

NATO and EU: Competitors or Co-Operators?

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Introduction

A comparative study about the relations between the EU and NATO carries no logic. It would not be useful to compare these two structural organizations because they are not much alike. NATO is a political-military Atlantic Alliance which exists since 1949. EU on the other hand is a unique organization which consists of several member states which delegate economic, financial, environmental and legal sovereignties. Till 2000, EU had not a Military Staff. As EU decided to form a politico-military structure in December 2000 in Nice, United States supported this idea. United States, thought that EU should undertake its own security responsibility but within limits and in the context of NATO. United States plays significant role in NATO; likewise it has significant roles in many international organizations. Also United States is EU's largest trade partner and beside, EU and NATO have something common which cannot be ignored. Twenty one members of the European Union are also members of NATO and five has formal relations with NATO. For NATO, Europe is an effective and strong partner in its fight against global terrorism. Although United States is a superpower, world is changing rapidly and alternative power centers are developing.² The only way to increase European military capability is a greater degree of European defense integration. In other words, the survival of NATO depends largely on the development of credible European military capabilities. For EU to have an independent security policy seems not possible because it will be too costly. For global threats, competition of NATO and EU is far away from being beneficial not for themselves but also for the global world. Regarding these

¹ Uzman, Ankara Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü.

² Winn Neil, 2003, "CFSP, ESDP, and the Future of European Security: Whither NATO?", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. IX, Issue 2, p.151.

facts; this study looks at firstly basis of the partnership and relationship between EU and NATO. In the second part, European Security and EU-NATO relationship starting from St. Malo Summit will be evaluated. In the final part, the importance of Treaty of Lisbon and NATO's Lisbon Summit will be discussed in terms of relations between EU and NATO. The Issue about Turkey -which has an important place in relations as being one of the most important non-EU members of NATO-, will be evaluated. Finally, the debate about being a global player will be discussed in the light of the critical question whether EU and NATO are competitors or co-operators. Because it is clear that these two organizations serve for difference purposes and are complementary, the main argument is not whether they are competitors or co-operators it is rather how to improve the relations in order to be more effective co-operators.

NATO and EU in the Globalizing World

Basis of EU-NATO Strategic Partnership

The origins of both NATO and EU provide cornerstones of European success after 1945. Both organizations came about in a post-World War environment. For EU, the establishment of Steel and Coal Community for economic interests in 1951 was the first step; for NATO an anti-Soviet pact in 1949 for a collective defense can be thought as a starting point.³ After the Cold War, when the danger of war terminated, adherence to NATO diminished and local efforts came to question. In that period, Germany was seen as a threat. From the beginning of mid 1948s, when the relations between Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and West German got worse, it was understood that peace in Europe cannot be solved solely by Germany, it can be solved mostly by USSR. Contrary to this threat, Brussels Treaty was not enough and it has been decided a transatlantic common defense policy with participation of USA and Canada should be formed. With Washington Treaty coming into force in 9 April 1949, NATO is established. By the establishment of NATO, West Europe became under the force of NATO in the bipolar world. The establishment of NATO unfortunately did not erase fully the inner European security concern. France has continuously doubts about armament of Germany, after the Korean War, USA had decided that Europe should take the responsibility to defense itself. What should be done was to arm Germany and include it to NATO. As an alternative, France proposed to form a federal European Army. However, this proposal was rejected by France National Assembly. With Paris Agreement which was signed in 1954, West European

³ Kampmark Binoy, (2008), "Limits of Expansion: The European Union and NATO", *Contemporary Review*, Vol.290, No.1691, p.441.

Union (WEU) was established and Federal Germany became a member of NATO under the control of WEU.

After this period, NATO became the main actor about European defense related issues. WEU could not become an important actor and remained ineffective. NATO's first aim was to provide 'secure space' for its European members. While the EU member states were an integral part of American strategy during Cold War, they acquired an autonomous role in European security in the post Cold War era. Beginning with the Maastricht Treaty the EU began to think about not only its role in the world but also the appropriate means by which to carry out such roles.⁴ In the 1990s, George H. Bush administration requested that Europe shares a great slice of the Atlantic burden and increase its contribution to regional security in Europe by creating a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). This arrangement which was decided to take place inside NATO essentially allowed European forces to borrow American military assets to conduct crisis management missions in Europe's immediate neighborhood. This was agreed upon at the NATO Council in Berlin in 1996 and became known as 'Berlin Plus' agreement. Detailed and complicated negotiations on the agreement lasted until December 2002 and with this date, where an institutionalized and strategic partnership between the two organizations is formally started. Despite differences in methods between the EU and NATO, countries which are members of both organizations do not have forces assigned exclusively to one or the other organization: thus, since the forces come from the same pool, improvements made by one will necessarily benefit the other as long as there is some basic coordination. Giving credence to the idea that the Berlin Plus arrangements might actually reflect the whole EU-NATO relationship can be viewed as an attempt to wield influence over fields which fall outside the scope of Berlin Plus. These fields include work on improving military capabilities, arrangements for associating non EU-NATO members with European operations and the use of an alliance member's resources for an EU military operation.⁵

The Security Issue between NATO and EU

Competition is the inevitable consequence of the functional and geographic overlap between NATO and EU. The EU's required degree of autonomy in the field of foreign and security policy is at the core of the debate.

⁴ Zyla Benjamin, (2011), "Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO's Strategic (Sub-)Culture", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol.32, No.3, p.667.

⁵ Morel Jean-François, (2004), "EU-NATO Relations: A European Vision", **Baltic Defence Review**, No.11, Vol.1, p.86.

This debate goes straight back to the foundation of the EU and its second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), by the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. The creation of CFSP was to a large extent motivated by the concern that after the end of the cold war the United States – and thus NATO – could no longer be relied upon to automatically take upon itself the resolution of every security issue with which Europe could be confronted.⁶ Civil war in former Yugoslavia also proved this. It became disastrously clear that for lack of foreign and security policy structures had not yet come, that the United States intervened after all, whereas Washington initially saw the conflict as a European problem to be solved by the Europeans. When in 1997 Albania descended into anarchy, Washington again made it clear that neither the United States nor NATO would volunteer, assuming that Europe should bear first-line responsibility for peace and security in its own backyard. In the absence of automatic American intervention, a capacity for autonomous EU action is a necessity. In combination with the obvious shortcomings of existing European capabilities, as evidenced in Kosovo in 1999, this was the motivation for the creation of CFSP and, in 1999, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which replaced the now near-defunct Western European Union as the EU's own military arm. An autonomous capacity instead of relying exclusively on an American-led alliance and on the United States itself also becomes a necessity when US intervention is no longer automatically considered legitimate and opportune.⁷

The 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was rejected by a number of key EU member states and by public opinion almost throughout the EU, provides an evident example. In the wake of the invasion and the upsurge of global terrorism that it has provoked, there is a lingering fear that a US administration that considers itself engaged in a “long war” could draw its allies into further risky adventures with negative consequences for the security and the image of the EU.⁸ For that concern it was thought that NATO would be instrumentalized in function of a US policy that is not shared by all allies, a fear to the recent tendency to put all NATO activities under the heading of the fight against terrorism, might give credibility. These fears highlight the fact that the post-cold war period has indeed produced a strategic divide between the EU and the United States, whose interests, policies and priorities no longer always coincide. The United States pictures itself as the pillar of a unipolar

⁶ Stefanova Boyka, (2005), “The European Union as a Security Actor”, **World Affairs**, Vol. 168, No.2, p.55.

⁷ Winn Neill, op. cit., p.154.

⁸ Bailes Alyson J.K., (2008), “The EU and a ‘Better World’: What Role for the European Security and Defense Policy?”, **International Affairs**, 84:1, p.120.

world, reserving the right to act unilaterally and via ad hoc coalitions, and operating via the United Nations (UN) only when it is in its interest. The EU on the contrary advocates a holistic approach that seeks to integrate all instruments, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military, into a structural policy of prevention and stabilization, operating through partnerships and rule-based, “effective multilateralism”. In such an approach the use of force is an instrument of last resort, which in principle can only be reverted to with a mandate from the UN Security Council. Clearly the EU and the United States view the world differently: according to the United States, the world is dangerous, according to the EU, the world is complex, as a European diplomat worded it. The European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted in itself is the clearest indication of the dilution of the consensus on a common purpose between all NATO allies. The ESS sets forth a very ambitious agenda: redrawing the multilateral architecture in order to assure effective global governance and, within that framework, stabilizing states and regions via intrusive bilateral partnerships. It resolutely opts for the EU as a global rather than a regional actor. As the ESS states, the EU with twenty-seven member states, over 450 million people and a quarter of the world’s gross national product is inevitably a global player.⁹ Whether it will also be a global power, that is whether it will proactively influence the world, depends on the strengthening of its emerging strategic culture: the political will, including in demanding situations, to take decisions true to its strategic objectives and to put to use all necessary instruments to implement them.

During the cold war and before Maastricht, the idea of Europe as a power in its own right was irrelevant, as all allies fundamentally subscribed to NATO’s strategy in view of the dominating threat of the Soviet Union, while the European Economic Community (EEC) and the WEU lacked the capacity anyway to play such a role. Since then however, the EU has not only increasingly fostered the ambition, but is also continuously developing its capacity to be a global strategic actor, especially since the creation of ESDP. That constitutes a new structural factor in transatlantic relations. But because this development coincided with NATO’s reorientation towards global peace support operations, it is also the core of a permanent debate, which haunts policy making ever since the early 1990s. Because today’s missions, peace support operations are in effect operations of choice, depending upon a political assessment, rather than defense against an existential threat as during the cold war, this strategic divide has immediate operational consequences for

⁹ Biscop, Sven (2007), “NATO and EU: No Transformation without Re-equilibration” Paper presented at the 48th ISA Annual Convention Chicago, p.3.

NATO. It is difficult to see, for example, in which scenario all allies would agree on deploying the NATO Response Force (NRF) for a high-intensity operation, which is its primary purpose.¹⁰

European Security and NATO-EU Relations

St. Malo Summit

In the autumn of 1998, when prime minister of England, Tony Blair, decided to strengthen the role of EU defense policy, vision of EU in the area of defense has changed broadly. Tony Blair has explained his thought in North Atlantic Assembly. This initiative of Blair was seen confusing, and welcomed by Neo-Gaullists in France. Blair's main aim was to be the leader of a defense system which will protect both EU and NATO from the unwanted consequences of the new forming-system. Because England is not included in the common monetary system, it wanted to fill this gap with defense policy. France prime minister Jacques Chirac, welcomed this and invited Tony Blair to St. Malo in December 1998. After this meeting, St. Malo Declaration offered a new military formation and as a result EU will be the leader political power. In this perspective, it was decided that EU will be the leader of the operations which allies that are members of NATO but non-members of EU. With this declaration, the role of WEU has finalized. St. Malo initiative is welcomed by USA because the amount which USA had to pay was rapidly increasing. USA no longer wants to share the financial responsibility with EU.¹¹ However, this does not mean that USA wants to be apart from the European defense, USA wanted to protect the current situation without much financial loss. St. Malo Declaration is a turning point in European defense area. Because all the discussions related to European defense were channeled to EU. European Security and Defense Identity turned to European Security and Defense Policy.

Development of European Security and Defense Policy

After St. Malo Summit, important decisions were taken in 1999 Helsinki Summit. In this summit, it was decided that till 2003, EU will have a military Committee. With these decisions, it was supposed that NATO will lose its power. German Prime Minister Fischer declared in June 2000 that, this

¹⁰ Biscop Sven, op. cit., p.4.

¹¹ Ceylanoğlu Altay, (2007), "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası: Bölgesel Bütünleşmeden Küresel Aktörlüğe", Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, p.11.

defense system of Europe will strengthen NATO. During Kosovo War which emerged just after St. Malo Summit, EU contribution was insufficient and it was seen that EU has dropped behind USA in terms of using high technology in military areas. In Nice Summit in 2000, important decisions were taken related to usage of NATO power and necessary arrangements were done to include the countries to EU operations that are members of NATO but non-members of EU. In this period Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Turkey, Iceland and Norway had an uncertain situation. Especially Turkey, which had second largest land force in NATO after USA, would be included to the defense platform however would not have a decision making authority. Turkey stated that unless it has no decision making authority, it would veto the transfer of NATO sources to Rapid Reaction Force. Turkey gave up from this decision with the mediation of England and USA.¹² Despite shortfalls and the outstanding issue of whether the EU will reach an agreement with NATO on the use of NATO assets for EU-led operations, ESDP was a prematurely declared operational at the Laeken European Council on 14-15 December 2001.¹³

The development of an ESDP as a further advance of the EU's foreign and security political strength has been amazingly rapid. After this policy came into life; the EU has troops assigned to it, and is constantly developing their skills through means such as the battle group concept. It has been and is involved in several civilian and military crisis management operations, and has achieved a co-operation agreement with NATO for the use of NATO assets in such operations. The new Constitutional Treaty includes a terrorism-related solidarity clause, further widening of the already ample Petersburg tasks, a European Defense Agency and even a mutual defense clause. This was not a thing that can be predicted because; in a longer time perspective, analyses of security political co-operation within the EU have mainly concentrated on the improbability of such a development. The surprise effect of the rapid steps taken stems partly from a research tradition in which the problem to be explained has been the absence of security political integration. The fact that security political integration has not been achieved may even have turned into a normative standpoint against it ever emerging. Change rubs against the existing balance or harmony created by well-rehearsed statements of how things are. Two examples of such negative interpretations of the EU's new security political role are: first, the view that such a change to the EU's external image might decrease what has been seen as one of the EU's assets

¹² Orallı Levent Ersin, (2007) "Güvenlik Politikaları Bağlamında AB-ABD İlişkileri ve Irak Savaşı", *Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi* 9/3, p.232.

¹³ Winn Neill, op. cit., p.154.

on the international arena – legitimacy, which, in turn, has been attributed to the fact that it is a civilian or normative power that does not even have military means at its disposal. Second, the EU is perceived as a threat to another organization, NATO, or to transatlantic relations more generally, where a harmonious state of affairs would now seem to require a division of labor and role specialization between the two organizations.

The steps that are taken by EU in order to develop a common security and defense policy have brought several discussions about European security. The real reason about the concerns is the fact that EU has the possibility to use the military forces which it created with its own resources, independently from NATO and USA. USA actually supports EU's efforts about security and defense related issues. However EU, if becomes a competitor against NATO and claims to provide the security of Europe independently from USA, this would certainly create a problem. In a speech in London in 1999, deputy foreign minister of USA, Strobe Talbott, clarified that USA would not accept a EDSP that was borne in NATO, develops out of NATO and finally become an independent organization from NATO.¹⁴ When the development about EDSP after Helsinki Summit was insufficient, USA approved a new plan in May 2004, Head Line Goal 2010, which primarily focuses on Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Plan predicts that little war alliances named "European intervention unity" and "Battle Groups" will set up for the military intervention on a global scale. Apart from this, with the initiative of Netherlands and France in 2004 gendarmerie force of 800 people from France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Netherlands. In 23 January 2006, European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) headquarter in Italy was opened. That means, Europe has three operational forces in military area: RRF, European Battle Groups, European Gendarmerie Force. For NATO, after 11 September attacks, "NATO Rapid Reaction Force" was established in order to move more elastic and fast against terrorism. There are similarities between this force and EU Emergency combat force and EU's War Groups. This displays the possibility that EU will have interventions which may result with replacement of NATO with EU. Another similarity is between NATO's out of area concept and EU's neighborhood policy. With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, borders have reached to Black Sea and thus EU has the possibility to have more effective policy related to Caucasus and Middle Asia. Despite these signals of competition, it is not possible to say that there is no cooperation between NATO and EU. EU, in 1 April 2003 in Macedonia, undertook the task of peace protection with 320 people force and realized the

¹⁴ Akçadağ Emine, (2010), "NATO ve Avrupa Birliği: Ortaklar mı, Rakipler mi?" www.bilgesam.com.tr, retrieved 15.05.2013

first military operation. This experience made it possible for EU to take over the SFOR peace force in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO with 7000 people force and EUFOR took action. Beside, EU undertook peace protection duty during elections in Congo with 1300 people force under UN mandate. These tasks show that EU obtained visibility and even if it is limited with Petersberg tasks, it formed a military intervention force.¹⁵

For the UK, ESDP was essentially a NATO project with an EU instrument; for France, it was an EU Project with an Atlanticist instrument. As long as the emphasis was on forging the European dimension of the new transatlantic order, this ambiguity might have delayed progress, but it did not bring unsurpassable problems. After 11 September and particularly as the Iraq crisis mounted, that ceased to be the case. The intra-EU divisions over policy towards the Iraq crisis stemmed from differing responses to new implications in the field of international law and specifically in the use of pre-emptive warfare as an instrument of policy. Three players all had a major role in this unfolding drama. Tony Blair had been the driving force behind ESDP in its early years. However, after 11 September, Blair became convinced that, while still important, European security autonomy was a second-order priority behind the global war on terror. Blair believes that the UK can act as a pivotal force between the EU and the US in this new global campaign.¹⁶ After this point, it became clear that cooperation is needed between the prominent forces.

EU and NATO: Co-Operation or Competition?

NATO-EU Relations After Lisbon Summit and Issue of Turkey

Lisbon Treaty which came into force in 2009 had effects to European security structure. The missions of Commissioner for External Relations and High Representative for The Common Foreign and Security Policy were combined and new authority named High Representative for foreign and security policy was formed. Also, rotating presidency system removed and a permanent president was elected. With Lisbon Treaty, provisions related to EDSP included first time to Union Treaties and opened the way for gaining legal obligations. In this area “permanent structural cooperation” was predicted and way has opened up the possibility to apply “strengthened cooperation” to issues related to military and security. However it was indirectly stated that, provisions of security and defense issues in Lisbon

¹⁵ Akçadağ, (2010), *ibid*.

¹⁶ Howorth Jolyon, (2003), “ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock?”, **Cooperation or Conflict**, 38:235, p.247.

Treaty does not show that it is predicted for EU to form itself a permanent military force (European Army). Current developments show that competition pushed into the background in terms of EU-NATO relations. USA President Obama emphasizes the importance of forming close relationships based on cooperation between EU-NATO. International Security Defense Undersecretary Alexander Vershbow clarified that there is no more a debate about whether EU and NATO complementary or competitors. From now on, the focus is to increase EU's capacity. On the other hand, in Europe continent it seems not possible to exclude NATO and institutionalize another structure because of the opposition of England and Eastern Europe countries. For these countries which constitute NATO's side in EU, a changing NATO is still very important and it is not possible to think a European security without NATO cannot be thought. Beside, as it was seen in Iraq war in 2003 despite the opposition of France and Germany to the operation; Italy, Spain and Eastern European countries crusaded with USA. This shows that necessary cooperation in the area of common foreign policy and security strategy has not been formed yet. On the other hand, France which played a key role in forming European Security and Defense Policy, decided to rejoin military wing made it to think it is impossible to form an EDSP independent from NATO. Full military integration of the 12 Central and East European states within the defense structures of the Alliance is a key challenge, even if it is not the only one. To the public, the priority task is to successfully complete the NATO mission to Afghanistan. But the fundamental truth is that the Alliance was brought to being in order to defend Europe. NATO's future will be determined not in the mountains of Afghanistan on the Pakistani border, but in Europe and in relations between Europe and the United States. Therefore, the next important task is to work out a way to integrate NATO's strategy with the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The problems that have piled up in this respect, especially in the context of Turkey-Greece relations, make it more difficult—at the practical and institutional level—to establish a new-model partnership. For this “Gordian knot” to be cut, courage and an unconventional approach are needed not only on the part of Turkey, but also all stakeholders, including the United States. NATO and Europe should regain their due place in the U.S. global strategy.¹⁷ Turkey is a very strategic partner for each organization with its geographical situation and powerful army however not having an EU membership yet, and the problem about Cyprus makes the relations somehow entrapped.

¹⁷ Rotfeld Adam Daniel, (2010), “NATO 2020: A New Strategic Concept of the Alliance”, **The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs**, No.4, p.22.

In NATO Summit which took place in Lisbon in 19-20 November 2010, 28 members of NATO confirmed the new strategic concept which will shape the next 10-15 years of the cooperation. In the missile defense system, Russia is invited to cooperate with NATO and at the same time demands from Turkey are welcomed. USA Minister Obama stated that: “We have reached a consensus about the missile defense system that will cover all European States and USA”. The signing of this document which defines the role of NATO in 21.Century, General Secretary of NATO qualifies the moment as historical. In the document which has NATO-EU common emphasis, the countries which are not EU members but NATO members like Turkey, Norway and Iceland have contributing a lot to EU missions and the meaning of this contribution to the principle of the indivisibility of the security of the alliance. Besides; there is an expression: “An alliance does not evaluate any country as enemy but no one should doubt the stability of NATO in case of a threat of a single member country.”¹⁸ Missile defense system which has been agreed upon, is a very costly system which requires totally 45 billion Euro and each NATO member should pay 200 million USD every year for 10 years. This amount is too much for EU countries which struggle with budget deficits and unemployment. NATO-EU cooperation is then left to General Secretary Rasmussen who thinks this amount is not too much to provide security for member countries.

Turkey originally had an associate partnership status in the WEU, which could be described as the institutional precursor to ESDP. This status allowed it, as a non-EU partner to take part, in practically all WEU activities and at a minimum entailed a say in decision-shaping as well as a sense of belonging in the club. Exclusion from meetings and decisions was more the exception and participation was close to being the role. Although, Turkey could not have the opportunity of being a full member, at least it had the opportunity to make its voice heard. When the WEU was replaced by EDSP as the EU’s operational arm, Turkey lost its status as an associate member. Despite such setbacks, the Turkish position from the very beginning with regard to ESDI, later ESDP, as well as the development of NATO-EU relations has been and continues to be fully supportive. In fact, Turkey has contributed to eight ESDP missions and will continue. Until mid-2007, Turkey declared a reinforced brigade to the EU’s force planning target-the Helsinki Headline Goal 2010. Moreover, being a member of one of these organizations and a country negotiating for accession to the other, Turkey strongly feels that it is a matter of national interest to support closer relations between NATO and EU in accordance with the agreed modalities. It can be said that, suggestions that Turkey is opposed

¹⁸ Demir Metehan, “Füze Kalkanı’nda Uzlaşma: Türkiye’nin 3 Talebi Kabul Edildi”, www.euroctiv.com.tr, retrieved 05.06.2013

to closer NATO ties with the EU as a way of punishing the latter for letting in the Greek Cypriots or for dragging its feet on Turkey's own accession process are misleading. As an important non-EU member country, Turkey desires enhanced NATO-EU ties and to the extent possible, a meaningful role in ESDP, but finds these roads blocked.¹⁹ It will be a loss for both the EU and Turkey if this downward spiral relation continues, as defense and security is an area where enhanced cooperation would have great promise. In order to strengthen NATO-EU relations; Turkey-Cyprus issue should be solved. Turkey's EU accession would be the best solution to this problem. Till this accession period, a status to Turkey will be given in terms of European Common Security and Defense Policy.²⁰

Debate About Being a Global Player

EU and NATO share some values which make impossible being competitors and which make them co-operators. Two organizations both have a strong commitment to a peaceful, open, international order that is based on democracy and rule of law. The two organizations respective enlargement processes, although not formally coordinated have complemented each other and played a crucial role in widening the zone of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. In the pause of the EU's enlargement process, NATO continues its open door policy.²¹

The possible effects of EU's policies about EU security and defense policies to NATO and the possibility of weakening the connection of Europe and Atlantic were causes of concern. Disengagement of NATO and Europe and Europe's efforts to form a separate defense system will weaken NATO. Besides, the efforts of EU to balance the power of NATO; will also affect NATO in a negative way. Why will it be costly for EU to pursue a separate security policy from NATO? Firstly USA's one sided policies will increase which is a disadvantage for EU. Secondly the two organizations will become competitors and both EU and USA trade will affect negatively from this competition. Thirdly, EU will have to increase its military expenses and impose this increase to EU citizens. Evaluating all these facts, it seems impossible for EU to be part of a fully independent formation. For this reason,

¹⁹ Kızıltan, İhsan, "Improving NATO-EU Partnership: A Turkish Perspective", **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, Vol. 7 Nr.3, p.43.

²⁰ Tangör Burak, (2013), "NATO-AB Stratejik Ortaklığı Bağlamında Kıbrıs Sorunu", **Ortadoğu Analiz**, Cilt 5, Sayı 51, p.93.

²¹ Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop, (2008), "NATO-EU Relations on the Threshold of a New Area", **Défense nationale et sécurité collective**, p.82.

the relations that becomes competitive after 1998 today become more cooperative.

From the British perspective, the relationship between NATO and EU is clear. NATO remains the most effective international security Alliance the world has ever seen. British authorities also want the EU to be able to make its contribution whether alongside NATO or its own, including with armed forces when NATO is not engaged. The EU has the unique potential to draw together several strands of activity in support of a single policy; diplomatic, economic, development, policing and the rule of law, and now military. Its potential is enormous but it delivers less than the sum of its parts.²²

Neither EU nor NATO by itself can provide the full breadth of security in a wider post-Cold War Europe. Therefore both need to continue to pursue their enlargement processes and develop more formal and systematic linkages between those processes. Also EU and NATO members should try to develop mutually satisfying cooperative relations with long term nonmembers in a more sophisticated manner.²³ The partnership of these two organizations play crucial role for security of not only Europe but also the whole world. The two institutions should reduce rivalries among their members. However, contrary to this, NATO stated in Lisbon Treaty that it supported EU's competition with NATO in the areas of foreign, security and defense policy. This makes hard to believe that NATO's new strategic concept values a strategic partnership between EU and itself based on the principles of complementary and mutual reinforcing roles. It cannot be denied that EU and NATO stand in competition with one another for resources and roles in the global world area.²⁴

EU and NATO can be said to be the key elements of a true security community. It is because of the communality of values that even though not all EU member states line up behind the United States on every occasion, Europe still remains the most solid ally of the United States. The motivations of other states who join ad hoc coalitions of the willing are often more of a tactical or opportunistic nature and therefore less steadfast. NATO has proved its efficacy as an operational organization for non-Article 5 missions; it is therefore the obvious – and most efficient, for permanent – framework to use when all allies agree on the need to intervene militarily. Besides, NATO is an instrument for the permanent enhancement of military capabilities in terms of

²² Browne Desmond, 2007, "NATO and ESDP: Forging New Links A British Perspective", **Military Technology**, 9, p.12.

²³ Smith Martin A., (2000), Timmins Graham, "The EU, NATO and the Extension of Institutional Order in Europe", **World Affairs**, Vol.163, No.2, p.87.

²⁴ Zyla Benjamin, (2011), "Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO's Strategic (Sub-) Culture", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol.32, No.3, p.676.

usability and interoperability. But the existence of a community of values does not in itself guarantee an effective partnership and alliance. Without political transformation, the defense transformation sponsored by NATO is unlikely to succeed.²⁵ In today's world, security threats include international terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction, unsuccessful states, unsettled conflicts, cyber threats, energy deficits, environmental degradation, natural or human made disasters, pandemic and threats like these. To overcome these threats requires a broad based partnership between EU and NATO.²⁶ While there have been practical achievements in NATO-EU cooperation, the realization of an efficient security relationship is to concentrate to what is actually required in the real world of security risks and challenges, rather than on distant and abstract goal of an institutional accommodation between the EU and NATO.²⁷

NATO's Strategic Concept clearly states that an active and effective EU contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The European Union's Lisbon Treaty (in force end 2009) provides a framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU European Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential.

NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. The Allies are determined to make their contribution to create more favorable circumstances through which they will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organizations;
- enhance practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
- broaden political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimize duplication and maximize cost-effectiveness.²⁸

²⁵ Pop Adrian, "NATO ve AB: İşbirliği ve Güvenlik", <http://www.nato.int/>, retrieved 05.06.2013

²⁶ Koçöz Remzi, *Avrupa Uluslarından Birleşik Avrupa'ya*, Nobel Yayın, Ankara, 2007, p.362.

²⁷ Cornish Paul, (2006), "EU and NATO Co-operation or Competition", Briefing Paper European Parliament – Policy Department External Policies, p.23.

²⁸ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm, Retrieved 20.01.2016

New Areas of Cooperation

Since the adoption of NATO's new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, which identifies the need for the Alliance to address emerging security challenges, several new areas of cooperation with the EU are taking place, in particular energy security issues and cyber defense. In this context, NATO and EU staffs have been holding consultations in order to identify the specific areas in which the two organizations could enhance their cooperation in these fields.²⁹ A policy approach by the EU and NATO in dealing with all of new security threats would encourage greater contributions from Western allies by drawing on a much broader range of resources from member governments to find effective solutions. By embarking on a Copernican revolution to reconsider how these Western institutions can achieve more unified missions would give both NATO and the EU a new lease on life.³⁰

Conclusion

After the Cold War with the disintegration of USSR, international organizations started to redefine themselves to concretize their places in the new-forming global system. NATO and EU are two of these organizations which cannot be thought independently and which need each other for the peace of the global world. NATO's effectiveness depends on the ability of US and European statesman. In their nature, NATO and EU are different organizations based on their purpose of establishment. NATO is a security-based organization whereas EU was established first for economic concerns than it became also a political project. The two organizations are united in many ways like strategic vision, sense of responsibility, common members, and limited budget. While NATO can offer high level military force, it cannot compete with EU in some policy areas. EU by the way has neither ability nor need to compete with NATO in all levels. Through Berlin Plus Agreement, EU's operation experience increased. NATO Reaction Force and EU's Battlegroup Project cannot be compared because their military and tactical operations differ. Although, two organization's response to terrorism is developing, it should be increased more. Because terrorists are successful at identifying and exploiting political differences and divisions, the possible non-developed cooperation between NATO and EU will make the atmosphere more suitable for terrorist attacks.

²⁹ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm, Retrieved 20.01.2016

³⁰ <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/09/28-strategic-partnership-nato-eu-drozdiak>, Retrieved 20.01.2016

In order to develop the relations between NATO and EU, two summits one in Germany and one in France were made under 60. Year of establishment of NATO, in April 2009. In 2010, NATO Summit is also made in Lisbon. As well as issues like NATO-Russia cooperation and Afghanistan strategy, NATO-EU relations is one of the main issues that are discussed in Lisbon. It can be said that this summit is a milestone in terms of NATO-EU relations. After Lisbon Treaty came into force, it is clarified that there is no more a debate whether NATO and EU are competitors or co-operators, what is required is to increase EU's security capacity. Besides, it is impossible to form an independent European Security System without NATO because of opposition of England and Eastern European countries. These countries defend that European Security cannot be thought without NATO. During 2003 Iraq War it was seen that despite France and Germany's opposition; other European countries joined the war with USA which shows there is not still a common security policy in Europe. Rejoining of France to NATO's military wing also proves that any EDSP can be thought without NATO. Likewise, an independent security organization of EU will weaken NATO. Another key issue to strengthen the relations between EU and NATO is the resolution of the Cyprus problem. As Turkey does not recognize Cyprus which is an EU member and which is vetoed by Turkey in NATO, NATO-EU relations are negatively affected by this conflict. Turkish accession to EU will be the solution of this problem and in this way; a status like common partnership will be given to Turkey in the framework of CSDP. In the light of these evaluations and discussions, it is clear that there is no more a question whether NATO and EU are competitors of co-operators. These two organizations complete each other and there is no way of complete success of each, without the support of the other. The matter is therefore how to strengthen the relations between these two organizations in order to provide a secure global world.

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