that they fear an end to Turkish Lira.

On an interesting note, in 2004.1, only the Turkish were afraid of the loss of national identity and culture, by placing it in top three choices. Almost half of the Turkish respondents have stated that they were currently afraid of such an outcome as a result of European integration, while none of the other candidate countries have placed the fear of loss of national identity and culture among the top three.

The concern and fear for national identity will not be analyzed further in the rest of the study as the related data is collected only after 2002. In addition, the data for three out of the five above mentioned Eurobarometers are still not available for analysis. Thus, it is not possible to continue the analysis with more advanced techniques. However, these initial results all support the previous arguments regarding the importance of the national identity as a determinant of support in Turkish case. As the Turkish public display high levels of concern regarding the European Union as a threat for the national identity, it is very likely that this concern is in effect in forming one's opinion on Turkey's membership to the European Union.

3.3.5. Religiosity and support

Turkey is a Muslim country, as the majority of citizens are of Islamic faith. This issue is often raised and used as a counter argument by the members of the Anti-Turkish camp within the EU member states. Then again, Turkey is a hard line secular state, which strictly tries to separate

religion from political sphere. The relation between Islam and politics constitutes one of the major topics of domestic political debate in Turkey. Especially with the electoral victory and establishment of a single party government by the pro-Islamist Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP (Justice and Development Party), the domestic debate became even more heated and did not end till this day. But where does the religion stand in relation to the Turkey's membership to the EU?

In the search of this question, there is the very important challenge of measuring the religiosity itself. It is not simple to measure the degree of commitment to Islam and its reflections on political opinions, as it is not a simple measure of the frequency of attendance to a mosque. The CCEB 2002.2, as a survey of all candidate countries, falls quite short of providing a clear measure by only asking the frequency of mosque attendance with the following question;

Q: Do you attend religious services other than weddings or funerals several times a week, once a week, a few times a year, once a year or less, or never?

The daily prayer of Islam, which is required 5 times a day, does not require a person to go to the mosque, except for the Friday noon prayer. On top of this, there is the month of Ramadan, in which devoted Muslims fast from sun up to sun down; and the religious festival of "Kurban- Sacrifice" (*Turkish*) during which the devoted Muslims are obliged to make offerings to the God by purchasing and sharing the meat of a livestock. In addition to these practices, there are the political issues in which the religious point of view has a certain stand; the lifting of the law banning women wearing veils in official places is one example.

Çarkoğlu et . al. on the other hand, handles the question of religiosity better than CCEB 2002.2. In their survey, there are the following questions aimed at measuring level of religiosity:

Q: Are you a member of a religion?

Q: Considering the last 5 years, how often do you go to mosque, except for funerals?

Q: Do you fast? if not now, did you in the past, or you never fast?

and,

Q: Regardless of how often you practice, how religious do you consider yourself? (1 to 10 scale, 1: not religious at all; 10: Very religious)

For the sake of simplicity and a more efficient measurement, I will take question on self assessment of religiosity as the main measure (recoded into 1 to 5 scale), as all other questions are related with it. The decision is mainly based on the assumption that an individual who identifies himself/herself as religious would also be a practicing one. In order to test this assumption, I have put self assessment of religiosity in cross tabulation with other religion related questions. The results are as follows:

Table 3.25. Self Assessment of Religiosity and Fasting (Çarkoğlu et. al.)

		Do you fast? If not now, did you in the past or you never fast?			
		Yes, I do fast	No, I was fasting in the past but not now	No, I never fast	Total
<i>Self assessment of religiosity</i>	Not religious at all	21	26.1	52.9	100
	2	65.7	18.6	15.7	100
	3	88.1	8.8	3.1	100
	4	94.3	4.6	1.1	100
	Very religious	95.7	3.2	1.1	100

All figures are rounded percentages by row; Pearsons Chi Square: 1135.610. (N=3021)

Cramer's V: .434 (p<.001)

As the Table 3.25 indicates, the people who define themselves as religious are also the ones who do fast during the month of Ramadan. The 21 per cent of people who define themselves as not religious at all also stated that they do fast. This issue has two possible explanations, either they gave false information with the fear of social pressure or they really do fast as a result of cultural and societal traditions. But in any case, my assumption that self indication of religiosity is a safe measure to be used as an indicator of religiosity stands valid.

With this starting point, how the population is distributed among different scales of religiosity becomes worthy of note for further analysis. As Table 3.26 demonstrates, the majority of the population in Turkey have identified themselves as somehow religious. More than 80 per cent of the interviewees have selected 3 or more on a scale of 5, where 5 stands for very religious. The mean score for self assessment of religiosity appears to be 3.57 with a standard deviation of 1.08. This shows that Turkish population at large considers themselves to be religious. However, I have to underline the difference between being a devoted believer and being committed to political Islam. We have to be careful to distinguish between a person who

identifies himself/herself as religious and a person who believes in Islamist policies. While the people who would be committed to Islam as a political view would also identify themselves as religious, the people who define themselves as religious do not necessarily support Islamist politics. At this point the lack of extensive measures of religiosity should once again be emphasized.

Table 3.26. Self Assessment of Religiosity (Çarkoğlu et. al.)

Values	Percentages (%)
Not religious at all	7.0
2	4.6
3	33.5
4	34.0
Very religious 5	20.8
Total	100
	Mean /std. deviation 3.57 / 1.08

As discussed previously, the findings of major public opinion studies in Turkey have indicated that there is a reverse relationship between level of religiosity and the support for Turkey’s membership for EU. It has been indicated that the more educated and less religious people tend to be more supportive of the membership while the more religious tend to be more against it. When applied into bivariate analysis in Çarkoğlu et. al, the initial findings tend to be in line with previous indications.

Table 3.27. Self Assessment of Religiosity and vote in referendum (Çarkoğlu et. al.)

		Would vote for Turkish membership to EU	Would vote against Turkish membership to EU	DK/NA	Total
<i>Self assessment of religiosity</i>	<i>Not religious at all</i>	70.4	27.7	1.9	100
	2	74.5	20.5	5.0	100
	3	66.5	27.8	5.7	100
	4	62.5	30.5	7.0	100
	<i>Very religious</i>	59.0	32.8	8.2	100

All figures are rounded percentages by row; Pearsons Chi Square: 27.288. (N=3034)

Cramer’s V: .067 (p<.005)

When the table is studied, the support for membership appears to be weakest among the people who have identified themselves as very religious. Only 59 per cent have stated that they would vote for Turkish membership to EU, while 70.4 per cent of people who have placed themselves as not religious at all indicated that they will vote for membership.

With these results there are three points that are worth taking note of. First, regardless of level of religiosity, more than half of the population in each sub group still tends to vote in favor of membership. This situation is most probably is a result of the divisions among the pro Islamist camp in Turkey. At the time of the survey, summer 2002, the previously leading pro-Islamist Saadet (Felicity) Party had a very clear anti EU stand point. Its founder and main leader Necmettin Erbakan has often been a loud and clear critic of the westernization of the country and the relations with the EU. While another pro-Islamist party, AKP which was founded by the modernist wing within the Felicity party has portrayed a more committed image to the Turkish modernization project and to integration with Europe. This commitment was emphasized to distinguish and distance themselves from the Felicity party. Therefore, the pro-Islamist camp in Turkey by 2002 was divided on the issue of EU membership, even though Çarkoğlu (2003) has demonstrated that the Islamist constituency is the least committed to EU membership. With the AKP's commitment to the EU membership during their government following their electoral victory in November 2002 and their success to link the membership with their own domestic agenda, further studies have showed that there has been a considerable shift within the religious electorate (Çarkoğlu, 2004).

Second, the confusion among the religious public is also reflected under the DK/NA category. It can be seen that with the increased level of religiosity, the DK/NA category tends to increase as well. While it is highest (8.2 %) among the most religious, it is the lowest among the lowest religious group (1.9 %) and it decreases steadily in between.

And finally, I have to once again underline the misleading nature of bivariate analysis. As the religiosity and other explanatory factors discussed in chapter three are correlated, it is unclear to what extend religiosity is a dominant factor influencing the support for EU membership. When the measure of association is taken into consideration, it appears that the relationship between religiosity and vote for membership is a fairly weak one (Cramer's V: .067 ($p < .005$)). So, one should be very careful before reaching any conclusions regarding the impact of religiosity on the preference of EU membership. Thus, there is an absolute need for a multivariate analysis which would include all the explanatory factors that have been discussed in this chapter.

3.4. Conclusions

In the light of the above analysis, even before the introduction of multivariate analysis, certain points are clear. Bivariate analysis do have the advantage of giving an image of the support for the EU membership among different segments of the population and the measures of the magnitude of association between two variables. However, as all variables included in bivariate analysis are correlated with each other, the bivariate analysis fall short of yielding to the significant and dominant determinants of support. Yet, it is still thought to be beneficial at this stage to briefly review the outcomes of the bivariate analysis and proceed to the next chapter keeping these findings in mind. It is believed that these observations would prove to be handy while interpreting the results of multivariate analysis.

Most importantly, in the varying levels of support for EU membership across different sub-groups in the different studies, almost all the sub-groups display clear majorities supporting Turkey's membership to the European Union. Only in a few cases, such as within the subgroups who believe that their personal benefits would be disadvantaged from membership or in extreme nationalist cases, the majority appears to be against membership. Thus, one can conclude that in case the hypothetical referendum for membership takes place in Turkey, the result would be clear: the Turkish public supports Turkey's entry into the EU.

Similarly, the initial expectations concerning winners versus losers, nationalist sentiments, and level of expectations seem to be confirmed by the outcome of the bivariate analysis and these factors appear to bare a strong relation to the level of support for membership. Other aspects, such as cognitive mobilization, or level of knowledge about the EU and the Copenhagen criteria appear to be effective, but their relation with support for EU seems to be weak. Thus, at a very premature stage, one can argue that the explanations brought about by the utilitarian and nationalist models are more efficient in explaining the support for membership in Turkey. The variables derived from a value model on the other hand, appear less explanatory of the Turkish case. The main determinant for support in Turkey is the expectation of immediate personal economic benefits rather than certain idealist value judgments such as commitment to democracy.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

In the multivariate analysis of the determinants of public support for the European Union membership for the Turkish case, the logistic regression will be utilized as a method. The reason for the selection is due to the fact that the dependent variable will be the vote for or against membership. As this is a dichotomous variable, it is inappropriate to use Ordinary Least Square (hereafter OLS) analysis, which requires an interval level dependent variable. Another important reason for using logistic regression is that while the OLS models the impact of an increase in one unit in explanatory variable on the dependent variable, logistic regression is based on the impact of an increase in the explanatory variable on the probability that the outcome under analysis will occur (in my case voting in favor of Turkey's membership to EU in a referendum). In other terms, the technique which will be used in this chapter will predict the probability of change, compared to the OLS which measures the amount of probable change.¹

In the logistic regression, two different data sets are used in order to run two parallel tests of proposed models. These data sets are the study by Çarkoğlu et.al. and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.2 (CCEB 2002.2)².

4.2 Variables in The Model

Dependent variable

In both data sets, the dependent variable consists of a binary dummy variable constructed from the responses to the questions dealing with a hypothetical referendum taking place in Turkey regarding Turkey's membership to the European Union.

¹ A great deal of statistical text books have been investigated during the writing of this chapter. Main sources benefited are, Pampel (2000), Long (1997), Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) and Kleinbaum (1994).

² Detailed information on both Çarkoğlu *et.al* and CCEB 2002.2, including sampling, methodology and margin of error have been presented in chapter three.

In Çarkoğlu et.al.:

Q. If there were to be a referendum about Turkey’s full membership to the EU, would you vote in favor of or against full membership?³

The variable is coded as 1 for “vote in favor” and 0 for “vote against”.

In CCEB 2002.2:

Q. And, if there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of (country)’s membership of the European Union, would you personally vote for or against it?

The variable is coded as 1 for “vote in favor” and 0 for “vote against”.

Independent and control variables

The independent and control variables mainly consist of the variables that were subjected to bivariate analysis in the previous chapter. As the aim of this study is to apply and test three major models on support for European Union; *value*, *utilitarian* and *nationalism*, the variables are drawn accordingly. However, as the indicators contain a large set of elements, they are grouped under four titles: *Cognitive*, *Attitudinal*, *Expectations*, and *Socio-economic and demographic*⁴. How each indicator is related to the models under analysis is presented in table 4.1:

Table 4.1. Models and related indicators

<i>Model</i>	<i>Indicator</i>
Value	Attitudinal
	Cognitive
Utilitarian	Expectations
	Socio-Economic and demographic
Nationalist	Attitudinal

The two data sets being utilized contain certain similar items that allow for the conceptualization and measurement of similar items. However, there are also certain items that can be measured in one of the data sets and not so much in other. Thus, in order to have a complete picture, two parallel analyses are done with two data sets, and in addition to common items, there are certain different independent and control variables in each of the analysis.

³ Translation of ‘Bugün Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne tam üyeliği hakkında bir halk oylaması yapılacak olsa siz Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliği için mi, yoksa bunun karşısında mı oy kullanırdınız?’

⁴ The notion of applying indicators for easier analysis and their titles are taken from Çarkoğlu (2003 and 2004)

At this stage it is useful to note the fact that while certain variables, such as cognitive mobilization do exist in one data set and not in the other, there are items which are possible to measure in both data sets, but in some cases the measures which are more comprehensive and detailed are utilized.

Two examples for this situation are the measure of nationalism and socio economic situation. The nationalism/patriotism is measured within Çarkoğlu et.al. as a composite index which is composed of several questions.⁵ However, in CCEB 2002.2, there are three separate questions which lead to only one aspect of nationalism, namely the perception of own identity; terminal community and fears from integration (Carey 2002, pp. 394-395). As the index used in Çarkoğlu et.al. is more comprehensive, nationalism is included in the analysis with Çarkoğlu et.al. but not in CCEB 2002.2. In regards to the Socio Economic Index, once again a very complex and comprehensive measure has been built with a large set of questions in Çarkoğlu et.al., while CCEB 2002.2 includes only a limited sub set of these questions. Therefore, even though certain socio economic control variables are included in the analysis of CCEB 2002.2, the main investigation of socio economic status takes place within the Çarkoğlu et.al. analysis. The same goes for level of religiosity. While Çarkoğlu et.al. asks for self assessment of religiosity along with several other questions linked directly with Islamic practices such as fasting, CCEB 2002.2 uses only one indicator, attendance to religious services, which is an inadequate measure for Islam.

In the light of these arguments, the independent and control variables that will be included in analysis are as follows:

The models created for each data set includes categorical variables, which have been transformed into dummy variables. Thus, it is necessary to indicate the reference category, which is covered by the constant of each model. These reference categories are accumulated representations of all dummy variables in the equations.

Çarkoğlu et.al. reference category; is female, illiterate, does not speak a foreign language or Kurdish, lives in village, has only political expectations from membership, believes that in the case of Turkey's membership her life will remain the same, is neutral in terms of Turkey's possibility of becoming a member, believes that the changes made for membership are neither beneficial nor harmful for the country, and thinks that there is a place for Muslim countries like Turkey in the European Union. She is also satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Turkey.

⁵ For a detailed description on how the nationalism index is created, see chapter three.

CCEB 2002.2 reference category: female, who believes that she would not benefit personally from membership, also believes that Turkey would not benefit from membership. She also identifies herself as European and Turkish. She also rarely attends religious activities. She lives in a midsize town and is a manual worker.

As the reference categories are not identical, it should be underlined that these two models do not measure exactly same equations. Therefore, the results of logistic regression are not fully comparable, but still valuable for informative purposes.

Table 4.2List of variables utilized in the model

	<i>Çarkoğlu et.al.</i>	<i>CCEB 2002.2</i>
<i>Cognitive Indicators</i>	Perceived knowledge about Copenhagen criteria	Perceived knowledge about EU
	Speaks a foreign language	Opinion leadership
<i>Attitudinal Indicators</i>	Level of religiosity	Self image Turkish only
	Believes that membership is possible	Self image Turkish and European
	Believes that membership is not possible	Self image European only
	Level of approval of the necessary reforms	Proud of nationality
	Changes made for EU are beneficial for the country	Religious attendance frequently
	Changes made for the country are harmful for the country	Image of the European Union
	Level of nationalism	Satisfaction with democracy in Turkey
	Believes that EU is a Christian club	
<i>Expectations</i>	Mixed expectations	Would benefit personally from membership
	Economic expectations	Country will benefit from membership
	Turkey's membership would change my life for good	
	Turkey's membership would change my life for bad	
<i>Socio economic and demographic Indicators</i>	Male	Male
	Age	Age
	City	Rural area or village
	Town	Large town
	Socio Economic Status	Household income
	University graduate	Self employed
	High School graduate	Managers
	Junior high graduate	Other white collars
	Primary school graduate	House persons
	Literate	Unemployed
	Speaks Kurdish	
		Student
		Education termination age

4.3. Analysis

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 convey the results of the binary logistic regression applied to two data sets, using the vote for a possible referendum as the dependent variable.

The first model (Çarkoğlu et.al.) correctly predicts 80.5 per cent of the cases, while the second model (CCEB 2002.2) correctly predicts 93.9 per cent of the cases.

At first glance, the models demonstrate that most of the variables that appeared to have an impact on the public support for EU seems to lose their significance once they are controlled for the influences of other variables. Second, the constant term for Çarkoğlu et. al. has a positive sign, indicating that the reference category has a tendency for voting in favor of Turkey's entry into the EU, while for the CCEB 2002.2 data the constant term is negative implying a bias for the reference category against voting in favor of membership.

4.3.1. Cognitive indicators

Using two different data sets allow for measurements on different aspects of the cognitive levels of individuals. As indicated in chapter two, the value model of Inglehart lays a great deal of importance on the cognitive mobilization, as the individuals with a higher level of cognitive mobilization have an increased ability to associate with and understand better a remote political institution and related issues such as the European Union.

As seen in Table 4.3, the perceived level of knowledge of the individuals and the capacity of using a foreign language both seem to have significance in explaining the referendum vote. Oddly, both variables seem to affect the direction of voting in the negative direction. Especially speaking a foreign language reduces the probability of voting in favor of membership by 25.4 per cent, which is rather noteworthy.⁶ This also appears to be true for the CCEB data in table 4.4, as the perceived level of knowledge on the EU, its institutions and its policies appear to be significant at $p < 0.10$ level in explaining support. The direction in CCEB 2002.2 is positive, meaning that

⁶ The interpretation of the odds is done by using the transformed logistic regression coefficients so that the independent variables affect the odds rather than the logged odds of the dependent variable. Thus, the exponents of the logistic regression coefficients are used. The Exp (B) values are indicated on the most right of the tables 4.3 and 4.4. The formula $\% \Delta = (e^b - 1) * 100$ is used in order to calculate the percentage increase or decrease due to a change in the independent variable. For more discussion on the issue, see Pampel (2000, pp.18-31).

increased level of knowledge on EU issues increases the odds of voting in favor of EU membership by 17.9 per cent.

Table 4.4 also demonstrates that the level of “cognitive mobilization”, measured as a combined index of “discussing politics” and “persuading friends” appear to be insignificant for the Turkish case.

These findings point to the fact that once controlled for the attitudinal and socio economic and demographic variables, the cognitive measures cease to be strongly significant in determining support for membership. This point is also in line with the initial finding in chapter three that the Turkish public, despite having the lowest level of information among the other candidate countries, displays the highest level of support. Thus, it can be concluded that the Turkish public’s support for the European Union membership is not an outcome of the individual’s level of knowledge on the European Union. Another important conclusion is the difference between self perceived knowledge and the knowledge which is tested. As two different data sets indicate opposite directions vis-à-vis the impact of increased level of knowledge on the support, how the knowledge is conceptualized becomes crucial. As seen in Table 4.3, the perceived level of knowledge on Copenhagen criteria is inversely related with the support, while CCEB data demonstrates that an increased level of knowledge points to a higher level of support.

Having reached this conclusion, it becomes necessary to analyze the statistical significance of other variables that explain the voting behavior in a potential referendum for Turkey’s membership.

4.3.2. Attitudinal indicators

Some of the variables in this group in both data sets have some significant effects.

In the CCEB 2002.2 data, the image of the European Union appears to be a very significant factor in explaining the support. One unit increase in the image of the European Union from negative to positive increases the odds of voting in favor of membership by 215 per cent, or in other words the odds of an individual who possesses a more positive image of the European Union voting in favor of Turkey’s membership is two times more than another individual with a negative image.

Another aspect of the image of the EU is measured in Çarkoğlu et.al. in relation to Christianity. It appears that the individuals who consider the European Union as a Christian club and see no place for a Muslim country like Turkey tend to have a negative approach toward membership. The variable is negatively signed as expected, and for a person who thinks that

EU is a Christian club, the odds of voting yes in the referendum is 55.1 per cent lower than a person who thinks there is place for a Muslim country like Turkey. Religious difference seems to become a significant point for the Turkish public, as the issue often comes out to be a discussion point regarding Turkey's membership. It appears to have a strong influence on the Turkish public's perception of the European Union and leads to a decrease in support. However, this issue needs further exploration to see whether the decrease in support is a result of EU's negative image as a closed Christian club or due to the religious mentality of the Turkish public.

Religion is a very controversial and popular topic. However, once controlled from the other factors, the degree of religiosity does not appear to be statistically significant in determining support. As discussed before under section 3.3.5, there are serious concerns on the measurement of religiosity. In order to measure the degree of religiosity there is a need for an extensive set of questions and various indicators. The questions in both surveys used fall short of measuring comprehensively the degree of commitment to Islam and its reflections on political opinions. Even though Çarkoğlu et.al. has several items that make it possible to measure the degree of religiosity to a certain extent, the results presented in table 4.3 points out that the degree of religiosity (to the extent it is measured) does not appear to be a significant factor as a determinant of support for Turkish membership. However, there is a need for a further extensive analysis of political Islam in Turkey and their stand toward the European Union membership, and it is beyond the scope and capacity of this study to provide detailed analysis of this relationship due to the limitations in the available data.

The evaluation of Turkey's possibility of becoming a member at the end also needs to be assessed in relation to the image of the European Union. As expected, the variable of the respondents who think that membership is 'not possible' is negatively signed, pointing to a decrease in the odds of supporting, in table 4.3. However, the assessment of the possibility of membership does not appear to be statistically significant for Çarkoğlu et.al.. This issue is also linked with the increasing pessimism among the Turkish public when faced with an increasing objection from certain constituents in the member countries.

The level of nationalism appears to be insignificant for CCEB 2002.2, but it is significant for Çarkoğlu et.al.. The reason for the difference is due to the fact that the nationalism index in Çarkoğlu et.al. is constructed from a detailed series of questions and is much more comprehensive, while in CCEB 2002.2 only the self identification is used as a measure of the level of nationalism.

In the detailed measure of nationalist/patriotic sentiments, as shown in table 4.3, there is a clear indication that a strong nationalist sentiment leads to a decrease in the support for Turkey’s membership to the European Union. The nationalism score in Çarkoğlu et.al. is negative signed, which indicated that the nationalism has a negative effect on the support for membership. One unit reduction in the nationalist sentiments increases the odds of being supportive by 29.3 per cent. As such, an increase in nationalist/patriotic sentiments has a significant effect on decreasing odds of voting in favor of membership.

Çarkoğlu et.al. was collected just before the passage of a series of democratic reforms necessary for meeting the Copenhagen criteria in the Turkish parliament. It appears that the individuals who opposed these democratic reforms and believe that they were harmful for the country display a lower level of support for membership. In table 4.3, it is seen that the odds are 44 per cent lower for individuals who believe that the changes done for meeting the Copenhagen criteria were harmful for Turkey than individuals who think they were neither harmful nor beneficial. On the other hand, the individuals who consider the changes beneficial display a higher odds of voting in favor of membership than those who have neutral opinions (43.4 per cent higher odds). This point also goes in line with the relation between a commitment to human rights and democracy and support for the European Union, which was discussed in chapter three. It appears that commitment to human rights and democracy remains as a significant factor even when controlled for other factors. In spite of this, the relation between the level of satisfaction from the functioning of democracy in Turkey does not appear to be statistically significant in both models.

The table 4.3 will be at the next page.⁷

⁷ I have conducted joint tests of significance for each group of explanatory variables, (Cognitive, Attitudinal, Expectations and Socio-Economic and Demographic Indicators). The improvement in the model with the introduction of each group is as follows:

	-2 Log Likelihood	Cox & Snell R2	Nagelkerke R2	Prediction (%)
Full model (Cognitive + Attitudinal indicators + expectations + Socio economic and demographic indicators)	1937.818	.315	.443	80.7
Cognitive indicators	3473.870	.005	.007	68.5
Cognitive + Attitudinal indicators	2477.439	.157	.221	73
Cognitive + Attitudinal indicators + expectations	2031.559	.305	.429	80.3

The difference in the -2 log likelihood values gives the improvement in the model. As the -2 log likelihood decreases for each group introduced in the model, it signifies that the groups contribute to the model. For a detailed discussion on tests of significance for logistic regression models, see Pampel (2000, pp. 48-53).

Table 4.3. Logistic Regression Results (Çarkoğlu et al.)

	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig	Exp(B)
Constant	.769	.709	1.175	.278	2.158
<i>Cognitive Indicators</i>					
Perceived knowledge about Copenhagen criteria*	-.051	.026	3.854	.050	.951
Speaks a foreign language**	-.293	.154	3.642	.056	.746
<i>Attitudinal Indicators</i>					
Level of religiosity	.026	.027	.900	.343	1.026
Believes that membership is possible	.036	.093	.152	.697	1.037
Believes that membership is not possible	-.298	.238	1.573	.210	.742
Level of approval of the necessary reforms	.037	.058	.413	.521	1.038
Changes made for EU are beneficial for the country*	.361	.151	5.673	.017	1.434
Changes made for the country are harmful for the country*	-.580	.142	16.588	.000	.560
Level of nationalism*	-.347	.081	18.444	.000	.707
Believes that EU is a Christian club*	-.800	.123	42.596	.000	.449
Not satisfied with the way democracy functions in Turkey	.181	.212	.733	.392	1.199
<i>Expectations</i>					
Mixed expectations*	.450	.127	12.640	.000	1.568
Economic expectations*	.446	.189	5.554	.018	1.561
Turkey's membership would change my life for good*	1.327	.138	92.892	.000	3.771
Turkey's membership would change my life for bad*	-1.718	.147	136.796	.000	.179
<i>Socio economic and demographic Indicators</i>					
Male	.109	.124	.773	.379	1.115
Age*	.015	.005	9.550	.002	1.015
City	.096	.134	.513	.474	1.101
Town	.088	.174	.258	.612	1.092
Socio Economic Status	-.069	.083	.686	.408	.933
University graduate*	1.213	.429	8.004	.005	3.363
High School graduate*	.977	.386	6.407	.011	2.656
Junior high graduate*	.787	.386	4.156	.041	2.197
Primary school graduate	.418	.348	1.445	.229	1.519
Literate	.107	.491	.048	.827	1.113
Speaks Kurdish**	.342	.179	3.634	.057	1.407
		Predicted			
		Y to EU	N to EU		
Observed (Y)es to EU		1394	141		90.8 %
Observed (N)o to EU		292	411		58.5 %
Cox and Snell R-square=.315 Nagelkerke R-square=.443 -2 Log Likelihood: 1937.818		Overall			80.7 %

*p ≤ 0.05, ** p < 0.10

Table 4.4 Logistic Regression Results (Cceb 2002.2)⁸

	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.380	2.425	3.262	.071	.013
Cognitive Indicators					
Perceived knowledge about EU**	.165	.097	2.876	.090	1.179
Opinion leadership	.209	.213	.956	.328	1.232
Attitudinal Indicators					
Self image Turkish only	-.276	1.112	.062	.804	.758
Self image Turkish and European	1.128	1.081	1.089	.297	3.089
Self image European only	-.434	1.252	.120	.729	.648
Proud of nationality	-.551	.357	2.388	.122	.576
Religious attendance frequently	-.499	.457	1.195	.274	.607
Image of the European Union*	1.149	.203	31.908	.000	3.155
Satisfaction with democracy in Turkey	-.154	.291	.280	.596	.857
Expectations					
Would benefit personally from membership*	2.340	.500	21.874	.000	10.380
Country will benefit from membership*	2.732	.539	25.734	.000	15.361
Socio economic and demographic Indicators					
Male	-.554	.578	.920	.337	.574
Age	.036	.023	2.456	.117	1.037
Rural area or village	.247	.529	.218	.640	1.281
Large town	-.578	.541	1.141	.285	.561
Household income	-.034	.092	.136	.712	.967
Self employed	-.597	.855	.488	.485	.550
Managers	-1.177	1.355	.755	.385	.308
Other white collars	1.075	1.303	.680	.410	2.929
House persons	-1.643	1.008	2.659	.103	.193
Unemployed	-1.595	1.056	2.280	.131	.203
Retired	.997	1.213	.675	.411	2.710
Student	-.441	1.151	.147	.702	.643
Education termination age	-.428	.405	1.116	.291	.652
			Predicted		
			Y to EU	N to EU	
Observed (Y)es to EU			524	15	97.2 %
Observed (N)o to EU			25	97	79.5 %
Cox and Snell R-square=.487			Overall		93.9 %
Nagelkerke R-square=.791					
-2 Log Likelihood: 191.044					

*p<0.05; **p<0.10

⁸ The results for joint tests of significance for each group of explanatory variables, (Cognitive, Attitudinal, Expectations and Socio-Economic and Demographic Indicators) and the improvement in the model with the introduction of each group are as follows:

	-2 Log Likelihood	Cox & Snell R2	Nagelkerke R2	Prediction (%)
Full model (Cognitive + Attitudinal indicators + expectations + Socio economic and demographic indicators)	191.044	.487	.791	93.9
Cognitive indicators	862.700	.012	.020	80
Cognitive + Attitudinal indicators	427.486	.325	.522	88.6
Cognitive + Attitudinal indicators + expectations	242.757	.454	.739	94

4.3.3 Expectations

The variables examined under the expectations yield to the most significant results. In line with the perceived benefits in the proposition of the utilitarian approach, the evaluations of individuals concerning the personal benefits of EU membership have one of the strongest positive impacts on determining the support for membership.

In Çarkoğlu et.al., the individuals who believe that Turkey's membership to the EU would change their personal lives in a good way has the most greatest odds probability of voting in favor of membership, with 277 per cent more than those who believe that membership would make no difference. On the other side of the equation, individuals who believe that membership would affect their lives negatively are 82.1 per cent less likely to vote in favor compared with those who believe in no difference.

The nature of these expectations can be further analyzed through another significant variable in the equation. The odds of voting in favor of membership in a referendum is increased by 56.8 per cent if the individual has mixed -both political and economic- expectations. The individuals with only economic expectations from membership also indicate a positive direction, with an increase in the odds of voting by 56.1 per cent.

Evaluations of personal benefits from Turkey's membership yield to extremely strong and significant results in CCEB 2002.2 as well. Individuals who believe they will benefit personally from membership are guaranteed to vote in favor of membership compared with others who believe they will not benefit personally from membership (Exp (B)=10.380). The interesting point is that belief that the country will benefit from membership appears to be more significant, meaning that the Turkish public puts their country's benefit before individual utility.

4.3.4 Demographic and socioeconomic indicators

Control variables such as gender, level of education or the employment status, whose theoretical potential effects have been evaluated in chapter three appear to be in general insignificant as determinants of support once they are introduced in a multivariate equation. This situation in general falls short of expectations raised in the previous chapter, mainly regarding the winners versus losers hypothesis.

The statistically significant variables that come out from Çarkoğlu et.al. are *age* and *the level of education*.

In terms of age, the age of respondents is positively associated with support. The older the respondent, the higher the odds of voting in favor of membership. To be more specific, each year an individual gets older their

odds of supporting membership increase by 1.5 per cent. As demonstrated in Table 3.13., the older people in Turkey are not more post-materialist than younger people, and still they appear to be more supportive of EU membership. This point is also noteworthy, as it stands against the value model's argumentation that young people are more cosmopolitan and more educated, thus they possess more post-materialistic values and display higher level of support for European integration (Inglehart and Rabier, 1978).

Education yields to an increase in support only at the highest levels. A university graduate is 236 per cent more likely to vote in favor compared to an illiterate person. As the level of education decreases, the likelihood of voting in favor of membership decreases as well. The odds for a high school graduate is 165 per cent and for junior high graduate it is 119 per cent. Education below junior high school does not appear to be a statistically significant as a determinant of support.

Another important point that should be underlined is that neither age nor education appear as statistically significant factors in CCEB 2002.2, which can be linked to the sampling differences between two data sets, as CCEB 2002.2 takes 15 as minimum age, while Çarkoğlu et.al. takes 18 and above.

All other socioeconomic and demographic factors fail to be statistically significant once all other variables are controlled. Statistical insignificance of variables such as socio economic status, level of income and occupation indicate to the partial invalidity of the winners versus losers hypothesis, as it puts forward the idea that the individuals with high level of occupation are the potential winners, and therefore are more supportive of membership. However, on the other hand, the winners versus losers remains valid on other characteristics such as with the individuals with high level of education, speakers of a foreign language and among the Kurdish speakers.

In line with the expectations raised in the previous chapter, speaking Kurdish does appear to be a significant factor in determining support, as Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin are considered to be the instant winners of transition due to democratization and the lifting of limitations on individual rights and liberties. Being of Kurdish origin, it appears, increases the likelihood of voting in favor by 40.7 per cent compared with another citizen who does not speak Kurdish.

4.4. General points and Discussion

It is possible at this stage to underline three important conclusions from the results of the multivariate analysis before proceeding to the conclusions of the study.

First, once the variables utilized in bivariate analysis in chapter three are introduced in multivariate analysis in this chapter, it became clear that most of them were highly correlated, as indicated at the end of the previous chapter. A majority of the expectations that have been raised in chapter three related to different theories have been therefore rejected.

Second, the utilitarian calculations of the costs and benefits associated with EU membership and nationalist/patriotic orientations and behavior emerge as significant determinants of support. The propositions of the utilitarian approach, underlining the importance of personal perceived benefits are failed to be rejected. In addition to that, the effect of nationalism also appeared to be statistically significant in determining Turkish public support for membership. The nationalism/patriotism, coupled with the suspicion concerning the EU's willingness to accept Turkey as a member, and the emphasis on the Christian identity, appears to be a significant potential for present and future Euro-skepticism. It is not a rejection based on religiosity, but rather on the fear of being rejected. Despite challenges to its measure, the level of religiosity does not appear to be a significant determinant. What appears significant is the level of pessimism on Turkey's acceptance as a member and the Christian identity of Europe as a linked factor. The other variables have appeared to be non significant once they are controlled by other variables in the equation.

The third conclusion, related to the propositions of the value model and cognitive mobilization is that as Turkish individuals mainly rely on cost and benefit calculations and focus on their potential personal gains from membership, the level of knowledge and post-materialism remain less significant. As the figures in 4.3 clearly indicate, the personal expectations of Turkish individuals from Turkey's membership appear to be the strongest determinants of support. Regardless of cognitive mobilization, or level of knowledge on the European Union in general, the Turkish public appears to be relying on perceived self interest from membership in reaching its decisions on the membership issue. Clearly, Turkish citizens' support, or not, for membership is much more likely to depend on their subjective expectations rather than their willingness and support for democratic and political reforms.

It is also important to note that the findings of multivariate analysis of the data Çarkoğlu et. al. are pretty much in line with the earlier findings of the analyses of the same data. In his articles Ali Çarkoğlu (2003; 2004) have reached similar results with regards to the determinants of support. His findings (2004) also indicate that attitudinal indicators such as Pro-EU attitudes, anti-democratic attitudes and personal expectations from membership, as well as demographic indicators such as age, level of

education and speaking Kurdish are significant determinants of support. In Çarkoğlu's (2003, p. 184-185) findings the impacts of these variables are in accordance with the findings presented in Table 4.3. Different from the results of my model, nationalist/patriotic values do not appear as a significant factor in the model Çarkoğlu develops, while religiosity appears as one. Then again, it is also important to note down two major differences between my analysis and the one of Çarkoğlu, despite using the same data set. First difference comes from the variables included into the equation. Çarkoğlu (2004) follows a more general approach and utilizes a larger equation which also includes party choice, regional differences and the effect of sensitive issues related to the minority rights. The equation in this study, however, is built more conceptually with the focus being laid on the propositions drawn from the three explanatory models. Factors such as the party choice, which are proven to be insignificant both statistically and contextually, are not included in the model. Second difference between the model by Çarkoğlu and this study stems from statistical techniques employed in constructing various indexes. While Çarkoğlu (2003; 2004) uses more advance methods such as factor analysis, this study has predominantly utilized additive method in constructing indexes. This difference of techniques topped with the inclusion of different variables into the indexes appear to influence the outcomes in different directions. For instance, Çarkoğlu (2003) uses a composite index for measuring religiosity, while I have used only self evaluation of religiosity. However, it can still be argued that when contrasted with each other, the results of both equations do not differ significantly from each other despite these differences. Despite the different number of variables included, the model by Çarkoğlu predicts 80 per cent of the vote correctly (Çarkoğlu 2004, p. 35), and the model of this study correctly predicts 80.7 per cent of the vote, and these are extremely close to one another.

In Eastonian formulation, these findings point out that the support in Turkey for EU membership is more within the frame of specific support, rather than diffuse support. Turkish public supports EU membership not because of what it represents but more because of what they perceive membership can do for them. Then again, once looked at the poor level of knowledge regarding to the institutions and policies of the EU among the public, these expectations appear to be more imaginary than being based on facts and information.

CONCLUSIONS

Over the last three years, Turkey has made significant progress in terms of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria for becoming a member of the European Union. In the period between 2001-2004, Turkish legal system went under a tremendous change and reform process. In three years, a total of 43 articles in the constitution along with 8 reform packages, 66 codes, 29 by-laws, a total of 175 articles and 49 directives have been changed in order to meet the membership criteria. In addition, 28 related international agreements have been ratified in the same timeframe (Birand 2005, p. 456). As the changes cover important areas of legislation such as the civil law, they also have an impact on the everyday lives of the Turkish citizens.

As an acknowledgement of this progress, the European Commission started membership negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. The Turkish government has implemented difficult changes in policy - such as the penal code and on Cyprus- and the general attitude among the Turkish public is that it is now the EU's turn to make concessions. However, the EU will demand further political reforms in the years ahead, especially when it comes to difficult chapters under negotiations such as agriculture. The Turkish government will have to find ways to adapt to the further challenges, and furthermore, make sure that the Turkish public supports the whole process.

In this research, I have analyzed the determinants of the Turkish public support for European Union membership in order to find out which factors influence the opinion of Turkish citizens toward the EU. The study contributes to the growing body of literature on support for European integration, as it presents one of the first studies that applies the existing models to the Turkish case.

The research had two main objectives, to explore and describe the nature and level of public support for European Union membership in Turkey and to analyze the determinants of public support. To achieve these objectives, I have used two data sets from 2002, the CCEB 2002.2 and the study of a group of academics from Boğaziçi University in cooperation with TESEV. I have also made use of several other surveys carried out on

between 2002 and 2004 in order to explore possible trends and changes in the level of support.

In its descriptive task, the findings in chapter three demonstrated that Turkish public portrayed a very high level of support for Turkey's entry into the European Union. This support for membership runs parallel to the image of the European Union in the eyes of the public. As the analysis in the first part of chapter three has shown, Turkish public held a positive image of the European Union in the time period between 2002 and 2004. However, the level of support over time has shown sensitivities to the changes in the political arena and different incidents within Turkish- EU relations. In times of difficulties, the support fluctuated. However in the long run, Turkey has remained as the candidate country with the highest level of public support.

In the second part of the analysis of the nature of support, an interesting finding was that Turkish public displays a certain worry of exclusion by the members of the EU on the basis of religion. Half of the Turkish public have indicated that they think the EU is a Christian club and there is no place for a Muslim country like Turkey (Figure 3.1).

As regards to the determinants of support, I have started with bivariate analysis using variables drawn from the propositions of the utilitarian, the value and the national identity models. These analyses have provided some interesting insights regarding the initial expectations stated in the introduction.

The first and most clear result was the existence of a low-knowledge versus high expectations situation in Turkey. All the data demonstrated that Turkish public was the least informed on the membership process, on the politics and the institutions of the EU among the candidate countries. However, the cross tabulations have not demonstrated a clear relation between the perceived and measured level of knowledge on EU related issues and the level of support. Regardless of the level of knowledge, the support for membership remained high.

The analyses also demonstrated that Turkish public had also the highest level of expectations from the EU membership and believed that both their personal lives and the country would benefit very positively from membership. Once looked at these benefits, it appeared that the expectations were a mixture of economic and socio-political ones, such as the consolidation of the democracy or political stability. However, as Figure 3.3 and Table 3.17 demonstrated, the support is highest among the people with economic expectations.

The analysis of the World Values Survey demonstrated that in Turkey the materialist values prevailed the post-materialist ones and in the 2000s

Turkey remained mainly as a materialist society. As the data on World Values Survey does not allow for an individual level analysis, the main assumptions had to be made at society level. Once the high level of support in Turkey for membership is compared with the materialistic characteristics of the society, it becomes difficult to link the post-materialist values with support for membership. This also becomes apparent with the inverse relation between age and support. The more materialist older generation in Turkey appears to be more supportive of EU membership than the younger group who possess more post-materialistic values. In this regard, this research demonstrates that Turkish case is more in line with Janssen's (1991) argument that as European integration is perceived as a economic process, the materialists who expect potential material gains from further integration would be more favorable for membership.

I have also analyzed the differences in support between potential winners of integration compared with the potential losers. As derived from the Utilitarian model, the sub groups of the society who are considered to potentially gain more advantages as a result of Turkey's membership appeared to be more supportive of entry into the EU. These groups, described in detail in section 3.3.3, showed differences in the level of support, albeit in varying degrees. Factors such as age, education and gender appeared to be influential in determining the support for membership. Potential winners such as the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin or the individuals with higher socio-economic status have also appeared to be more supportive of membership as Table 3.16 demonstrated.

The bivariate analysis of different determinants of support in chapter three pointed to a very significant factor, the national identity. In line with the arguments of the national identity model, the individuals with high levels of national attachments are less supportive of Turkey's membership to the European Union.

Overall, the results of the bivariate analyses in chapter three demonstrated that the support for EU membership in Turkey remains high within all sub groups. However, considering the high possibility of interaction between these factors, I have conducted multivariate logistic regression analysis in chapter four.

Three important conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of data in chapter four.

First, the analysis of the data showed that perceived benefits are rather strong and stable predictors of attitudes toward the European Union in Turkey. As tables 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrated, my hypothesis that the expectations of perceived benefits for the individual and the country are

significant determinants of support for EU membership is confirmed. The individuals with strong expectations for themselves and the country from membership are evidently more supportive of the membership. The individuals who are more likely to benefit from membership due to their level of education, language skills and ethnic background (winners of transition) are also more likely to support membership than those who will lose in the process. In other words, the utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits associated with EU membership are strong determinants of support in Turkish case.

Second, the political and social variables, such as perceived level of knowledge on the EU related issues, are also determinants of support, albeit at a lesser degree than utilitarian ones.

Third, the level of commitment to national identity and nationalist values are statistically significant determinants of support for Turkish individuals. In line with the initial expectation, the individuals with stronger nationalist sentiments and attachment to the Turkish identity are less likely to support Turkey's entry into the EU (for similar results for Western Europe see Carey 2002 and McLaren 2002).

On the whole, the Turkish support for membership appears as a good example of specific support; a calculated appraisal of immediate costs and benefits of membership both for the country and the individual. As the opposite of diffuse support, the specific support is sensitive to short term variations.

In conclusion, this research reinforces some of the existing theories that explain individual levels of support for European integration. In relation to the three models that have been presented in the outset of the research, the findings of this study reinforces the propositions of the utilitarian and the nationalist models. As the results of statistical analyses demonstrated, explanations of support such as expectations of personal and country benefits, winners vs. losers of Turkey's membership, and level of education are found to be useful predictors of support for the EU. Furthermore, the Turkish public seems to be sensitive to issues dealing with national identity. The results of the analysis demonstrate that feelings of national identity have a strong influence on individuals' attitudes toward membership. Under the light of the findings, it can be concluded that the utilitarian and national identity models appear to be more explanatory of the Turkish public support for the European Union membership. However, the Turkish support is not based entirely on utilitarian and nationalist models. In addition to the utilitarian and nationalist explanations, non-utilitarian factors such as level of knowledge on European Union, its institutions and policies, belief in the possibility of membership and image of the EU as a closed Christian club

also appear to be influencing to a lesser extent individuals' opinions toward the EU.

This research holds the strength of using two different data collected at a very crucial time in Turkish-EU relations. However, in carrying out this research, I have dealt with certain shortcomings and challenges. The most prominent is the lack of necessary questions in the data sets to further test the value model at individual level. The World Value Survey did not include a direct question on EU membership for Turkish participants. In addition, both data sets lack set of extensive questions that can be utilized to investigate certain aspects in detail, such as religiosity or level of knowledge on EU related issues.

One of the findings of this research is that, over the past years, the Turkish public has portrayed significant support for Turkey's membership to the European Union. However, the results of the analyses also demonstrate that this support is not solid and continuous. It is highly sensitive to the ups and downs of the membership prospects. The Turkish public seems to lose its enthusiasm about membership in times of difficulty. This leads to another important point, the potentials for future changes in the level of support.

As the research revealed, the Turkish public has very high expectations from membership, yet very little knowledge about the European Union. This situation creates the prospects of potential fluctuations in the level of support in the course of negotiations. The fulfillment of these expectations or not is very likely to affect the level of support substantially, especially in the short term. Another important aspect is the influence of strong attachments to the national identity. As the European Union membership includes policy changes in a variety of "sensitive issues" such as increased rights and liberties for minorities, it is also possible that there will be a potential nationalist backlash. With the perception of a threat to the national identity and the nation state, it appears very likely that the support for the EU would decline significantly among the citizens with higher nationalist sentiments.

Demonstrating the significance of national identity and nationalism as a determinant of support in Turkish case can also be considered as a contribution to the overall debate on public opinion and European integration. National identity is a rather new model in explaining public support, and it is not even considered as a model by some of the academics working on the subject. McLaren (2002) for instance, views it as a complementary explanation to the utilitarian model. However, the findings of this study yield to the conclusion that national identity and nationalist sentiments are significant in explaining support by themselves, and national identity model is worthy of attention.

This conclusion has two major implications. First, it is a contribution to the European debate and may be used as a model for understanding better the developments in other candidate or member countries. As it has been seen in the recent outcomes of the elections in Poland and the Czech Republic, both ending with the victories of anti European populist parties putting heavy emphasis on national identities, there is a need for keeping a close eye on the interaction between national identity and public opinion with regards to European integration. Second, the bureaucrats and policy makers dealing with Turkish integration into the European Union should be paying attention to the nationalist sentiments and its potential impacts on the implementation of future policies.

As the influence of the European Union in all spheres of economic and political life increases with the negotiations, the membership issue is becoming the subject of a larger debate within Turkish politics. Until now the parties have all appeared to be supportive of membership. However, it has already started to become a part of party politics, as the leading parties have developed different approaches toward issues related to membership. Hence, the citizens are being subjected to increasing amounts of information and diversified elite positions about the European Union. Thus, it is very likely that the lack of partisan differences which has been dominating the European debate in Turkey may disappear. As the mass media and political elites increasingly focus on EU related issues, “we can expect a change both in the overall pattern of determinants of support and in the calculus of support at the individual level” (Slomczynski and Shabad 2003, p. 505).

The potential changes in public opinion with the increased debate concerning the EU within domestic politics call for further research. This study has focused on 2002, when the EU membership became a part of the political debate to a large extent for the first time with the passage of the first comprehensive reform package by the parliament. Hopefully, with the extension of data collection practices in Turkey, it should become possible to conduct in depth time analysis of support with data pooled in the near future.

Another potential further research area is the opinion formation in Turkey. This study clearly demonstrated that there is a ‘high expectations vs. low level of information’ situation in Turkey. But how did the citizens develop such high levels of expectations without a rational calculation is a question to be investigated.

In any case, what sticks out is the importance of the Turkish public opinion with regards to the European Union. There is a very important task awaiting Turkish politicians, a more formidable task than completing the negotiations: to persuade the people, not just the EU institutions. The Turkish government will have to spend a lot of time explaining why

accession is good for the EU in the capitals of the 25-member states. It will need to spend even more time explaining the process to the Turkish people, because they need to give their consent to the terms of accession.

As the Czech Republic's former chief EU negotiator Pavel Telicka observes, "Accession negotiations are 80 per cent in your own country, 15 per cent in the EU member states and only 5 per cent in Brussels."(Grabbe 2004, p.21)

REFERENCES

Anderson, C. and Tverdova, Y. (2000), “Merging East And West: How East Europeans Form Opinions about Economic Integration into the European Union”. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 30 August-3 September 2000.

Anderson, C. (1998), “When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support for Integration”, *Comparative Political Studies* 31(5): pp. 569-601.

Anderson, C. and Reichert, S. (1996), “Economic Benefits and Support For Membership in the EU: A Cross-National Analysis”, *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol 15, pp.231-249.

Anderson, C., & Kaltenthaler, K. C. (1996). “The Dynamics of Public Opinion toward European Integration, 1973-93”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 2, pp. 175-199.

Arat, T. and Baykal, S. (2001), “AB’yle İlişkiler” (Relations with EU) in Turkish, in Baskin Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası. Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, vol. II, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Asimov, I. (1988), *Prelude to Foundation*, London: Bantam Books.

Balazs, P. (2002), “Internal Communication Strategy and Its Implementation: Public Opinion and EU Accession”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp.15-25.

Birand, M. A. (2005) *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası 1959 – 2004*, (Turkey’s great European Fight) in Turkish, Istanbul: Dogan Yayıncılık.

Bosch, A. and Newton, K. (1995), “Economic Calculus or Familiarity Breeds Content?”, in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds), *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 73-104.

Bruse, W. A. and Griffiths, R. (2004), “Good Intentions and Hidden Motives. Turkey EU Relations in a Historical Perspective”, in Richard T. Griffiths and Durmuş Özdemir (eds.), *Turkey and the EU Enlargement. Process of Incorporation*, Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, pp. 13-27.

Carey, S. (2002), “Undivided Loyalties. Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?”, in *European Union Politics*, vol. 3(4), pp. 387-413.

Çarkoğlu, A. (2003). "Who Wants Full membership? Characteristics of the Turkish Public Support for EU Membership", *Turkish Studies*, vol. 4 No. 1 Spring, pp.171-194.

Çarkoğlu, A. (2004), "Societal Perceptions of Turkey's EU membership. Causes and Consequences of Support for EU membership", in Nergis Canefe and Mehmet Uğur (eds.), *Turkey and European Integration. Accession Prospects and Issues*, Routledge. pp. 19-45.

Çarkoğlu, A. and Rubin, B. (eds.) (2003), *Turkey and the European Union. Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and Internal Dynamics*, London: Frank Cass.

Central European Opinion Research Group Foundation web page www.ceorg-europe.org.

Christin, T. (2003), "The European Union from the Point of View of Candidate Countries: Economic and Political Basis of Attitudes towards EU", paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR conference Marburg, 18-21 September 2003.

Cichowski, R. (2000), "Western Dreams, Eastern Realities, Support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe", *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 33, no 10, pp. 1243-1278.

Dalton, R. J., & Eichenberg, R. C. (1998). "Citizen Support for Policy Integration" in Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet (Eds.), *Supranational governance: The Institutionalization of the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 250-282.

Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Dicey, A. V. (1962), *Law and Public Opinion in England*, London: MacMillan.

Easton, D. (1975), *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Eichenberg, R. and Dalton, R. (1993), "Europeans and the EC: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration", *International Organization* 47(4), pp. 507-534.

Erdemli, O. (2003), "Chronology: Turkey's Relations with the EU", *Turkish Studies*, vol. 4 No. 1 Spring, pp.4-8.

Eralp, A. (1993), "Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-War International System", in Canan Balkir and Alan M. Williams (eds) *Turkey and Europe*, London:Pinter Publishers Ltd., pp. 24-44.

Eralp, A. (1997), "Soğuk Savaş'tan Günümüze Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri", (Turkey-EU relations from Cold War to Present) in Atilla Eralp (ed.) *Türkiye ve Avrupa*,(Turkey and Europe) in Turkish, Ankara:İmge, pp. 88-121.

Erder, N. (1996), *Türkiye’de Siyasi Parti Seçmenlerinin Nitelikleri, Kimlikleri ve Eğilimleri* (Characteristics of Political Party Constituencies, their identities and tendencies in Turkey) in Turkish, Istanbul: TÜSES Publications.

Erder, N. (1999), *Türkiye’de Siyasi Parti Seçmenleri ve Toplum Düzeni* (Political Party Constituencies and Social Order in Turkey) in Turkish, Istanbul: TÜSES Publications.

Erder, N. (2002), *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partilerin Yandaş/Seçmen Profili (1994.2002)* (Profile of Political Party Constituency and Supporter) in Turkish, Istanbul: TÜSES Publications.

Esmer, Y. (1997), “Türk Kamuoyu ve Avrupa” (Turkish Public Opinion and Europe), in *Türkiye Avrupa Birliği’nin Neresinde? Gümrük Birliği Anlaşmasının Düşündürdükleri* (Where is Turkey in Europe? Thoughts on Customs Union with EU) in Turkish, Ayraç Yayınevi: İstanbul, pp. 124-135.

European Commission, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Public Opinion Analysis Sector. CANDIDATE COUNTRIES EUROBAROMETER 2002.2, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2002 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Budapest: Gallup Organization Hungary (Magyar Gallup Intezet) [producer], 2002. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 2004.

European Commission, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Public Opinion Analysis Sector. CANDIDATE COUNTRIES EUROBAROMETER 2001.1, OCTOBER 2001 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Budapest: Gallup Organization Hungary (Magyar Gallup Intezet) [producer], 2001. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 2004

European Commission, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Public Opinion Analysis Sector. CANDIDATE COUNTRIES EUROBAROMETER 2003.2, MAY 2003 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Budapest: Gallup Organization Hungary (Magyar Gallup Intezet) [producer], 2003. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 2004.

European Commission, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Public Opinion Analysis Sector. CANDIDATE COUNTRIES EUROBAROMETER 2003.4, OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 2003 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Budapest: Gallup Organization Hungary (Magyar Gallup Intezet) [producer], 2003. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 2004

European Commission. Directorate-General Press and Communication, joint full report of EUROBAROMETER 61 AND CC EUROBAROMETER 2004.1, retrieved from <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/>

European Commission. Directorate-General Press and Communication, full report of Standard EUROBAROMETER 62, retrieved from <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/>

European Commission. Directorate-General Press and Communication, joint full report of EUROBAROMETER 63, retrieved from <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/>

European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association (2004), *European And World Values Surveys Integrated Data File, 1999-2002, Release I* [Computer file]. 2nd ICPSR version. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA)/Tilburg, Netherlands: Tilburg University/Amsterdam, Netherlands: Netherlands Institute for Scientific Information Services (NIWI)/Madrid, Spain: Analisis Sociologicos Economicos y Politicos (ASEP) and JD Systems (JDS)/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producers], 2004. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA)/Madrid, Spain: Analisis Sociologicos Economicos y Politicos (ASEP) and JD Systems (JDS)/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors].

Gabel M. and Whitten, G., (1997): "Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration", *Political Behaviour* 19(1), pp. 81-96.

Gabel, M. (1998a), *Interests and Integration: Market Liberalisation, Public Opinion and European Union*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Gabel, M. (1998b), "Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European Union", *American Journal of Political Science* 42(3), pp. 936-953.

Gabel, M. and Palmer, H.D. (1995). "Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration". *European Journal of Political Research* 27, pp. 3-19.

Gabel, M. and Whitten, G. (1997). "Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration". *Political Behavior*, 19, pp. 81-96.

Gelleny, R. and Anderson, C. (2000), "The Economy, Accountability and Public Support for the President of the European Commission", *European Union Politics*, vol.1, no.2, pp.173-200.

Gibson, J. L. and Caldeira, G. (1995), "The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: Compliance, Support and the European Court of Justice", in *American Journal of Political Science*, 39 (2), pp. 459-489.

Grabbe, H. (2004), "When Negotiations Begin: The Next Phase in EU-Turkey Relations", in *Insight Turkey*, vol. 6, no.4, pp. 13-21.

Inglehart, R. (1970), "Cognitive Mobilisation and European Identity", *Comparative Politics*, 3, pp. 45-70.

Inglehart, R. (1971), "Changing Value Priorities and European Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 10, pp.1-36.

Inglehart, R. (1977a). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1977b), "Long Term Trends in Mass support for European Unification". *Government and Opposition* 12, pp. 150-177.

Inglehart, R. (1997), *Modernization and Postmodernization; Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. and Rabier, J. (1978), "Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity: Public Opinion Trends", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 440, pp. 66-97.

Inglehart, R. and Reif, K. (1991), "Analysing Trends in Western European Opinion: The Role of Eurobarometer Surveys", in K. Reif and R. Inglehart (eds.), *Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Inglehart, R., Rabier, J. and, Reif, K: (1987), "The Evolution of Public Attitudes toward European Integration 1970-86", *Journal of European Integration*, 10, pp. 135-155.

Inglehart, Ronald, et al. (2000), *World Values Surveys And European Values Surveys, 1981-1984, 1990- 1993, And 1995-1997* [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research [producer], 2000. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].

Janssen, J.H. (1991), "Post Materialism, Cognitive Mobilisation and Support for European Integration", *British Journal of Political Science*, 21, pp. 443-468.

Kalaycıoğlu, E. (1999), "The Shaping of Political Preferences in Turkey: Coping with the Post-Cold-War Era", in *New Perspectives on Turkey*, vol.20, no.1, pp.47-76.

Kleinbaum, D. (1994), *Logistic Regression: A Self Learning Text*, New York, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.

Koç, T. (2004), *Küreselleşme ve Türkiye Basınında Avrupa Birliğine Adaylık Süreci* (Globalization and Membership process to the European Union in the Turkish Press) in Turkish, Ankara:Naturel.

Kritzinger, S. (2003), "The Influence of Nation-State on Individual Support for the European Union", *European Union Politics*, vol. 4 (2), pp.219-241.

Lewin, L. (1991), *Self Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics*, Oxford: Oxford Uni Press.

Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1986). *Economics and Elections*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lindberg, L.N. and Scheingold, S.A. (1970), *Europe's Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Linz, J., and Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lippmann, W. (1946), *Public Opinion*, New York: Penguin (*Original publication, 1922 by Macmillan*).

Long, S. (1997), *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*, London:Sage.

McLaren, L. (2002), "Public Support for the European Union; Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?", *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 64, no.2, pp. 551-566.

McLaren, L. and Müftüler-Baç, M. (2003), "Turkish Parliamentarians' Perspectives on Turkey's Relations with the EU", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.4, No.1, Spring, pp.195-219.

Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (1997). *Five Years After the Fall: The Trajectory and Dynamics of Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*. Unpublished manuscript, Quoted in Cichovski, R. (2000),p. 1214.

Niedermayer, O. and Westle, B (1995), "A Typology of Orientations", in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds), *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 33-51.

Norpoth, H., Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Lafay, J.-D. (eds.). (1991). *Economics and Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Nye, J.S. (1971), *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown.

Pampel, F.C. (2000), *Logistic Regression: A premier*, Sage University Papers Series On Quantitative Applications In The Social Sciences, 07-132. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Rose, H. and Haerpfer, C. (1995), "Democracy and Enlarging the European Union Eastwards.", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3, pp.427-450.

Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000), "The Political Basis of Support for European Integration", *European Union Politics*, vol. 1(2), pp. 147-171.

Shepherd, R. J. (1975). *Public Opinion and European Integration*. Westmead, UK: Saxon House.

Sinnott, R. (1995), "Bringing Public Opinion Back In", in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds), *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 11-32.

Siune, K. and Svensson, P. (1993), "The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: The Danish EC referendum of June 1992", in *Electoral Studies*, 12 (2), pp. 99-111.

Slomczynski K. M. and Shabad G. (2003), "Dynamics of Support for European Integration in Post-Communist Poland", in *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 42, pp. 503-539.

Szczerbiak, A (2000), *Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership In Poland*, Sussex European Institute working paper no. 34, Brighton: SEI.

Tabachnick, B. and Fidell, L. (2001), *Using Multivariate Statistics (4th edition)*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Transatlantic Trends 2004, report retrieved from, <www.transatlantictrends2004.org>

Tsoukalis, L.. (1981). *The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement*. Sydney, Australia: Allen and Unwin.

Tucker, J.A, Pacek A. and Berinsky, A. (2002), "Transitional Winners and Losers: Attitudes Toward EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries.", in *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 46, no.3, pp.557-571.

Turkish National Statistics Institute <www.die.gov.tr>

TÜSES (Turkish Social Economic and Political Studies Foundation) (1999), *Türkiye'de Siyasi Parti Seçmenleri ve Toplum Düzeni* (Political Party Constituencies and Social Order in Turkey) in Turkish, Boyut matbaacilik; Istanbul.

Wallace, W. (1990). *The Transformation of Western Europe*. London: Pinter.

Zaller, J. (1992), *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

APPENDIX : Calculation of Socio Economic Index

Socio Economic Index:

The calculation of the Socio Economic Index (SEI) is based on the formulation of Necat Erder (1996). However, as the data sets being used have slight differences, the SEI created is not identical with his model due to differences in survey questions.

The SEI utilized is created by relative ranking of the following elements: *Occupation of the respondent; education level; ownership of certain household items; income; Housing type; number of working adults living in the household; usage of internet.*

The calculation of points is as follows:

1- Employment points:

<i>Employment</i>	<i>Employment point</i>
paid staff in private business	6
civil servant	6
worker in private sector	4
worker in public sector	4
work in own account and professions requiring specialization (doctor, engineer, etc...)	11
work for salary and profession requiring specialization (doctor, engineer, etc...)	10
work in own account and profession does not require specialization (shopkeepers, ,etc)	8
Work in own account and does big scale commerce (factory owners, export/import)	12
high level executive in private sector	10
High level executive in public sector	10
middle level executive in private sector	9
Middle level executive in public sector	9
Athlete or artist	9
Retired	3
Student	1
Unemployed	1
House wife/man	1
Benefits from interest / rent venue	7
Agricultural field	7

The SEI index point is calculated within the following ranges:

<u>Emp. Point</u>	<u>Index point</u>		
High socio economic class	A	10-12	5
Upper middle socio economic class	B	8-9	4
Middle socio economic class	C1	5-7	3
Lower middle class	C2	3-4	2
Low socio economic class	D	1-2	1

2- *Adults working in the household:*

2 points are given for every individual working in the house.

3- *Education points:*

Education points are calculated as follows:

<i>Last school graduated</i>	<i>Index points</i>
University or higher	5
High school	4
Middle school	3
Primary school	2
Literate – no primary school graduate	1

4- *Ownership of household items:*

Each person is rewarded the following points for different items that they were asked in the questionnaire:

<i>Household item</i>	<i>Ownership points</i>
Car	17
Telephone	1
Dishwasher	4
Washing machine	2
Mobile phone	3
Credit card	4
PC	5

(If any of the variables was system missing, the respondent is considered as system missing and excluded from the index)

The SEI index point is calculated within the following ranges:

<u>Emp. Point</u>	<u>Index point</u>		
High socio economic class	A	29-36	5
Upper middle socio economic class	B	24-28	4
Middle socio economic class	C1	12-23	3
Lower middle class	C2	6-11	2
Low socio economic class	D	0-5	1

5- *Usage of internet:*

2 point for *often using the internet* , 1 points for *using the internet sometimes*

6- *House points:*

House points are calculated in a complex way, which includes the combination of 3 categories; *Ownership of the house, type of dwelling and living in a rural or urban area.*

The respondents were awarded different points for each of the categories listed above and the points from each of the categories are added at the end in order to find the index point.

a- *Ownership of the house:* Own house: 2 / Apartment/house provided for an employee by employer: 1 / Rent/others: 0

b- *Type of dwelling:* Luxury: 2 / middle: 1/ shanty: 0

c- *Residence area:* province center: 4 / District center: 3/ Village: 1/ others: 0

The SEI index point is calculated within the following ranges:

<u>Emp. Point</u>	<u>Index point</u>		
High socio economic class	A	7-8	5
Upper middle socio economic class	B	6-5	4
Middle socio economic class	C1	4-3	3
Lower middle class	C2	2-1	2
Low socio economic class	D	0	1

7- *Income points:*

Regarding the income, the following question was asked in the survey and the respondents were given 12 ranges to choose from. *Taking last 6 months into consideration, can you please tell which one of the following groups your average income of your household (including all salaries, incomes from rent and interest and all others) is most close to?*

The minimum salary declared by the state for the first 6 months of 2002 was 222,750,000 TL¹. By taking the mid points of each category and calculating the distance from (the minimum wage X the number of working adults in the house), the following points were calculated:

¹ Results of the first period revenue and employment survey 2002, Turkish statistic institute, retrieved from <www.die.gov.tr> on 01 March 2005.

<i>Income category</i>	<i>Index points</i>
Less than 150M	1.5
150M-250M	2
250M-350M	2.5
350M-450M	3
450M-550M	3.5
550M-750M	4
750M-1B	4.5
1B-1.5B	5
1.5B-2B	5.5
2B-3B	6
3B-5B	6.5
5B- more	7

Final calculation of the SEI points:

When all the index points from 7 items listed above are summed up, the final accumulative index points are obtained between 3 and 36, which are transformed once again to a 5 point scale:

SEI category		Total index points	SEI point
High socio economic class	A	28-above	5
Upper middle socio economic class	B	22-27	4
Middle socio economic class	C1	17-21	3
Lower middle class	C2	12-16	2
Low socio economic class	D	3-12	1

Figures & Tables

Tables	
Table 2.1. Academic data collection in Turkey	48
Table 2.2. Data by private companies in Turkey	49
Table 3.1. Comparison of Çarkoğlu et. al. and CCEB 2002.2	53
Table 3.2. Image of EU for Turkish respondents (CCEB data)	54
Table 3.3 Categories applied in the analysis of open-ended questions	56
Table 3.4 Support for EU membership – Summary Table (Data from Turkish researchers)	59
Table 3.5 Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union would be...? (CCEB DATA)	62
Table 3.6 Vote in the referendum for EU membership (CCEB data)	64
Table 3.7 Conceptualization of the support for EU membership in Turkey	65
Table 3.8: Average scores of level of knowledge (CCEB DATA)	71
Table 3.9. Trivia results (number of correct answers) (CCEB DATA)	72
Table 3.10 Level of knowledge and vote in referendum (Çarkoğlu et.al.)	73
Table 3.11. Level of knowledge and vote in referendum (CCEB 2002.2)	74
Table 3.12 Post-materialist/materialist values in Turkey	76
Table 3.13 Age and Post-materialist/materialist values in Turkey	78
Table 3.14 Support for Democratic reforms and human rights (Çarkoğlu et.al.)	81
Table 3.15 Cognitive mobility and support for membership (CCEB 2002.2)	84
Table 3.16 Demographics and Winners/losers of membership (Çarkoğlu et.al.)	88
Table 3.17 Expectations from EU (Erder Data)	93
Table 3.18 Expectations from Turkey's EU membership (Transatlantic Trends Data)	95
Table 3.19 Personal expectations and membership (CCEB data)	96
Table 3.20 Personal expectations and support (CCEB 2002.2)	97
Table 3.21. Nationalism & Patriotism and support for EU membership (Çarkoğlu et.al.)	101
Table 3.22 Self identification (CCEB 2002.2)	102
Table 3.23. Self identification and vote for membership (CCEB 2002.2)	103
Table 3.24. Fears related to building of Europe (CCEB Data)	105
Table 3.25. Self Assessment of Religiosity and Fasting (Çarkoğlu et. al.)	109
Table 3.26 Self Assessment of Religiosity (Çarkoğlu et. al.)	110
Table 3.27. Self Assessment of Religiosity and vote in referendum (Çarkoğlu et. al.)	111
Table 4.1 Models and related indicators	117
Table 4.2 List of variables utilized in the model	120
Table 4.3. Logistic Regression Results (Çarkoğlu et.al.)	127
Table 4.4 Logistic Regression Results (CCEB 2002.2)	128
Figures	
Figure 3.1. Is EU a Christian Club? (Çarkoğlu et.al.)	57
Figure 3.2 Perceived level of knowledge on Copenhagen criteria (Çarkoğlu et.al.)	70
Figure 3.3 Expectations and support (Çarkoğlu et.al.)	92

