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VE UYGULAMA MERKEZİ**

**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ KOMŞULUK
POLİTİKASI VE ORTADOĞU**

**EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE
MIDDLE EAST**

**ULUSLARARASI KONFERANS
Ankara Üniversitesi ATAUM
28 Kasım 2014
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ve Uygulama Merkezi**

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POLİTİKASI VE ORTADOĞU**

EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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**“AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ KOMŞULUK POLİTİKASI VE
ORTADOĞU”
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-28 Kasım 2014-**

Kayıt : 9.15

Açılış Konuşmaları: 9.30-10.00

Prof. Dr. Çağrı ERHAN-AÜ SBF Öğretim Üyesi, ATAUM Müdürü
Dr. Colin DÜRKOP-Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Derneği Türkiye Temsilcisi
Prof. Dr. Kasım KARAKÜTÜK-Ankara Üniversitesi Rektör Yardımcısı

10.00 – 10.15: Kahve arası

**Birinci Oturum: AB'nin Akdeniz Politikasının ve Ortadoğu'daki Son
Gelişmelere Yönelik Yaklaşımlarının Değerlendirilmesi: 10.15-12.15**

Oturum Başkanı: Dr. Antje NÖTZOLD (Technische Universität Chemnitz)

Konuşmacılar:

Prof. Dr. Erwan LANNON (College of Europe)

Prof. Dr. Çağrı ERHAN (Ankara University)

Dr. Nurgül BEKAR (Ankara University)

Dr. Alessandro QUARENGHÌ (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

12.15 – 14.00: Öğle Yemeği

**İkinci Oturum: AB'nin “Arap Baharı”na Tepkisi ve AB-Ortadoğu
İlişkilerindeki Bazı Anahtar Konular: 14.00-16.00**

Oturum Başkanı: Prof. Dr. Çağrı ERHAN- AÜ SBF Öğretim Üyesi,
ATAUM Müdürü

Konuşmacılar:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Münevver CEBECİ (Marmara University)

Prof. Dr. Esra HATIPOĞLU (Marmara University)

Dr. Antje NÖTZOLD (Technische Universität Chemnitz)

SUNUŞ

Bu çalışma 28 Kasım 2014 tarihinde Ankara Üniversitesi Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi (ATAUM) ve Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Derneği Türkiye Temsilciliği tarafından ortaklaşa düzenlenen “Avrupa Birliği Komşuluk Politikası ve Ortadoğu” konulu uluslararası konferans kapsamında katılımcılar tarafından gerçekleştirilen sunumların bir araya getirilmesinden oluşmaktadır.

Söz konusu Konferans, 2015 Mayıs ayına kadar ATAUM’un Müdürlüğünü yürüten değerli meslektaşım Prof. Dr. Çağrı ERHAN’ın yürütücülüğünü yaptığı “Turkey’s Role and Functions with Respect to EUs Neighbourhood Policy towards Mediterranean (TEMED)” başlıklı Jean Monnet Kürsüsü Projesi’nin bir faaliyeti olarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. Proje, Güney Akdeniz’de yaşanan gelişmelerin ve değişimin AB’nin komşuluk politikasını ve Türkiye-AB ilişkilerini nasıl ve ne ölçüde etkileyeceğini analiz etmeye çalışmaktadır. Proje, yakın gelecekte AB, Türkiye ve Arap dünyası arasındaki ilişkilerin muhtemel yapılanmasını ve ilişkilerin dinamiklerini incelemektedir. “Yeni AB ve “Dönüşen Arap Dünyası” arasında “Türkiye’nin değişen konumu” Projenin anahtar sözcükleridir.

Bu kitaba konu olan Konferans Proje kapsamında oluşturulan Ortadoğu, AB ve Türkiye uzmanlarının akademik değişimi ve bilgi ve deneyim paylaşımını teşvik etmek amacıyla organize edilmiştir. Kitap ATAUM’un web sitesinde de yayımlanacaktır.

Avrupa Birliği Komşuluk Politikası ve Ortadoğu, AB’nin Akdeniz Politikasının ve Ortadoğu’daki Son Gelişmelere Yönelik Yaklaşımlarının Değerlendirilmesi ve AB’nin “Arap Baharı”na Tepkisi ve AB-Ortadoğu İlişkilerindeki Bazı Anahtar Konular düzenlenen konferansın ve konferans çerçevesinde gerçekleştirilen sunumların temel tartışma konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Bu kapsamda hem yurtdışından ve ülkemizden değerli ve konunun uzmanı akademisyenler, hem de konu ile ilgili bürokratlar konuyu kendi bakış açıları ve ilgi alanları çerçevesinde değerlendirerek değerli katkılar sunmuşlardır.

Proje faaliyeti olan Konferansa ve kitaba katkı sağlayan, hazırlanmasında emeği geçen herkese, tüm konuşmacılara teşekkür ediyor, ilgilenenler için yararlı bir başvuru kaynağı olmasını umut ediyoruz.

Prof. Dr. Sanem BAYKAL

Ankara Üniversitesi ATAUM Müdürü

**“AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ KOMŞULUK POLİTİKASI VE
ORTADOĞU”
ULUSLARARASI KONFERANS**

28 Kasım 2014, Ankara

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

Çok değerli Rektör Yardımcım, çok değerli katılımcılar,

Son derece önemli bir zamanlamada böyle bir konferans düzenliyoruz. Her şeyden önce bu konferansın düzenlenmesinde bize büyük yardımları dokunan ortağımız Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Derneği'ne ve Sayın Colin Dürkop'a çok teşekkür ediyoruz.

'Arap Baharı' denilen süreç, 2010 yılının sonunda başladı ve bir süre sonra, sizlerin de yakından takip ettiği gibi, başlangıçtaki hedeflerinin ve amaçlarının çok gerisine düştü. Hatta pek çok değerlendirmede bunun bir Arap Sonbaharına, bir Arap Kışına dönüştüğü ifade ediliyor. Zaten bu gelişmeleri geniş Arap coğrafyasının her tarafında görmemiştik, örnekte bazı krallıklarda yaprak kımıldamadı ama Kuzey Afrika'da Tunus'ta başlayıp, Mısır'da, Libya'da devam eden bazı demokratikleşme çabaları oldu. Bunlardan çok azı başarıya ulaşabildi. Tunus'ta çok partili seçimlerle bir parti iktidara geldi, tekrar çok partili seçimlerle, iktidardan gitti. Bu bile büyük bir başarı.

Biz bu konferansımızda, Avrupa Birliği'nin 2010'dan bu yana, Arap Baharı sürecine, nasıl yaklaştığını, bölgedeki ayaklanmalar ve demokratik dönüşüm çabaları karşısında ne şekilde tepki gösterdiğini ele almaya çalışacağız.

Elbette bunu yaparken odaklanma noktalarımızdan bir tanesi de bir yandan Avrupa Birliği'ne tam üyelik için müzakereler yürüten, bir yandan da bölgede bulunan Türkiye'nin gördüğü işlev üzerinde olacak. Ayrıca Türkiye'nin bölgedeki faaliyetlerinin, Avrupa Birliği üyeliğine nasıl etki ettiği konusunu değerlendirmeye çalışacağız.

Sınırlarımızın hemen ötesinde, özellikle Suriye’de çok önemli gelişmeler oluyor. Suriye’de yaşanan olaylar Türkiye’yi doğrudan etkiliyor. Herhalde bu konuşmalar sırasında 2 milyondan fazla mülteci bugün Türkiye sınırları içerisinde olduğu gerçeği dile getirilecek. Bugüne kadar resmi rakamlara insani yardım maksadıyla mülteciler için 4,5 milyar dolarlık bir tutar harcandı. Fakat bu insanların Türkiye’de ne ölçüde kalıcı olacakları, geriye dönüp dönmeyecekleri kesinlik kazanmadı, çünkü Suriye’deki sorunun ne şekilde evrim göstereceği hakkında herhangi bir ışık gözüküyor.

Tüm bunlar aslında Avrupa Birliği’nin Türkiye’nin AB üyesi olması halinde Suriye’ye sınırı olacağı gerçeğine binaen bölgede daha aktif rol alması zorunluluğunu doğuruyor. Suriye aynı zamanda hali hazırda Gümrük Birliği dolayısıyla Avrupa Birliği’nin ekonomik sınırı durumundadır. Türkiye’deki devlet adamları da uzunca bir süredir AB’nin daha aktif rol alması gerektiğini belirtiyorlar.

Diğer taraftan, Avrupa Birliği’nin bir takım güvenlik kaygılarının da bu gelişmeler neticesinde artmaya başladığını gördük. Özellikle, Suriye ve Irak bölgesinde faaliyet gösteren IŞİD Terör Örgütü’nün, Avrupa ülkelerinden gelen militanlarca da beslenmesi, Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği arasında yeni bir güvenlik işbirliği alanı doğurdu. Bu yakın işbirliğinin Türkiye’nin üyelik müzakerelerine de olumlu katkı sağlayabileceği değerlendirmesini yapabiliriz.

Aslına bakarsanız bölgedeki ekonomik gelişmelerden, enerji meselesine, terör ve güvenlik konularından, göç ve iltica konularına kadar pek çok başlığı bugünkü konferansımızda iki oturum halinde ele alacağız, değerlendireceğiz. Aramızda bu konularda yayınlar yapmış çok değerli uzmanlarımız var. Sizlerin de bu konuşmalardan ve daha sonra kitap olarak yayınlanacak olan tebliğlerden yararlanacağınızı umuyorum.

Bizlerle beraber olduğunuz için sizlere teşekkür ediyorum. Saygılar sunuyorum..

Dr. Colin Dürkop

Sayın Rektör Yardımcısı Prof. Dr. Kasım Karakütük, çok değerli hanımefendiler ve beyefendiler,

Günaydınlar. Değerli vakitlerinizden ayırarak toplantımıza katıldığınız için hepimize çok teşekkür ederiz. Hoşgeldiniz.

Değerli katılımcılar, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne katılım süreci uzun soluklu ve dolambaçlı bir yoldan geçmektedir. Bunu hepimiz biliyoruz. Birçok önemli konuda Türkiye büyük bir demokrasi süreci yaşamış ve halen de yaşamaya devam etmektedir. Yapılan reformlarla Avrupa Birliği yolunda büyük adımlar atılmıştır ve dileğimiz katılımın en kısa sürede gerçekleşmesidir.

Avrupa Birliği'nin sınırlarının genişlemesi ve komşularının değişmesi sonucunda hem güvenliği sağlamak, hem de komşuları arasındaki ilişkileri geliştirmek amacıyla, yeni politikalar üretmek ihtiyacı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu politikalarından bir tanesi olan komşuluk politikası ile kendisine komşu ve yakın durumda olan devletlerle ortaklık ve işbirliği öngörülmektedir. Akdeniz çevresindeki ülkeler, Avrupa Birliği'nin her zaman ilgi odağı olmuştur. Bu bölgede bir dostluk halkası yaratmayı hedefleyen Avrupa Birliği, Doğu Avrupa ve Güney Kafkasları da bu halkaya ekleyerek bir çember oluşmasını sağlamıştır. Ortadoğu Bölgesi de Avrupa Birliği için çok önemlidir. Bu bölge Avrupa'ya olan yakınlığından ve Avrupa'nın enerji güvenliği için hayati önem arz etmektedir.

Son yıllarda Ortadoğu'daki gelişmelerin ardından Avrupa Birliği ülkeleri yasadışı göçe maruz kalmışlardır. Bu göçle birlikte enerji, güvenlik gibi önemli unsurlar ön plana çıkmıştır.

İşte, hem kendini korumaya almak, hem de komşu ülkelere refahı yaymak, istikrarın ve insan haklarını ihlal etmeden güvenliği sağlamak için ortaya çıkan Komşuluk Politikasını bugün yurtdışından ve yurtiçinden davetimizi kırmayarak gelen konunun uzmanı değerli konuşmacılarımızla tartışacağız. Onların engin bilgileri bizlere ışık tutacak.

Başta ATAUM Müdürü Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan ve Müdür Yardımcısı Prof. Dr. Sanem Baykal olmak üzere, bu toplantıda emeği geçen tüm ekibe teşekkür ederim.

Tekrar toplantımızın başarılı geçmesi ümidiyle hepinize hoş geldiniz diyor, saygılarımı sunuyorum. Vielen dank, danke schön. Çok teşekkür ederim.

Prof. Dr. Kasım Karakütük

Değerli meslektaşlarım, değerli konuklar,

Günaydın. Hepiniz hoş geldiniz.

Bugün Avrupa Birliği Komşuluk Politikası ve Ortadoğu konusundaki uluslararası konferans için bir arada bulunuyoruz. ATAUM, hem kamu

kurumlarındaki Avrupa Birliđi uzmanlıđı kadrolarına uzmanlar yetiřtirmek, hem de Trkiye’de ve Dnya’da Avrupa Birliđi konusunu bilimsel alanda tartıřmak, arařtırmak ve bu konuda yayınlar yapmak, eđitimler vermek amacıyla kurulmuř olan ok nemli bir merkezdir. Trkiye’nin nemli arařtırma uygulama merkezlerinden ve Ankara niversitesi’nin nemli arařtırma uygulama merkezlerinden birisidir.

Bu anlamda, merkezimizin mdr Prof. Dr. ađrı Erhan ve yardımcıları, ekibi hem Trkiye’de hem yurtdıřında Avrupa Birliđi konusunda niversitemizi ve Trkiye’yi ok iyi bir řekilde temsil etmekte, bu konuda bilimsel alıřmalar ve yayınlar yapmaktadırlar. Aynı zamanda bu toplantının da gerekleřtirilmesinde byk bir katkı sađlamıřlardır. Hem sevgili ađrı Erhan Hocamızı hem de yardımcılarını ve ona katkı veren tm ekibini ncelikle kutlamak istiyorum. Onlara Rektrmzn teřekkrlerini sunmak istiyorum.

1950’li yılların sonunda Avrupa Birliđi’nin ilk ekirdekleri oluřturulurken, Avrupa elik ve Kmr Birliđi kurulurken ve daha sonra 1957’de Roma Antlařması yapıldıđında 6 devlet ye olarak bulunuyordu. Bunlar Avrupa Topluluđu’nu oluřturma konusundaki ilk giriřimlerdir. 1963 yılında Trkiye, Avrupa Birliđi’ne katılmak iin, Ankara Antlařması’nı yapıyordu.

Sonrasında 1970 yılında, Katma Protokol imzalanıyor, yine Trkiye ısrarlı ve 1973 yılında Trkiye’de nc 5 Yıllık Kalkınma Planı hazırlanıyor. Trkiye’nin yn hep Avrupa Birliđi’ne girmek řeklinde oldu. Devamında 1997 yılında Gmrk Birliđi sreci var ve bugn bakıyoruz 51 yıl olmuř, Trkiye henz Avrupa Birliđi’ne ye olamamıř.

Az nce sevgili Drkop, akıcı Trkesiyle, Trkiye’nin dolambalı yoldan geerek bir an evvel AB’ye ye olacađını umduđunu belirtti. Kendisini akıcı Trkesi nedeniyle tebrik ediyorum ve bu konudaki dileklerine binaen teřekkrlerimizi iletmek istiyorum.

Bugnk toplantının birinci amacı bu olmamakla birlikte, “Avrupa Birliđi’nin Komřuluk Politikası ve Ortadođu” konusu incelenecek. Sevgili mdrmz ađrı Hocamızın da az nce belirttiđi gibi, belki bu bađlamda Trkiye’nin yeliđi konuları da tartıřılacaktır nk bilim insanlarının grevi, konuları politik olarak deđil, akademik olarak ele almaktır. Dolayısıyla, belki bu bađlamda benim de merak ettiđim Trkiye’nin 51 yıl neden ye olmadıđı, olamadıđı, bu srete sonu ve nedenlerinin de bir tartıřma konusu olarak ele alınması gerektiđini dřnyorum.

Avrupa Birliđi’ne fiziksel olarak yakın olmayıp da ye olan devletler de mevcut. Bu durum merakımı daha ok artırıyor, rneđin Gney Kıbrıs Rum

Yönetimi gibi, coğrafi olarak uygun olmamakla birlikte, AB'ye üye olan devletler söz konusu olduğundan, bu sorunun tartışılmasının daha da önem kazandığını düşünüyorum.

Efendim, programda gördüğümüz kadarıyla toplantımıza çok önemli konuklarımız katılmaktadırlar. Öncelikle toplantının gerçekleştirilmesinde bizimle işbirliği yapan, katkı sağlayan, az önce konuşma yapan Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Derneği Türkiye temsilcisi Dr. Colin Dürkop'a üniversitemiz adına teşekkürlerimi iletmek istiyorum.

Ayrıca, programda yer aldığı şekliyle Dr. Antje Nötzold, Prof. Dr. Erwan Lannon, Çağrı Erhan Hoca, Alessandro Quarenghi, Doç. Dr. Münevver Cebeci, Dr. Florence Gaub, Prof. Dr. Esra Hatipoğlu gibi değerli isimlerin de bu toplantıda konuşma yaparak, konunun bilimsel alanda tartışılmasını sağlayacaklarını görüyoruz. Ben hem tüm katılımcılara, hem merkez müdürümüze ve ekibimize, hem de emeği geçen diğer kişilere Üniversitemiz, Rektörlüğümüz adına teşekkürlerimi iletiyorum.

Toplantının yararlı geçmesini ve bu konulara bir açılım getirmesini diliyorum. Hepinize saygılar sunuyorum.

Birinci Oturum: AB'nin Akdeniz Politikasının ve Ortadoğu'daki Son Gelişmelere Yönelik Yaklaşımlarının Değerlendirilmesi

Dr. Antje Nötzold

It is my pleasure chairing the First Panel in this conference. We will have four speakers talking about important issues, from the assessment of the EU Neighborhood Policy, to what is Mediterranean and assessment of recent developments in the Middle East. And as we are all following different things that happen in the Middle East, after the upheavals since 2011. There have been again more and more new developments and it will be very interesting to hear about these new developments from our four delighted speakers. Everyone of them will have up to 20 minutes for their presentations that we will have enough time for the discussions afterwards.

I would straight hand over to the first speaker, Prof. Dr. Erwan Lannon from the College of Europe.

Prof. Dr. Erwan Lannon

Thank you very much indeed.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, dear friends, dear students, it is a pleasure for me to be here today. Let me first of all express my sincere

thanks to the organizer for inviting me, to the EU Research Center of the Ankara University and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

As I have the honor and the pleasure to start the panel, I thought it would be interesting to do, first of all, a kind of tour of the Mediterranean, to see whether the ENP was successful or not in certain countries. If you allow me, I will also say a few words about the Eastern countries. I will not focus on the Middle East as such, because I am sure that my Turkish colleagues will really concentrate on what is going on there, especially in Syria.

And I think, also by way of introduction, it is quite important to mention that, although it is the 2002 December Copenhagen Conference that launched ENP process, and even if the first ENP action plans were adopted after 2004. In fact it was effectively launched on 1st January 2007, because of the entry into force of the European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument. So now we are in 7th year after this launch of the ENP and of course the assessment is quite mitigated and it is not a surprise.

So I will start with this tour of the Mediterranean to see what the impact was. I have to say that when considered, it was quite positive in four different countries. The first one being Morocco, that is certainly considered nowadays as being one of the best ENP students in the sense that the kingdom immediately took a major strategic choice to play the ENP game and notably through the adoption of what we call an advance status. It also took the decision to negotiate a deep and comprehensive free trade area.

So the situation of course is not perfect in terms of reforms but the Arab Reform Initiative recently mentioned and presented Morocco who was being one of the best reformers, not only in the Mediterranean but in the Arab World. So certainly, for Morocco, ENP has been very positive.

It is also the case of Israel, for other reasons you know that Israel is confronted some problems in the multilateral framework, so more bilateralism and more differentiation that are the keys of ENP, were really in line with the Israeli strategy, as well as the deep economic integration.

Surprise came from Jordan, because, as you know, Jordan is neither a Mediterranean country nor direct neighbor of the European Union. Nevertheless, they also concluded a privileged partnership and decided to negotiate deep and comprehensive free trade area in the future. Again the Arab Reform Initiative mentioned that it was the second best reformer in the Arab World. So it is quite interesting.

For Tunisia, the situation has changed because I think we have to distinguish the Ben Ali period and the past Ben Ali period. During the Ben

Ali period, the EU expected to confront some problems but I think that nowadays, this is changing very quickly and here the EU has a really potential leverage because the country is quite small. There is really a homogeneity and political will so here it is very promising and we have also privileged partnership here and this willingness to conclude the CFTA.

For Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, the situation is a bit different because they are confronted serious security issues so that the ENP is a bit out of the picture. This is to be dealt more with Common Foreign and Security Policy or other policies, rather than the ENP as such.

Then we have Algeria and Egypt. Here the situation again is very different because first of all for Algeria they refused to be fully involved in the Neighborhood Policy so that they decided not to conclude this ENP Action Plan that is in fact a kind of road map. Now the situation has changed because they have been negotiating an ENP Action Plan for a few months but as far as I know, it has not yet been concluded. Thus the situation of Algeria might change.

For Egypt as you know, the problem is that there was obviously a coup and here the ENP or the European Union is faced with very serious challenges in terms of notably double standards approach but of course the stabilization of this country is in nobody's interest.

Then we have Libya and Syria, and here I would like to be clear about that, Libya and Syria are not included in the Neighborhood Policy as such, because first of all there is no contractual agreement. In the case of Libya, it was never the case and in the case of Syria, they were negotiating a new agreement before the start of the Civil War but now the situation is so problematic that it is again not within the ENP framework that this is going to be solved.

A few words about the Eastern partners, because I think, this is quite important to hear the quite positive impact on Georgia and Moldova in terms of promoting reforms but first of all, one should not forget the war in Georgia and what happened in Caucasia and South Ossetia. On the other hand, nowadays, Moldova is certainly considered by the EU through the evaluation of reports, as one of the best reformers. Nevertheless, there are a number of problems, as you know, in Transnistria and also in Gagauzia, and the problem going on now in Ukraine is really affecting Moldova. So they are also in difficult context for the time being.

For Azerbaijan, not much change, as you know, this is still an authoritarian regime in this Russian sphere of influence but here I think the priority for everyone is clearly energy.

For Ukraine, that is really extremely important nowadays. It is a bit too early to have an assessment, because we are in the middle of its transition. It is quite negative for the time being, because in fact the Euromaidan led to the annexation of Crimea, to a war in Eastern Ukraine. And this is strongly affecting the situation. There is a civil, economic and financial crisis and maybe an energetic crisis this winter, if not a major confrontation. So the situation is extremely difficult and this is also of importance for Turkey. I do not know if you notice the recent development in Crimea, militarily speaking, but this is really worrying.

For Armenia, there was a recent shift. Because Armenia refused to negotiate an association agreement, including deep and comprehensive free trade area and opted in favor of the Euroasian Customs Union because of the Russian pressures.

Finally Belarus is still in the same situation and like Libya and Syria, is not fully included in the Neighborhood Policy.

So what is interesting while comparing the two regions of the ENP is that when considered, there are very important problems on both sides. One cannot say that East is more positive than the South anymore, not at all. There are problems in the South and in the East. Another common characteristic is also that a number of countries are in a very difficult situation and the context can change very quickly. So this is shared really by both regions and when we look at the three major objectives of the ENP that was prosperity, stability and security, when considered there is still a lot of work to be done.

Also another specific objective of the ENP was to avoid creation of new dividing lines in Europe. What we can see that now we have new borders, although they are not internationally recognized, this is the situation on the ground nowadays. Of course the external factors, like the Russian factor is playing a very important role. And here again not only in the East, but remember what happened in Libya, and what happened in Syria afterwards. So we organized recently a conference at the College with some colleagues from Ukraine and Syria, they found that they also have common concerns about Russia always playing a very active role in the region and Syria supporting the Assad regime.

Now a few words also about sectoral issues, I just picked up three issues that are of importance. Of course I developed a more critical approach but I mean we can discuss it during the debate. And also if you like to have more information about the reason why I classify those countries as good or quite good performers, we could discuss that.

The main sector issue, the first one is the conditionality inconsistency; there was especially at the level of the European Commission, I think the problem in the terms of the discourse was been developed. For example, the first financial instrument for 2007-2013, the European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument was referring to “EU values” whereas in the Commission documents, they were referring to the need of “shared values”. If you have a look for the new financial instrument for the period 2014-2020 that is called European Neighborhood Instrument, they are now referring to “universal values”. So I think that there is a quite problem in this regard, I think that “EU values” should be used for a negotiating country like Turkey because obviously they have to adhere to EU values as such. But to promote EU values or to be a bit confused about those values at Mediterranean is a bit problematic to my opinion.

The second sectoral issue of importance, I think, is the limited incentives and the financial means compared to the very high cost of the reforms. And I think that here in Turkey you are very well aware of what such important reform implies in terms of financial support. But also peoples support. I mean, you need to have also people that are trained to implement, incorporate the *acquis* at various levels. So I think this was changed to a certain level with this new phase, because one of the main ideas is to develop the more formal approach which means that financial means will be reallocated for the best performers. What will be the result of that we will see, but still I think that the incentives are insufficient because of course participation to EU programmes, EU agencies or you know, Twinning or TAIEX Technical Facilities, this is certainly interesting for the Mediterranean Partners. But what is beyond a deep and comprehensive free trade area is extremely demanding, it is about normative convergence, it is about legislative alignment and I am not sure that the EU has put enough financial means, but we can understand that because we are in a context of crisis.

So the last point is about the lack of regional integration. Despite the fact that inter-regional programme was launched within in Neighborhood Policy, what is called now the Neighborhood Worrying Programme. And despite the Communication of the Commission on the Maghreb, one can see clearly that the Neighborhood Policy is more a bilateral policy, so discomfited to the fact that the initiative of President Sarkozy almost destroyed the multilateral framework and that the Ministerial Conferences, the Multilateral Ministerial Conferences, were frozen for a number of years. This affected strongly, I think, the EUROMED Community and what was the EUROMED Partnership. I think this is a bit problematic, because we will

see in the commoner more and more a differentiation. So there will be a kind of a multi-speed policy I wrote a paper on that, already a few years ago but this is really what I can see nowadays and that we can see, a Multispeed European Neighborhood Policy.

So by way of conclusion, 2014 is a specific year, you understand, because this is really the year of launching of a second phase of the Neighborhood Policy that is based on reinforced conditionality. This is the idea for more increased differentiation and mutual accountability between the partners and according to the Communication, the Joint Communication in fact, between the High Representative and the European Commission, it was said that this cooperation will focus, and I quote, on promoting an enhanced political cooperation, deepen sustainable democracy, progressive economic integration and strengthening partnership with societies between the Union and the partner countries and in particular the implementation of partnership and cooperation agreements.

Another point that is of importance today is that we have a new European Commission. You certainly heard of that, and followed the hearings. And I would like to quote here our new Commissioner for, and this is also, you know, a great interest for Turkey, new Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. It is not anymore enlargement as such, it is enlargement negotiations, and I wanted to underline this because I think it is important. Mr. Johannes Hahn recently said that, although the ENP was revised in 2011, in the response to the Arab Spring the instability throughout the neighborhood but in particular in Ukraine, Syria and Libya underlines the need for further change. President Juncker has asked me to take stock and to suggest a way forward within the first year of the new mandate. And I regard this task as both essential and pressing. Without prejudging the outcome of this reflection I believe, the ENP continues to provide a broad overarching framework for our action in the neighborhood, based on European interests as well as values.

Well in fact, once again, the Neighborhood Policy is not based on European interests and values and I would like to quote now the article 1, paragraph 1 of our new European Neighborhood Instrument to be clear and this is legally binding; This regulation establishes a European Neighborhood Instrument with a view to advancing further towards an area of shared prosperity and good neighborliness involving the Union and the countries and territories listed in the Annex 1 by developing a special relationship, this is of importance, special relationship, founded on cooperation, peace and security, mutual accountability and shared commitment to universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

So it is really about shared prosperity, about shared commitments and universal values. Not only about European interests and I think we should go back to the spirit of the Barcelona process and put forward those ideas. I am sure that the new Commissioner will take that on board.

The second point is that, well it is very good to announce that they will revise, once again, the Neighborhood Policy but the margin of maneuver is extremely limited because in financial means, the financial envelope has already been earmarked and the program has been adopted. So I think that the Commission, will have to be extremely innovative, but at the same time I think it is important also that first of all, our ENP partners familiarize with the new rules because there are many new rules at technical level with the 2011 revision of the ENP.

However at the end of the day, I think it is really a matter of political will, rather than issues linked to technicalities and I have to say that I am very pleased to be here today to speak about that because I remember that a few years ago, I came to Istanbul, to the Islamic Conference Meeting and I was pleading for an association, I underline association of Turkey to the ENP. Of course Turkey is not an ENP partner, it is a negotiating country but if you have a look at the map, including Eastern regions of the ENP, Turkey is in the middle. This is very clear. You are confronted what is going on in Syria. I think it is a very good initiative to promote this kind of meetings so that we can discuss also the Neighborhood Policy here in Turkey and I am sure that our discussion would be very fruitful.

I thank you very much for your kind attention.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

Thank you Prof. Lannon for this excellent presentation giving us not only a tour to the Mediterranean and the current stand of the European Neighborhood Policy, but also, although you are coming from the European point of view, being a bit critical of the European approach, the actual approach and also the implementation of the Policy and finishing with an outlook of the new ENPE and also the new Commission, and possible future adoptions of the European Neighborhood Policy.

And I will straight hand over now to the Prof. Erhan. He will add, I would say, a view from the South on the European Neighborhood Policy. Thank you.

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

Thank you chair.

My speech is titled “The Turkish role in the Middle East during the course of Arab Spring through European Union’s Perspective”. The main objective of this paper is to analyze how the EU sees Turkish function in the Middle East, particularly, before, during and aftermath of Arab Spring.

I will try to show the EU perceptions’ evolution about Turkey’s function and role in the Middle East through European Union Commission’s Progress Reports which are published every year annually and I will focus on the chapter of Common Foreign and Security Policy of these Progress Reports particularly.

If you go back to 2004, there is an important document, which was published, issued by European Commission, just few months before Turkey started negotiations with the EU. It was an analysis of the Commission about Turkey’s participation and for the first time in Turkey-EU Relations history, the Commission analyzed Turkish foreign policy. How can Turkey, a member Turkey, contribute to EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy particularly in the region? Starting from 2004, for many years, maybe until 2011, the main approach of the EU for Turkey’s function in the Middle East based on Turkey’s new foreign policy principles, particularly the “Zero-problems approach with the neighbors” and we all see that EU frequently praised Turkey’s new approach and underlined the positive and active role or constructive role of Turkey in the region but unfortunately, starting from the second year of so-called Arab Spring, we will see, this approach or this perception of EU about Turkey’s role in the region has disappeared.

In order to better understand, how this evolution of EU, perception of Turkey has changed, I tried to make a table and I will try to analyze, I will try to show in this 10 different subjects, how the EU has changed its rhetoric about Turkey from 2009, just one year before the Arab Spring has erupted, until this year’s Progress Report, 2014.

In order to make it easier to understand, I will try to start with European Union’s approach to Turkey in the Middle East from 2009 Progress Report.

In 2009, there was no Arab Spring. Turkey was praised as a constructive country in Middle East and EU was saying, Turkey continued to develop a positive role, contributing stabilization in the whole region. This approach continued in the very first stages of 2010 with almost same sentences, Turkey seeks to play a constructive role by offering a mediator

role between Israel and Syria. Maybe you all will remember that during that time, Turkey was the sole country in the region that was respected by Israel and Syria, by Palestinian actors like Fatah and Hamas at the same time as a mediator and Turkey was directly and sometimes indirectly, playing this role. Therefore, EU was seeing Turkey as an active and constructive country in the region which serves the stabilization of the region.

When we come to the first year of the Arab Spring, EU started to change its rhetoric about this stabilization role or constructive role in the Middle East. They opted for using that Turkey has become more active in its wider neighborhood but we do not understand what this “active” actually means. We should go into the details and I will do it later.

In 2012, there is no special mentioning to Turkey’s role in the region. But in 2013 and 2014, we see EU has a little mentioning for Turkey’s role in the Middle East. They opted for saying that Turkey is developing and expanding its diplomatic footprint and bilateral relations. It took a positive and supportive stand towards democratic transition in the region. Very interestingly, in 2014, in this chapter of the report, same sentence of the 2013 Report about Turkey’s diplomatic footprint and bilateral relations, particularly in Asia, Africa and Central and Latin America was used. Quite interesting, there is no mentioning about Turkey’s expansion of diplomatic footprint in the Middle East. Therefore, when we see from 2009 to 2014, according to the EU, Turkey started with a country has a constructive role in the Middle East, serving to stability, playing a mediator role between disputed parties etc. Then in 2014, we do not see any mentioning of the Turkey’s role in the Middle East.

Now I would like to make the same comparison for the countries, for Turkey’s relations with the countries.

Let’s start with Iraq. In 2009 and for many years, in fact until 2012, Turkey’s role in Iraq was seen by EU as a balancing role. Turkey had good relations both with central Iraqi regime, Baghdad, and Kurdish authorities. We see the same approach in 2010, several high level visits were made and extensive political consultations were made with Iraqi government, particularly about the general elections but when the general election was won by Shia party leader, Maliki, Turkey’s relations with Iraq started to deteriorate, particularly in 2012 and Turkey started to develop its relations with Erbil, the Kurdish regional authority and its relations with Baghdad started to deteriorate, which was underlined in European Union’s documents. Of course, maybe in the afternoon session, there will be a special paper about the energy issues in the region. The main reason of this deterioration

with Baghdad regime was solely, or more importantly, because of the energy transportation in the region because Turkey tried to buy Iraqi oil through Kurdistan regional government and sometimes even without the approval of Baghdad regime. There was a second basic reason for the deterioration of the relations; it was Arab Spring, because Iraqi government did not give enough support for the opposition in Syria, while Turkey was supporting Syrian opposition against Assad regime. Therefore, we should some more focus on Syria issues. Maybe it was the most dramatic change. Not only European Union's Progress Reports' approach of course but also in Turkish foreign policy because when we compare 2009 to 2014, from European Union's perspective, you see almost a 180 degrees of u-turn in Turkey's approach towards Syria, or in Turkish-Syrian relations. Of course, this is because of the developments in the region.

In 2009, Turkey was a mediator between Syria and Israel. Since both countries had a considerable trust on Turkey at the time, some academics, some retired diplomats were gathering in Turkey. Turkey was hosting some diplomatic meetings between Israel and Syria, for a final peace agreement. However, starting from the Arab Spring, Gaza operation of Israel in late 2008, Turkey's such role started to disappear. However, in order to remember how good Turkey's relations with Syria were, we should remember, Turkey lifted visas, bilaterally Turkey and Syria in 2011, and a Strategic Cooperation Council was set up in the same year.

In 2011, when the Arab Spring or upheavals in Syria erupted, Turkey firstly, in a diplomatic manner, called Syria to refrain from disproportionate and excessive use of force against civilians. Turkey started to provide some humanitarian assistance to Syrians. At the initial stage the number was around 18 thousand for the year 2011, now it is up to 2 million almost. So it is a huge increase in the number of fleeing Syrians to Turkey. And very interestingly, European Union, they did not criticize but they put a sentence in their report mentioning that Turkey did not align itself with the EU restrictive measures with respect to Syria, in 2011. Therefore, in 2011, EU imposed some restrictions on Syria; however Turkey did not align itself with the restrictions, because still Turkey's relations with Syria were not too bad.

But just one year later, in 2012, the biggest part of the Report is about Turkish-Syrian relations. All these are written in the 2012 Report about Turkey's role in Syria. Turkey is becoming more and more vocal on the Syrian developments. Turkey is repeatedly and strongly condemning Syrian regime's violence against civilians. Turkey asks the Syrian government to refrain from, again, disproportionate and excessive use of force. Turkey not

only aligns itself with EU restrictions, but also welcomes UN Security Council's Resolutions 2042 and 2043 about Syria. A lot of restrictions were imposed on Syria. Turkey called Assad regime illegitimate, close contacts with the Syrian opposition were developed. Turkey started to give political support and economic support to Syrian National Council. And a Turkish aircraft was downed by Syrian forces over the Mediterranean and after this incident Turkey intensified this military presence on Turkish-Syrian border. Turkey closed its embassy in Damascus and its Consul General in Aleppo, closed its borders for commercial traffic with Syria, however, opened its borders for civilians and in 2012, the number of Syrian refugees was around 100,000 to Turkey.

In 2013, the problem became worse and Turkey continued to condemn Syrian regime, gave more support to Syrian opposition, provided a lot of vital humanitarian assistance and restrictive measures, including travel bans and freezing certain individual assets, were imposed. As I mentioned, these restrictions were already imposed by the EU, three years before Turkey made it. But that time, in the early 2011, Turkey did not align with the EU restrictions. That shows clearly how Turkey changed its approach to Syria and aligned with European Union's measures.

And finally, this year's report indicates that Turkey continues to give more humanitarian assistance, but unfortunately, it is a pity for European Union's side maybe, in this year's report, they did not mention the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey because all previous reports, numbers were given. Now there are almost 2 million Syrian refugees in Turkey and our European friends should also know about these numbers.

Another dramatic change in Turkey's role in the Middle East is about its relations with Israel. If you go back to 2004 Report of the Commission, we also see Turkey's relations with Israel was praised and even the European Commission was saying that this position in the region would serve, I mean Turkey's position in the region, good relations with Israel, good relations with Arabs, including Syria and Palestinians, would serve an overall Middle East peace process. It was shown as a model for the all other countries in the region in 2004. Literally, Turkey's relations with Israel were very good before 2009 or 2008-2009 winter attack to Gaza by Israel. Turkey expressed its strong concerns on Israel's military operations in Gaza and just a few days after this Gaza operation, then the famous Davos incident. Israeli President and Turkish Prime Minister met in a meeting in Davos and a new crisis between two countries has started. In 2010, a new crisis came to the platform of Turkish-Israeli relations; it is the flotilla incident or Mavi

Marmara incident. The reason was Israeli Special Forces' attacking to humanitarian assistance flotilla in the international waters of Mediterranean and killing of 10 Turkish citizens. Therefore, Turkey-Israel relations started to dramatically deteriorate. There was no mentioning in 2011 Report. In 2012, it was underlined that Turkey's diplomatic relations with Israel remained downgraded; military agreements with Israel suspended; Turkey strongly condemned Israeli settlement activities.

However, in 2013, after Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's apologies from Turkish Prime Minister that time, a new process of normalization was launched but this normalization did not finalized and Turkey's relations with Israel still remain in a bad position. Particularly Turkey strongly criticized Israel's new Gaza operations.

As expected, when Turkey's relations with Israel are getting worse, Turkey's relations with Palestinian Groups are getting better. This, we will see, is mentioned in some of the reports, particularly in 2012. European Union says that close relations were maintained with Palestinian Authority. They repeat the same sentence, and finally Turkey continued to maintain open communication channels with both Fatah and Hamas, provided Gaza with humanitarian assistance and this issue was just mentioned in the report.

When we come to some real Arab Spring countries, like Tunisia and Egypt and Libya, we see that Turkey's role in the region, particularly during the developments in Tunisia and in Egypt, was firstly praised by European Union. Turkey was seen as a supportive for democratic transition in Egypt in 2012. For instance, Turkey was vocal for the need of a change of regime in Egypt which means Mubarak regime should be changed. Turkey took a positive and supportive stance and welcomed democratic trance in Egypt after Mr. Mubarak was elected. However, when there was a coup'd'etat in Egypt in July 2013, Turkey started to raise its voice against the new General Sisi regime in Egypt and then, of course Turkey's relations with Egypt significantly deteriorated and the respective ambassadors were recalled. For the moment there is no Turkish ambassador in Egypt and there is no Egyptian ambassador in Turkey.

When it comes to Libya, it was almost the same course. First of all, Turkey did not align itself with the EU measures with regards to Libya, gave a lot of substantial humanitarian assistance to Libya but however, just a few months later, Turkey agreed to support NATO's command of operations for the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions on Libya and Turkey participated actively to these operations. Then according to European Union's Reports, Turkey gave support to democratic transition in Libya.

Finally in Tunisia, there is no too much reference to what had happened in Tunisia. There are only a few sentences. They said Turkey expresses support people's aspirations in Tunisia and supported new government and constitution in Tunisia.

If we come to a conclusion, we see at the beginning, Turkey's role in the Arab Spring, which is no more an Arab Spring, it is maybe a winter, and it is over now as a positive role by the EU. Turkey was the only country in the region which had good relations with Syria, very good relations with Egypt, good relations with Israel, and good relations both politically and commercially with Iran. Moreover it was seen by the European Union as an advantage of the European Union, when a country having accession negotiations with the European Union, have very good ties with all countries in the region, and would contribute very positively to both political and economic needs of the European Union in the region. However, during the course of the Arab Spring, when Turkey's relations with some of the countries in the region has deteriorated, almost diplomatic relations were cut with some of them, Turkey's dysfunction was no more mentioned by European Union's side.

Therefore, I would say and conclude that this Arab Spring, unlike our previous or initial calculations, did not positively help Turkey's negotiations with the EU. I only underlined the role of Turkey as a mediator or a stability factor but on the other hand, we should also mention, maybe during discussion time, that the image or the perception of the region at all, particularly after the emergence of the Islamic State Organization in the region, does not help to Turkey's relations with the EU and negotiation process.

Thank you for your patience.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

Thank you very much Çağrı for this assessment of the Turkish role in the region through the eyes of the European Union which showed us that the view European Union took Turkish policy and role in the region was mainly affected by the developments in the region and the specific Turkish reaction in comparison to the EU policy. As we all know, especially we forgot that the European Union sometimes called as a paper tiger, it is always important to study the words carefully. So thank you very much again for giving us this deep impression of the European assessment of Turkey.

I would now hand over to another speaker from Turkey, giving us another Turkish view of the developments in the region, Dr. Nurgül Bekar from also Ankara University. We are looking forward to your presentation.

Dr. Nurgül Bekar

Teşekkür ederim Sayın Başkan.

Ben konuşmamda Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz politikasını çok daha geniş bir perspektiften ele alarak, tarihsel süreci özetledikten sonra bugün gelinen noktadaki durumu değerlendireceğim.

Akdeniz bölgesine baktığımızda, Akdeniz bölgesinin yüzyıllardan beri çok farklı din, dil, kültür ve sosyal yapılara ev sahipliği yaptığını görüyoruz. Bölgenin bir başka özelliği ise, özellikle, Afrika-Avrupa arasında çok önemli bir geçiş noktası olmasıdır. Yine büyük enerji kaynaklarını barındırması açısından da bölgenin gerek Avrupa Birliği için, gerekse uluslararası politika için çok önemli bir stratejik değeri olduğunu söylememiz gerekiyor.

Bölgedeki aktörlere baktığımızda ise, sadece Avrupa Birliği'ni görmüyoruz, Avrupa Birliği dışında, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve bugün için konuşursak, Çin'in de belli çıkarlarını maksimize etmeye çalıştıklarını tespit ediyoruz.

Bölgedeki sorunları, geçmişten bugüne ele aldığımızda, karşımıza şöyle bir tablo çıkıyor; sorunlar tarihten bu yana çözülmemiş. Sorunlar belirli bir tarihi devamlılık içeriyor. Başta Arap-İsrail sorunu olmak üzere, bölgedeki kabile savaşları, bölgedeki enerji kaynaklarının paylaşımı, Cezayir krizi ile başlayan sorunlar, bugün de hala, Arap Baharı ile birlikte daha da farklılaşarak, hala devam etmektedir.

Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz politikasını nasıl şekillendirdiğine baktığımızda ise, Roma Antlaşması ile birlikte, bölgeye yönelik özel hükümlerin konulduğunu ve özellikle o dönem Avrupa Birliği içerisinde dominant ülke olan Fransa'nın bastırmasıyla, eski koloni ülkeleri ile olan ayrıcalıklı ilişkinin devam ettirmeye çalışıldığını görüyoruz. Bu meyanda, biraz önce Prof. Lannon da ifade ettiği gibi, Avrupa Birliği ile ilişkiler açısından Tunus'un ve Fas'ın ayrıcalıklı olduğunu görmekteyiz. Tabii ki o dönemde yapılan antlaşmalar ortak bir politika oluşturmak açısından farklı bir duruma işaret ediyor. O da her ülke ile tek tek antlaşma yapılması, her ülke ile koşulluluk ve karşılıklılık ilkesi üzerine antlaşma yapılması. Tabii ki bu unsur Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz'e yönelik politikalarının etkin olmasını ve ortak bir çıkarda buluşmasına engelleyici bir unsur olmuştur.

Avrupa Birliği'nin ilk dönemlerinde, biraz önce söylediğim gibi, Fransa'nın etkisi çok daha yoğun, özellikle bugünle karşılaştırsak. Fransa'nın eski kolonileriyle olan ilişkisini devam ettirirken, bu ilişkiyi aynı zamanda Avrupa Birliği içerisinde bir güç unsuru olarak da kullanmaya çalıştığını görüyoruz.

Akdeniz politikası şekillenirken, ilk karşımıza çıkan antlaşmalar, Yaoundé Antlaşmaları ve daha sonra Lome Antlaşmaları. Lome Antlaşmaları'nın farkı ise, artık topluluğa katılmış olan İngiltere'nin de bu bölgelerde kendi çıkarlarını maksimize etmek istemesinden kaynaklanıyor.

1960'larda, İspanya, Yunanistan ve Portekiz'le görüşmelerin yavaş yavaş başlaması, bu ülkelerin Avrupa Topluluğu'na girmek için istek belirtmesinden sonra, Akdeniz politikasının şekli biraz daha değişmeye başlıyor. Hele hele 80'lerde Yunanistan, İspanya ve Portekiz'in üye olmasıyla, Akdeniz politikasının kapsamı, daha çok kuzeydeki zengin ülkelerin yararına değişmiş oluyor. Zira bu ülkeler güneye karşı olan durumlarını daha ayrıcalıklı hale getirmek istiyorlar. Özellikle tarım politikası konusunda Avrupa Birliği'nin uyguladığı kotalar, sınırlamalar ve koruma mekanizmaları, güneydeki Akdeniz Devletlerinin, biraz daha dışarıda kalmasına ve Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz politikalarının etkisizleşmesine yol açıyor.

Bundan sonra baktığımızda ise, her ülke için farklı kriterler ve koşullar uygulanmasının, yine karşımıza bir sorun olarak çıktığını görüyoruz. Zira Avrupa Birliği her ülke ile farklı bir antlaşma yaparak, ortak bir tutumun ortaya çıkmasını da aslında engellemiş oluyor.

Akdeniz politikasındaki, en önemli adımlardan bir tanesi yine, 1972 yılında oluşturulan, Global Akdeniz Politikası'dır. Global Akdeniz Politikası'nın Akdeniz ülkeleri için önemi şüphesiz çok büyük. Fakat yine tarım konusundaki sınırlamaların, Global Akdeniz Politikası'nın amaçladığı serbest ticaret bölgelerinin oluşmasını da engellediğini söylememiz gerekiyor. Keza 1980'lerin başında, Birlik yetkilileri de, ya da o zaman ki adıyla Avrupa Topluluğu yetkilileri de, Akdeniz politikasının başarısız olduğunu açıklamışlardır.

1990'lara geldiğimizde, Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz politikasını Soğuk Savaş'ın bitiminin ardından yenileme ihtiyacı hissettiğini görüyoruz. Bunun sonucunda da 1995'te, Barselona'da yapılan toplantı sonunda, Barselona süreci denen ya da Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklığı denen oluşumun ortaya çıktığını görüyoruz. Akdeniz ülkelerinin yine bu meyanda, yani Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklığı çerçevesinde, temel amaçladıkları hedef ekonomik işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi, bölgedeki kalkınmanın artırılmasıdır. Ama tarihe bakarsanız, 1995'ler, yani Soğuk Savaş'ın bitimi ve Avrupa Birliği'nin genişleme çalışmalarının başladığı dönemler... İşte tam da bu dönemde, artık Avrupa Birliği'nin ilgisinin ve önceliklerinin daha çok Doğu Avrupa'ya, Merkezi ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerine kaydığını görmekteyiz. Bu yüzden de Akdeniz politikasının, Avrupa Birliği'nin öncelikleri arasında biraz daha alt sıralara indiğini görüyoruz.

Soğuk Savaş sonrasında yine güvenlik sorunda ortaya çıkan belirsizlikler, Avrupa Birliği'ni yeni politikalar üretmeye yöneltmiştir. Bu dönemde gerek silahların el değiştirmesi, gerekse güvenlik, tehdit, risk gibi kavramların yeniden tanımlanması da, AB'nin Akdeniz Politikasını revize etmesini gerektiren sebeplerdendir. Özellikle 1989 yılında Berlin Duvarı'nın yıkılmasına neden olan politik değişimler, Avrupa Birliği'nin tabii ki stratejik ve jeopolitik önceliklerini yeniden gözden geçirmesine yol açmıştır. Bu dönemde Sovyet Bloğu'nun dağılması, Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin Topluluk kaynaklarından daha fazla yararlanmak istemesi ve Topluluk bütçesinin de bu ülkelere daha fazla ayrılması, Akdeniz politikasının yine gerilemesinin sebeplerinden olarak gösterilmektedir. Bu dönemde Almanya'nın artan ağırlığını da, tabii ki Akdeniz Politikası'nın gerileme sebeplerinden biri olarak söyleyebiliriz. Sebebi de, Almanya'nın, Fransa'ya karşı kendi durumunu Birlik içerisinde dengelemek istemesi olarak açıklanabilir.

Buraya kadar genel olarak baktığımızda, tarihsel süreci göz önüne aldığımızda, Avrupa Birliği'nin bölgeye yönelik politikalarının temelinde ekonomik amaçlı olduğunu görüyoruz ve Arap Baharı'na kadar olan dönemde esasen, ekonomik antlaşmalar üzerinden, ekonomik koşullar üzerinden yürütülmeye çalışıldığını görüyoruz. Ama Akdeniz için Birlik Örgütü, Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz politikasında bir manada değişiklik yaratmak istemiş, fakat bugün baktığımızda bunun da çok etkili ve işlerlik kazanmış bir örgüt olmadığını görebiliyoruz.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası değişen ortamın da etkisiyle, ekonominin yanı sıra artık güvenlik konularında gerek Akdeniz politikasında, gerekse biraz önce dinledik, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nda öne çıkmaya başladığı bilinen gerçeklerden bir tanesidir. Bu yüzden Avrupa Birliği, Akdeniz politikasında ekonomik ölçütlerin yanı sıra demokratik ilkeler, insan hakları ve temel özgürlüklere saygı, kültürler ve medeniyetler arası anlayışın desteklenmesi, barış, güvenlik, refah ve istikrarın korunması gibi ölçütlere de bugün daha fazla vurgu yapmaktadır. Zira bugün değişen güvenlik, tehdit ve risk kavramlarıyla birlikte, bu saydığımız unsurlar Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz politikası için daha önemli hale gelmiştir. Her ne kadar eskiden olduğu gibi mali yardımları ve destekleri kullanmakta ise de, Avrupa Birliği'nin bu yardımları esasen bölgede tehditleri yerinde önlemeye yönelik olarak kullanmaya çalıştığını görüyoruz.

Yine Arap Baharı süreciyle yaşanan gelişmeler neticesinde bu yardımların bölge için de daha önemli hale geldiğini tespit etmekteyiz. Zira Ortadoğu'daki son gelişmeler, Soğuk Savaş sonrası yeni risk ve tehditlerle

karşılaşan Avrupa Birliği'ne daha ağır sorunlar yaşatmakta, her şeyden önce enerjiye bağımlılığı gittikçe artan bir Avrupa Birliği ile karşı karşıyayız. Ve bu enerjiye bağımlılığı içerisinde, enerji ihtiyacının büyük bir bölümünü karşıladığı bölge için daha güvenli bir ortamın sağlanması, istikrarın, refahın sağlanması Avrupa Birliği için büyük önem arz ediyor.

Bugün Ortadoğu'daki sorunlara baktığımızda, Suriye'deki iç savaş, Libya'daki istikrarsızlık, Arap-İsrail çatışması, Doğu Akdeniz'de yaşanan münhasır ekonomik bölge ve kıta sahanlığı sorunları, Arap Baharı nedeniyle başlayan çatışmalı değişim döneminin etkilerinin yaşandığını bizlere göstermektedir.

Bölgedeki istikrar ve ekonomik gelişmenin sağlanması tabii ki sadece bölge ülkeleri için değil, Avrupa Birliği için de tam da saydığımız bu sebepler yüzünden son derece yaşamsal önem arz ediyor. Arap Baharı ile başlayan süreç, bunun için AB politikalarının yenilenmesi ihtiyacını da doğurmuştur.

Fakat değerlendirme yapmamız gerekirse, özellikle Lizbon Antlaşması sonrası, Avrupa Birliği'nin yeni ortaya çıkan kurumları veya değişime uğrayan, revize edilen politikaları açısından baktığımızda Avrupa Birliği'nin çok da etkin bir tutum sergileyemediğini görüyoruz. Avrupa Birliği Başkanı, Avrupa Birliği Yüksek Temsilciliği, Avrupa Birliği Dış İlişkiler Servisi'nin bölgeye Arap Baharı başladıktan oldukça sonra ilgili kişilerin atamalarını gerçekleştirdiklerini görüyoruz ve tam da bu döneme işaret ettiğimizde Avrupa Birliği'nin bölgedeki sorunlara, krizlere cevap vermede yavaşlığını da görmekteyiz.

Yine Lizbon Antlaşması'nda artık Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası haline gelen politika açısından baktığımızda, Avrupa Birliği'nin Arap Baharı sonrasında bölgeye yönelik politikalarında çok ciddi bir sınav veremediğini de söylememiz gerekiyor. Özellikle Libya meselesinde yaşanan ayrışma, yine İngiltere, Fransa gibi ülkelerin daha aktif bir rol üstlenmek istemeleri, Avrupa Birliği içerisinde Akdeniz bölgesine yönelik olarak ortak çıkarların olup olmadığı ya da hangi önceliklerin olduğu konusunda bir takım soruları akla getirmektedir. Mısır sorununa baktığımızda ise ülkelerin sergilediği tutumlar açısından bunun Avrupa Birliği için daha ileri bir kırılma noktası olduğunu görmekteyiz.

Avrupa Birliği, Arap Baharı'nın akabinde, öncü bir rol oynamak yerine, kendisinden beklendiğinin tersine daha çok Birleşmiş Milletler ve diğer uluslararası örgütler kapsamında davranmaya çalışmıştır. Ortadoğu'da yaşanan olaylara, AB Bütünleşmesindeki son noktayı teşkil edecek siyasi

birliğin de gerçekleşip, gerçekleşmediğinin sınıdığı bir alan olarak bakmamız gerekiyor. Böyle baktığımızda da, Avrupa Birliği'nin çok başarılı bir sınav veremediğini söylemeliyiz. Avrupa Birliği giderek karmaşıklaşan Ortadoğu gelişmeleri karşısında halen etkili adımlar atmaktan uzaktır. Avrupa Birliği'ne yönelik tehditlere baktığımızda ise, Arap Baharı sonrası özellikle, istihdam, eğitim, sağlık ve insan hakları gibi konularda yaşanan sıkıntıların, Avrupa'ya yasadışı göç olarak yansıdığını ki, yasadışı göç günümüzün en büyük sorunlarından bir tanesidir, ayrıca insan ve uyuşturucu kaçakçılığının da Avrupa kıtası için çok ciddi problemler oluşturduğunu söylemeliyiz.

Bu tehditleri önlemek için AB bir yandan sınır kontrollerini artırmaya çalışırken, diğer yandan da Avrupa Birliği içerisinde ortak bir tutum geliştirme çabasıdadır. Ancak hali hazırda Akdeniz'den gelecek tehdit ve riskleri önlemekte de yetersiz kaldığını söylememiz gerekiyor. Avrupa Birliği'nin esasen bölgeye yönelik politikasının bugün başarısız görülmesinin sebeplerinden biri, biraz önce söylediğimiz tarihsel süreçteki adımlarda daha çok merkezi otoritelerle işbirliği yapmasından ileri gelmektedir. Sivil toplum örgütleri veya özel sektörle işbirliği yapmak yerine, daha çok merkezi otorite ya da otoriter yönetimlerle ortak politikalar ürettiğinde, Akdeniz politikalarının başarılı olacağını düşünmüştür, ancak bugün yanıldığı da ortaya çıkmıştır. AB'nin bölgeye yönelik ekonomik işbirliği hedefinin de bugün saydığımız sebepler yüzünden başarılı olamadığını söylememiz gerekiyor. AB, merkezi otoritelerle bu kadar işbirliği yapmasından kaynaklanan sebeplerle, demokratik değerlerin Ortadoğu toplumlarında yerleşmesi ve insan haklarının sağlanması konularında, yeterince destekleyici olamamıştır. Ayrıca ekonomik işbirliği açısından baktığımızda da, tekrar vurgulamalıyız, tarım ürünlerindeki sınırlamalar, kotalar devam ettikçe, bölgeyle istenilen serbest ticaret alanlarının oluşması mümkün gözükmemektedir.

Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz politikasını genel olarak değerlendirirsek, 1950'lerden yola çıktığımızda ve bugüne geldiğimizde hedeflerle varılan sonuç arasında, çok ciddi bir farklılık olduğunu görmekteyiz. Başlangıçta tamamen ekonomik saiklerle bölgeye yaklaşan Avrupa Birliği, bugün artık bunun yetmediğini ve kendi girişimlerinin de ne kadar etkisiz kaldığını, Avrupa Birliği en yüksek yetkilileri tarafından da açıklamaktadır.

Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinin Akdeniz'e olan ilgisinin eşit olmaması, her ülkenin farklı ulusal çıkarlar kapsamında değişik hareket etmesi de bugün AB'nin lokomotif olan Almanya'nın önceliğinin Akdeniz havzası olmaması da yine Akdeniz politikasının, tamamen başarısız demek haksız olacak, etkisiz olmasının sebeplerindedir.

Son olarak Avrupa Birliđi'nin politikasını deęerlendirirsek eđer, küreselleşme çağında Avrupa Birliđi'nin uluslararası alanda belirleyici bir aktör olabilmesi, Avrupa Birliđi'nin Ortadoęu'daki gibi sorunlara, yani uluslararası krizlere, cevap verme kabiliyetine baęlıdır. Bu cevap verme kabiliyetinin de elbette Avrupa Birliđi'nin kendisini nasıl bir güç olarak tanımladığı ile açıklanabilir. Bugün biliyorsunuz yumuşak gücün yanında, sert gücün de gerekli olduđu kabul edilmektedir. Zira yumuşak gücün de, sert gücün de anlamı bugün deęişmiştir. Eskiden sadece ekonomi ile açıklanabilecek, ya da ekonomi ile çok daha kolay yürütülebilecek olan yumuşak güce bugün diplomasinin ve tabii sert gücün de eşlik etmesi beklenmektedir. Avrupa Birliđi kendisini önümüzdeki süreçte nasıl bir güç olarak tanımlarsa, Akdeniz politikasındaki davranışı da ya da Akdeniz politikasındaki başarısı da buna paralel olarak gidecektir. Dolayısı ile Avrupa Birliđi'nin siyasi birliğinde son nokta olacak Güvenlik ve Dış Politikası aynı şekilde Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası'nın başarıyla işleyip işlemeyeceğini sınavabileceğimiz en önemli alan da belki Arap Baharı sonrası Ortadoęu'da yaşanan gelişmelerdir. Avrupa Birliđi'nin geleneksel olarak sahip olduđu yumuşak gücünü bu yüzden sert gücüyle de desteklemesi gerekmektedir. Kaldı ki, Avrupa Birliđi'nin nasıl bir güç olacağı, bugün uğraştığı ekonomik krizin yanında, kendi geleceđi ile ilgili vereceđi en önemli sınavlardan da biridir.

Teşekkür ederim.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

Thank you very much Dr. Bekar for your presentation which brought a new aspect to our assessment in the panel. While looking at the EU and its policy as a uniform actor before, you highlighted that the challenging aspect especially for its partners that the EU is not a uniform actor, especially in the regard to its fond relations it is rather characterized by the different interests of its Members States and how it influenced its EU Foreign Policy strategies. Also with regard to these differences you scrutinized the rhetoric of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and its difficult implementation. So thank you very much again for this new aspect you brought to our discussions.

Last but not least, I will hand over to Alessandro Quarenghi who will have a closer look on a specific aspect, the EU promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean which is referred to as a universal value in the EU Strategic Documents as we heard at the beginning of the panel. We are looking forward to your presentation Alessandro.

Dr. Alessandro Quarenghi

Thank you. Thank you everyone, thank you president.

Starting by thanking to Konrad Adenauer Foundation and ATAUM for inviting us here and thank you for being here.

I heard some criticism, some critics to European Union from previous speakers and I wonder how that is possible. There is some glimpse of hope I think. So I chose to focus on the European Endowment for Democracy in my presentation, because it's a new institution that was created just a couple of years ago in 2012 and started working a few months later. That could actually give us an idea of a new European approach to the region.

What I am doing is firstly to frame the European Union approach to democracy promotion because it is impossible to talk about the European Union democracy promotion policies without taking into consideration the general framework of European Union foreign policy, especially towards the Middle East. Then second step, I will focus on European Endowment for Democracy, trying to understand something new in the bilateral issues about it that could actually give us vision, a new phase of European role in the region. We will try to assess, I will try to see, if this tool is actually going to be affective for European Union interests and especially democracy promotion in the changing of the Mediterranean or the Middle East.

So I focus on the European Union policy towards the Mediterranean from after the end of Cold War, of course before it was still important but we can talk about a different period after the Cold War. To do this, we have start with general rationale of the European foreign policies, after 89, and this implies both towards its eastern neighbors and the southern neighbors. So I am trying to harmonize security, actually European security, I know we have already talked about shared value, shared prosperity, shared economic improvement, everything you want, but if you considered the whole period from 89 up to today, the security adverted today as European security, development and that was a focus for both European Union, European Union countries, and the partners east and south. Of course the human right and democratization efforts was the goal for the policies aimed mostly at partners, and I am not talking about the improvement of European democracy, I am talking about European values and European democracy that can be adopted for practices in other countries. Very ambitious rationale, very ambitious framework, very ambitious frame of mind. It was difficult, so ambitious that it was very difficult in practice and makes it effective and we can say in general there are two main issues that are particularly relevant.

First one is the theoretical which I am not going to go into very much but it is a theoretical issue about the policies, time conflict, in the sense that the perspective framework was supposed to get harmonized in short term policies with a long term plan of transformation in the neighbors of the European Union. Security, economic development and democratization... But normally we follow different time frames. Security, its more into the short term policies, democratization, economic development more a long term policies and quite long term transformations. That is an issue because in fact, that is the second main issue, that the policy needs to be actually implemented and that depends on the scenarios, political scenarios that you are going to implement. From European Union perspective, we have two main regions: east and south and we have the transformation of the international environment. September 11, like it or not, was actually a milestone in the shifting of the international environment, very simply that security became predominant I would tell you, became predominant in the interest of the main actors, international actors, including the European Union after September 11.

So why the first period of time, civil society, democratization, security and economic development were somehow balanced and then slowly the security took the main goal that managed to take the advert of today, a kind of policies that were implemented.

In terms of democracy promotions, we can see two or three main phases, in order to oversimplify, I can talk about two main phases, one is end of Cold War, 2003-2006 and second one is presenting 2010 and before the Arab Awakenings.

First one, in terms of overall policies it is the year of enlargement, in the south it is the year of Euro Mediterranean Partnership, but it is the same with the previous because the priority of the European Union was the east, the enlargement, the historical enlargement at the end of that time. 2003-2006-2007 were the years of implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy.

In general terms, I see that these two phases have shared some structural features. The first one is the continuity of these two phases that are more than the discontinuities. The continuity is that the democratization can be brought into the neighbors by working on the structural cases on democratization. That means for example that can be economic development, because higher level of income can bring more democracy, we can create an environment more convenient to democracy. Second of the continuity is the long term or the short term policies attempted to harmonize

the process of democratization that was understood all over the European Union in helping those countries. Democratization was understood as democracy to be consolidated. So different steps... For democratization, European policy makers thought that the European development already take place in those countries, on those years, Arab and Middle East, it was the years of liberalization. But the perspective of *the* European Union brings them to open up more spaces for democracy. That is why in fact, in addition to the security priority, the second part, the second phase, 2003-2005-2010, the approach that was used focused mostly on government relationships, not much went, highlighted, focused into civil society actors. Democratization was mostly following a top-down approach. We focused on governments to help us in terms of security and then down the governments, top-down, will increase democratization. We use conditionality not being very effective but were there. The importance of resources in order to improve relationships and create some cooperative attitude let's say from different countries.

And finally, European Union preferred not formally but empirical data to show us that the support for civil society actors that were actually founded. Preferred actors well structured, well prepared to actually follow up western style idea of democracy. This is the first structural feature, continuities and then the discontinuities that I just highlighted. The structural cases, harmonization, democratical salutation, top-down approach, importance of resources and use of conditionalities mostly negative and a preference for western style civil society actors.

The second structural feature, again an empirical data is that democracy policies by European Union were mostly successful when European Union was able to offer the prize of membership. Membership requires some structural and complex transformation in legal and political systems of countries and if you have accession at the end of it, then you might be willing to do that. If you do not have it, it is very difficult.

That means clearly that the southern Mediterranean, the instruments of European Union proved to be not as successful let's say, in the first phase.

Then there is a trend that actually started before the end of the Cold War, a trend not to see the region as a whole but to differentiate and to create tools that were able to more focus on the individual situations, individual countries, and individual actors. Then that arrived the Arab Spring, Arab Awakenings and the European Union tried to react to it and now did it by adding a lot of "more"s, more commitment to Europe for Mediterranean, more money, more market access, more mobility, more instruments, more for more, more focus on civil society, "more"s keep coming up which means

that the European Union did not modify the overall framework because of the Arab Spring. It did try to, in the general framework of its policies, it tried to make them more effective. More in general, I say that, the reaction of the European Union to the Arab Spring was to revive the regional cooperation that was basically dead before, to go back and to revive the focus on civil society, to increase its ability to differentiate between the different countries and situations and to be more assertive, more credible, not be a paper tiger, using rhetorical principal politics but actually underground trying to create, agree on more precise benchmarks and to make countries stick to them, governments especially. At the governmental level, the government cooperation in the ENP wants to make the southern governments much more respectful of the communities that they assign. Then increase the use the positive conditionality for example, opening up the European Bank to Middle Eastern and North African countries. This is the general outlook.

Then we have, among the new tools that the European Union has created for the Arab Spring, the European Endowment for Democracy which is a special kind of institution. First of all, the European Endowment for Democracy was not created because of the Arab Spring. It was created because of the needs of the eastern countries. The Arab Spring or the Arab Awakenings when it arrived gave especially Poland and Sweden the final push to actually propose it and make it work. Because to bring the European Union to create the European Endowment for Democracy back in time, in the 80s, in the Poland revolution and all the eastern revolution and then the Arab Awakenings are understood as part of similar new way for democratization. Very similar phenomenon, very similar, they are based on agents, on people using certain tools, but different from all the revolutions of the last century. So the main interest of the eastern states, let's say, Poland, Sweden, they wanted the European Union to create a more attractive, not for European eastern countries in order to balance the Russian rise in power and involvement in the east.

Finally, as a preliminary point, that clearly the European Endowment for Democracy has the national endowment for democracy so the United States endowment for democracy has its model because eastern countries regarded the rule that the national endowment for democracies had in the eastern revolution as particularly important.

Let's get to the structure, so I try to highlight why it can be different. It is an independent foundation; it is not strictly part of the European Union. Independent foundation located in Brussels. It has a board of governors. I will get back to that in a few seconds. The committee deciding on grants that

can be given to actors that application is independent. It is totally independent from the board of governors and there are civil society experts in that independent committee. So it is very limited bureaucracy. I am talking about 12 permanent staff. It has no offices in the east or in the south. It can use some embassies of the European countries located in those neighbor countries, but no offices, no staff there. It relies on scouts in those countries that can point out the most interesting actors and budgets to fund. It is being funded both from the European Union and by the member states, I did not add it, and also from other private bodies, so not only states. The bureaucratic process is very limited, kept to minimum, and focus exclusively on civil society and the goal is that to support the unsupported. So those bodies and actors but that means also individuals, bloggers, civil society movements, or independent thinkers who cannot access to other, more long-term sources of funding. So these funding as well are mostly short-term funds. In other words, it looks like instruments that need to, it is important, complement other European Union instruments that are, that try to improve democracy in eastern and southern countries. In other words, they want to fill the gaps that European Union democracy promotion can push.

However, if you see, if you go back to the structural features, the continuities that I already highlighted earlier, but European endowment for democracy is also different premise. It is a different idea of what is needed in the region. It does not focus on the structural cases of democratization, but on agents, on people that are able to make a change. It does not really try to harmonize, short-term and long-term, it is short-term. It does not follow government down on civil society, it is actually bottom-up. It does not care at all about supporting the recognized NGOs, the human rights NGOs in the country. It jumps over, it does not consider the state-level. We do not know what kind of factors it will have, because it just started to fund. There are no empirical data at the moment but the idea is that, to be able to support the unsupported so the people that do not fit into our idea, our idea the European values so strictly but that are able to create a positive change. There is no prize, money, you do whatever you want with conditionality attached to the grants. Again, the idea of democratization and the phase of democratization that the countries are into, it seems different. Even before, European Union was trying to consolidate democratic policies in those countries, they start to understand that those countries are in a very early stage of democratization. Being in authoritarian situations and you need some actors again.

Now I will mention what are the issues and then I conclude with the European Union. First is relevant, or it is a nice little institution that can give some grants to bloggers. I will give just a few data to understand the issue.

European Endowment for Democracy has managed to acquire 26 million Euros from 3 years 2012-2015 which means, we are talking about 9 million a year in order to fund projects. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights which are not similar, are doing a similar job, talking about 180 million Euros a year. If you compare then to other actors, for example the National Endowment for Democracy, the American one, 130 million dollars a year. So European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights is 12 times as much as the Endowment. The US version gets around 15 times as much. You can argue that between EU and US is a matter of difference between the international power and the regional power.

Secondly, it is not going to change the European way of dealing democracy, dealing with democracy promotion. Second issue of being effective, not to just be relevant but to be effective. Second issue is about harmonizing with other sources, other European Union institutions, to have policies that go towards the same goal because it is independent, because easily fund bodies that, actors that European Union does not think worth funding. I do not think that it is a problem. I mean there is an issue but I do not think it is a problem. It is a part of all great powers to have different institutions that sometimes follow different policies and that is actually useful.

Third issue is political backing. If you are independent, you need to have bodies, European institutions, European actors, European states that actually think that your independence is important. In the board of governors we have all the representatives of European states, in addition of some civil society experts, in addition to some European Union office holders. But the main body, the main people, the most number of people that is part of the board of governors is expression of individual states, so we have to see if there is a political backing and it has few issues of getting some funding from some European states, Germany for example, southern European states not all of them had funded the European Endowment. So the issue of political backing is very certain.

Fourth is the issue of autonomy from the backers. We see that is being pushed by some countries, Poland most of all, the executive director is Polish. So we have to see how relevant, what kind of autonomy will actually be able to get. Fourth issue is the issue of Trojan horse. So it is a critic that has been always raised towards national endowment tools, just a matter of, you know, of spreading the American values into different countries. It works with the same manner, it designed in that way: Independent, it does not represent European Union but *funds* without the knowledge of the government. I think

that is quite a refine and sophisticated tool that European Union needed. A critic that was raised, I think it was actually needed.

The last issue then I will close it. Mostly the essential issue, I think fifth issue, it is the issue of the regional Middle Eastern scenario. So if it is actually an instrument that actually fits to work in the Middle East. There I see there are three trends that characterize today's Middle East. First, there is a trend in differentiation. There is an exposure of differentiation towards the Middle East, in terms of actors, the nature of the actors, interests of these actors have and the interests with regard to cooperating, dealing with the European Union. The old categories are kind of disappearing. The third big trend is the weakening of the state. In Middle East some are totally disappearing. In other countries, being kept up with some difficulty, in others it is changing. Before I remind, the European Union policies were focusing on the state level without a state, what kind of European Union can continue European Union policy, it needs to be reformed.

Thirdly, from the European Union perspective, it is the disappearance of the Mediterranean. I always regarded the idea of Mediterranean to create, to have a Mediterranean region, quite a stupid idea with respect to the quite a few years of European Union policy. However, it was quite artificial, was from a European perspective and it was not really taken into account. I do not want to go as far as to say, there is a new colonial policy but it did not actually take into account, from my perspective, the reality of the region. It was a really very self-serving view of the region. Mediterranean today is clearly not a Mediterranean anymore in a sense that it is enlarging south, east. You actually keep Mediterranean were it is but the dynamics are creating, are maintaining this region in just the European framework that designate that region as the Mediterranean.

So clearly, the European policy needs a big rethinking, which however I think, it is even more general the issue, the final issue of European Union political identity. My colleague already mentioned it but it is quite important. We are talking about the coming back of politics, the end of liberal world and all of that. I was reading yesterday, an interview by Tony Blair, because it is a very well paid advisor, we can use some of his words without paying him, and so I would like to do it. And he was saying that European Union from our part, the generation that created European Union, the European Union was about peace. Creating a world of peace, for us today the European Union is about power, is to make the European people, I would not say important but, being part of the world and back to what he was saying, it simply means that the European Union cannot afford anymore to think of

itself as a normative power. It can think of itself being an international power without using hard power, without using the old power it was disposed. Because the new trend is saying that hard power is important and that needs to be used, otherwise you are not going to be a power anymore. It is the idea of normative power is absolutely been over for a few years but now it is difficult to deny that is going to be.

So the European Union needs absolutely rethinking the idea of what it is, and therefore rethinking of what it can be. Can The European Endowment for Democracy be effective in Middle East? Yes, it can. It takes into account the new regional scenario, differentiation, no state, disappearance of Mediterranean. It can be a tool in the old framework, however it can be a nice tool if it is used by a power that to support democracy per se, as it is in the European Endowment for Democracy, support democracy per se, but sometimes being able to use hard power because of its own interest. The union between democracy interests that has led European policy so far is not going to be able to sustain European Union. There is a lot of talking about Middle East in the European Union, about the last few months, in the political circus, is European Union going to be able to appear union to be actually go through a such a fundamental shift in the self definition of itself. In my personal opinion, it is absolutely not. So I would finally agree with the previous speaker. The European Union is very likely to become not so relevant actor in the region. That is overall just doing some nice little funding for some nice democracy agents in the region. But not relevant but when the chips are down.

That is it. Thank you.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

Thank you very much Alessandro. You managed the huge task to structure the task of promotion of democracy with regard to its development over time, as well as the challenged phases in the European Neighborhood. And you assessed its success or rather failure with its close look to Mediterranean region after the Arab Upheavals based on this rather negative assessment. You highlighted the European Endowment for Democracy as a possible new era due to new structures and also as a character, as an additional tool to fill in the gaps, I like the phrase you mentioned, an additional tool to fill in the gaps and might make a difference in the performance of the EU promotion of democracy in the region.

I would like to thank all the speakers again for their presentation which addressed a lot of different aspects and views towards the European Union,

its Neighborhood Policy and also especially their effectiveness that will not only give us food for thought and I would say it also raised a lot of questions.

Now we still have 20 minutes left for questions, so I will open up the floor to you, if you have any questions for our speakers.

Katilmci

I have in fact two questions, one for Prof. Lannon. Do you think that the partnership of the EU and the Middle East and Mediterranean countries, such as for example the eastern partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean is in fact that bilateral, since the partnership explicitly limits the input of the other country in the process of that reform for the sake of this international and shared values?

And I have a question for Dr. Quarenghi, can in fact the EU really revive the cause of Middle East and Mediterranean peace? And if yes, can it play a major actor role and maybe even taking the actual major role of US and Russia in the region? Thank you.

Prof. Dr. Erwan Lannon

For the sake of clarification, to be sure that I understand well your question, you refer to Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean and your question is about if it has weakened the conditionality values approach, am I right?

Okay, this is the case. At least, very clearly for the Union, for the Mediterranean... Because this is one of the main problems that were confronted with, that there was no conditionality within the project, at least the original project that was proposed by Mr. Sarkozy and this came under very heavy criticism. If you remember for example President Sarkozy invited Mr. Assad to the Champs Elysees on 14th of July and Mr. Kaddafi was also invited at that time. So it is even worse than that, there were no conditionality within the first project for Mediterranean. But the French President was trying to, was developing in fact, relationship with clear dictatorship.

The issue of Eastern Partnership is a bit different because the Eastern Partnership, if you like difference between the two is that the Eastern Partnership was being included from the beginning in the European Neighborhood Policy. So there are clear connections between the Eastern Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy. The Eastern Partnership

was really developed again on the initiative of the countries like Poland and Sweden in fact to create a multilateral framework that did not exist in the Eastern Europe. There was a clear link with the ENP, so clear link to the values promoted by the European Neighborhood Policy which was really not the case within the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean. So I think it is a very relevant question, and it is very much linked to what I was trying to explain you. It is this confusion about the values because it is really did not finish. If you have a look at the communications that shaped of the Commissioner that shaped the ENP, you will see that there is much confusion. They are speaking about shared values, common values, values to be shared and then they have a reference to European values, EU values and it was extremely confusing.

Then we have faced a contradiction now because I told that in the first financial instrument, it is legally binding that is its difference with the rest. There was a reference to EU values and I quoted the new instruments where you have a reference to universal values. But really we do not know if this is in full contradiction with the treaty of the European Union article 8 that refers to EU values. So we are still in a complete mess and what will take precedence over the regulation is the treaty. Because article 8 is not only a provision of the treaty, it is a constitutional provision because it is in the first part of the treaty. So you see that today we have really contradictions at this level. My point is that this is very problematic because we do not send the right message, our partners are very confused.

Moreover, this is also very much linked to the Neighborhood policy because the Neighborhood Policy is based on the pre-accession strategy. They transposed the strategy, if you like, that you have at the level of Turkey, without the incentives and with much confusion in terms of values, but also in terms of the end game. What is the Neighborhood Policy is all about? So it is all that in 2007 that the European Commission, came with the idea to create a European Neighborhood Economic Community. But what will be the Neighborhood Economic Community? How would it look like? We do not know, you know.

There is confusion about this CFTA and Customs Union but I could not continue for that for a long time so leave it here. But thank you for your question.

Dr. Alessandro Quarenghi

I would like you to be a bit more precise in your question. When you were referring to the peace process which one are you referring to?

Katilmci

It is somehow a fact that European Union has been throwing a lot of money to Middle East and Mediterranean issues and somehow you can see that they have more Euros than Europe somehow still has. What we see at the moment, the major role goes to US and somehow Russia.

Dr. Alessandro Quarenghi

So you mean the peace process overall the Israeli-Palestinian process or the different peace process that are going on in different countries, so in general.

You are saying that EU has been throwing a lot of money, which is relative. It is a lot of money I agree with you, but I am not so certain if it is a lot of money compared to other actors. Despite of the financial crisis, European Union has been constantly putting money in Mediterranean. However, it is still not as much money as other actors have available in the region, both regional and international players. Then the issue is how much money and what kind of strings come with the money. European Union also comes with the strings but they are less relevant in practical data then that the strings come with others' money, for example with those countries. So I am not so sure, I mean, I would not tell you that the level of money that the European Union has actually invested in the region is of an amount that would require, that would make us expect a greater role for the European Union. However, the European Union has its normative power that it has developed so the fact that the European Union gives some actors, so actors in the list some certain advantages. Access to Europe, it does not mean just economic but also in terms of all European facility, European policies in the world. It is really not a matter of money that the European Union puts in the region, it is a matter of creating a better world, if you want. So let's go more into your question, the European Union has no relevant role in empirical terms, in power based terms in the region. It differs from country to country. In some countries European Union is a very important partner I think of Tunisia obviously. But it does not have less leverage in the last couple of years than it used to have. In terms of Israeli-Palestinian process, European Union has no leverage. It has funded considerably the Palestinians, as we know historically the biggest funder for the Palestinians and is trying to be more assertive towards the Israelis, but there as well, it is turning its role in Israeli-Palestinian process from being effective to being detrimental. That is also my opinion. As you know some European countries have been recognizing Palestine as a state. That sounds fantastic.

In terms of policy and in terms of ability of European Commission, about Palestinian state the ability of international recognition of the state to actually making it a full functioning state means a state that is able to function as a state, which in international politics a state that is actually able to defend itself and to self rule over its territory. That is actually makes that possibility less likely.

So again, European Union is extremely contradictory, its understanding of the dynamics of the region, is trying strongly to put the resources and to be more assertive but again there is no clear understanding of the dynamics of the region. It is very much self-serving of the European Union identity and outlook in the region then actually being able to focus on few interests of the European Union wants to achieve and actually to work towards them.

I will talk about United States then I close it. If you follow the United States' foreign policy towards the region, it is very clear that the United States always had three or four interest in the region. And despite of all that, we can talk about the United States, it has managed to achieve those three or four interests. The European Union has no clear interest and therefore it has no way of reaching them or is successful in them. So I honestly, in spite of being European, in spite of loving in the European Union, I think that the European Union is actually not going to be a regional player with exception of some individual countries where its role is actually extremely important. However, we are talking about exceptions; increasingly more than the role as it used to be.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

There is another question.

Katlımci

This question is for Prof. Lannon. We have been giving a lot of thought to the role of Turkey in ENP and you are saying that Turkey is not an ENP partner but its role is highly critical. So it will be a great contribution from you if you can just tell us about your opinion like what kind of a role can Turkey play within this whole policy? Thank you.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

As we are running out of time, I would like to collect questions if it is okay for the panel. I saw another one over there.

Katılımcı

Öncelikle teşekkürler. Benim sorularım Türk hocalarımıza olacak. Öncelikle Nurgül Bekar hocamıza soracağım. Doğu Akdeniz’de bulunan hidrokarbon rezervlerinin Avrupa Birliği’nin Akdeniz politikasına herhangi bir etkisi olur mu veya bir değişim olur mu? Çünkü siz Akdeniz politikasında Avrupa Birliği’nin ekonomik sebeplerle, güdülerle hareket ettiğini söylemişsiniz. Bu açıdan değerlendirir misiniz? Teşekkür ederim.

Diğer sorum Çağrı Hocamıza olacak. Avrupa Birliği devletleri, öncelikle İsveç, Filistin’i devlet olarak tanıdı ve İngiltere, İspanya ve kısa bir süre içerisinde Fransa’nın da adım atması bekleniyor. Adımlar tedrici olsa da bunun İsrail-Filistin sorununda bir çözümü olur mu? AB perspektifi açısından değerlendirir misiniz? Teşekkürler.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

Thank you very much. Is there any other question? Then we take one more.

Katılımcı

Thank you. Good morning. I want to make my comment and final question to Prof. Erhan and to the issue of the role of Turkey in the region. Because you said we have a good relation with all the players in the region, Israel, Syria, Egypt and so on. This we had if go back to I think, at least 10 years ago when it was certain the heritage of the pre-AKP era. So when Davutoğlu entered and declared or presented his zero-problem policy, the zero-problem policy was already enforced. Then things went differently, and I am not going through what went, we all know, you all know, the fact that from zero-problem policy situation, Turkey is now in a full-problem policy. Wherever you go around, you will find problems or you might say yes but in Africa, in Latin America... Sure, but I am not so sure that in Latin America they are happy with the last statement but in any case will not change the situation. Turkey was a mediator in Iraq at the time zero policy and now is a player and zero-problem policy turned out to be a full-problem policy, because Turkey left to be a mediator and now is a player, at least this is my interpretation. So my final question, what went wrong because from zero-problem you turned out to be controversy, a full-problem in the region? Thank you.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

Ok, so thank you very much. Now I will hand over to our panelists for answering the question and I ask you to keep it not too long.

Prof. Dr. Erwan Lannon

I will do my best. Thank you for your question. About the role of Turkey in the ENP, I refer to that because it was really an experience I was confronted and my starting point was to say have a look to the map; Turkey is in the middle of the picture. In the map you should just add all the pipelines, coming from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea so that in terms of infrastructure, energy, and one cannot disconnect Turkey from the rest of the ENP, this is very clear. Mediation was mentioned already so I will leave my colleagues certainly to continue on that; this is obvious having conferences between. Religion is important, border control is also extremely important nowadays in all borders, I mean with Syria with Greece and so on. Any factor of transnational destabilization, so I am referring here to all trafficking of all sorts, terrorism and so on. It is obvious that Turkey has a very important role to play here, also in terms of long-term strategic thinking because this is what we lack in the EU whereas here in Turkey at least there were some strategic thinking that were developed whether they work well or not, that is another issue but there is a reflection that is needed in the EU. There is a new role through NATO, once again I refer to Crimea beware of the fact that you have new ballistic missiles in Crimea and Turkey is a pillar of the NATO in the region so that this is also something to be taken into consideration.

The mistake would be to consider Turkey as a model, as the United States did at a certain moment and EU was trying to follow this. My colleague referred to the colonial past of some member states but I mean Neo-Ottomanizm is also based on a former empire.

So this is the risk to a certain extent, not to put forward the idea of Turkey as a model but more as a facilitator, you see the idea, on very concrete issues, I think this could be very interesting.

Dr. Nurgül Bekar

Doğu Akdeniz'deki karbon yataklarının ne kadar etkili olacağını sordunuz anladığım kadarıyla Akdeniz politikasında. Her şeyden önce şunu tekrar vurgulamak gerekiyor, Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz politikasında Soğuk Savaş'ın bitimine kadar ekonomik temelli politikalar ürettiğini söylemeliyiz. Soğuk Savaş'ın bitiminden sonra değişen ekonomik çıkarların sağlanmasında ve bunların sürdürülmesindeki güvenlik sorununun değişmesi bu yüzden Akdeniz politikalarında ekonomik temelli kalmakla birlikte bu çıkarların nasıl korunacağı endişesi artmış durumda Avrupa Birliği açısından.

Sorunuza gelirse, evet, Doğu Akdeniz'deki karbon yatakları bence Akdeniz politikasında bir nebze etkili olacaktır ama petrol ve doğalgazla kıyasladığımızda çok daha alt sıralarda yer alabileceğini söyleyebilirim. Fakat burada önemli olan başka bir unsur var, bugün girilmedi bu konuya ancak, Doğu Akdeniz'deki bu enerji kaynaklarının kim tarafından ve nasıl kullanılacağı çok önemli bir sorunu teşkil ediyor. Özellikle, Kıbrıs sorunu bağlamında düşündüğümüzde, aday ülke konumundaki Türkiye'nin, Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkelerden biri ile yaşayabileceği sorunları da göz önüne alırsak, Akdeniz politikasında etkileyici bir rol oynayacağını düşünüyorum.

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

İlk soruya cevap verirsek, İsveç, Fransa, İngiltere ve İspanya'da var biliyorsunuz, İspanya parlamentosu da Filistin'i tanıma konusunda bir karar aldı, hükümete bu konuda bir tavsiyede bulundu. Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinin tamamında bir görüş birliği yok bir defa, onu görmek lazım, yani Filistin'i tanıma tanımama konusunda... Ama daha büyük bir sorun var burada, söz konusu olan Filistin'in sınırları neresi, başkenti neresi, hangi sınırlar ve başkentle tanıyor bu Filistin'i. Bu açık ve net bir şekilde ifade edilmediği müddetçe herhangi bir sonuca yol açmasına imkân yok. Diğer taraftan İsrail de tabii Avrupa Birliği ülkeleri de Filistin'i tanıma yönünde bir kamuoyu baskısına paralel bu tür adımlar atılınca kendince önlemler aldı. Bir defa Kudüs'e ilişkin krizi tırmandırdı, Mescid-i Aksa bölgesine silahlı askerlerin girişi bu krizi daha da derinleştirdi ama daha da önemlisi geçen hafta İsrail Bakanlar Kurulu, İsrail'in Yahudilere ait bir yurt olduğu yönünde bir karar aldı ve bu kararı yasalastırmak üzere Knesset'e sevk ettiler. Yani İsrail toprakları dediğiniz zaman 1967 sınırlarından bahsetmiyor, hali hazırda işgal altındaki Filistin toprakları da olmak üzere İsrail'in Yahudi yurdu olduğunun altı çiziliyor. Bu da apaçık gösteriyor ki Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinin almış olduğu bu kararlar, İsrail'i hiç etkilememiş. Demek ki Avrupa Birliği quartet'in bir parçası olmasına rağmen Filistin meselesinde İsrail'i veyahut Filistin'i herhangi bir tarafa yönlendirebilecek ne bir ekonomik güce sahip, ne bir siyasi güce sahip. Burada herhalde en önemli olan bugüne kadar olduğu gibi, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin tutumudur.

As for your question Professor, I think we should give some credit to Prof. Davutoğlu's approach because it possesses some originality. Although as you mentioned Turkey's diversification of its foreign policy started before Davutoğlu came to Prime Ministry as a counselor and then to Foreign Minister post, we can go beyond to 1960s for instance, just after Johnson's letter of 1964, Turkey tried to improve its relations with eastern bloc countries, then with African countries, with the third world non-alignment

movement and particularly after the 1980 coup, Turkey also started to develop its relations with Middle Eastern countries. What Mr. Davutoğlu brought as an original contribution to Turkish foreign policy was that he put some extra factors and started to remove some taboos, like during his early days in the post, he started to talk about removing obstacles with Armenia, or opening border with Armenia and improving ties with Syria, he lifted visas, we started to talk about moving to Syria without using passports only with ID cards. This happened with Georgia for instance, Turkish citizens and Georgian citizens can travel vice-versa without passports now, and at these borders we just use ID-cards etc. So he put some theoretical basis and he added some extras to this long-going diversification of Turkish foreign policy. So we have to give some credit.

However, from the beginning there were some miscalculations and it was nothing related with Arab Spring. Now I see when defending Davutoğlu's policy, some of the experts in Turkey and some of the politicians from ruling party, they say "Okay, how could we calculate that Arab Spring would erupt" or some say that "Who? Even US, EU or Russia, they could not predict such a thing" so this catastrophe or this earthquake of course just ruined our foreign policy.

Now, independent from the Arab Spring there were some structural deficiencies of this theoretical framework at the beginning. First of all, the Davutoğlu approach, zero-problems did not take into account that some of our neighbors had deep adversaries with each other. Take Armenia and Azerbaijan. If you develop your ties with Armenia, then you lose your good ties with Azerbaijan. And this happened. Two years before Arab Spring, in 2009, we concluded protocols with Armenia, and then Azerbaijan got angry, then we could not put these protocols into force. Therefore, this is not a conclusion or a result of Arab Spring, but because of miscalculation.

Secondly, Turkey has very important allies, first of all United States and then some other NATO allies. Some of our allies had deep-rooted problems with our neighbors. For instance with Iran... Turkey did not understand that Turkey could not play a mediator role between the US and Iran because they themselves want to take this without Turkish contribution and they did it. For instance in May 2010, Turkey and Brazil, that time Brazil was ruled by Lula, Turkey and Brazil they signed a protocol with Iran. They went, Lula and Mr. Erdoğan went to Tehran and Mr. Ahmadinejad, three of them signed a protocol about nuclear deals. This protocol was not recognized by any of the P-5. Just a few weeks after, the United Nations Security Council ruled extra sanctions about Iran and only Turkey and Brazil just said "no" at the

Security Council and they ruled it. Therefore, it was also a miscalculation. If your important ally have some problems with your neighbor, it is not easy to keep the zero-problems with this region.

Third miscalculation was about democracy. From the beginning Turkey thought that being a model for these neighboring countries would persuade the leaders of these countries to take more steps forwards democracy. Turkey therefore tried to give some clues how to transform and tried to play a transformer in the region. But first of all, Turkey itself was in a transforming process, because of the EU process. I mean Turkey is a negotiating country with the EU, a candidate country; Turkey was trying to transform itself through democratic reforms and then try to be a model for these countries. But when you mention democracy to any dictator in the Middle East, they cannot sleep at night. You cannot talk about democracy to a king in the Middle East. Can you say those things to Saudi King? Let's take Turkey as a democratic model; I do not think so because there are no elections. Can you say these things to a dictator in the Middle East, to Mr. Assad? I do not think so. Therefore it was a miscalculation. It did not help Turkey's role but in contrary, when Turkey mentioned more of democracy, more of human rights, then its relations with its anti-democratic neighbors have decreased.

Finally, a final point, Turkey too much internalizes the issues in the Middle East. We gave too much place in our domestic politics to the issues in the Middle East and after a certain period of time, when making some comments on the developments in the Middle East, Turkey always gives references to the domestic political issues, which were needless. Take 3 July 2013 coup'd'état in Egypt, there is no relation between Egyptian coup and coups in Turkey. These are two different countries, two different historical backgrounds, but during the presidential election campaign in Turkey, we saw that there were many references given to the Egyptian coup'd'état in order to denounce the previous coups that were in Turkey and military attempts in Turkey etc... Of course if you create some parallelism between Egyptian developments and Turkish developments, if you keep continue to criticize Egyptian regime, then you cannot create a healthy relation with the regime. Now almost all countries in the EU recognized the regime in Egypt, and almost all the countries in Europe recognized the regime in Egypt. Okay, the regime is not a democratic one but they are a key player. And he made his first visit, Mr. Sissi, to France. Mr. Hollande did not say, "No, I will not receive a dictator in my country". He hosted them. So therefore I think, now we have to recalculate our policies not only towards the neighbors but also towards the regional states and it does not mean a U-turn of course. You can

make a reassessment, recalculation and then you can start a new way because if we keep continue like this, Turkey was the only country, not 10 years ago, just 5 years ago, was the only country who had good diplomatic relations with each, including Israel, Middle Eastern country, now Turkey is the only country in the world which does not have an embassy in Tel-Aviv, which does not have an embassy in Damascus, which does not have an ambassador in Egypt. So this is a very dramatic change. We have to immediately reassess our situation.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

So to finalize this morning session, it would be my pleasure to thank all our excellent panelists again for their contributions, also to thank the audience for their questions and also for their attention on this session. I am looking forward to continue with the conference after lunch break as we will have a closer look on same key issues in Europe-Mediterranean relations.

Thank you very much again.

İkinci Oturum: AB'nin "Arap Baharı"na Tepkisi ve AB-Ortadoğu İlişkilerindeki Bazı Anahtar Konular

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

Konferansımızdaki ikinci oturumumuza başlayacağız. Bu oturumumuzun başlığı: "Avrupa Birliği'nin "Arap Baharı"na Tepkisi ve Avrupa Birliği-Ortadoğu İlişkilerindeki Bazı Anahtar Konular". Oturumumuzda üç değerli konuşmacımız var. Sayın Münevver Cebeci, Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü'nden. Sayın Esra Hatipoğlu, yine aynı Enstitüden, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü'nde.

Sayın Dr. Antje Nötzold da Chemnitz Teknik Üniversitesi öğretim üyesi. Avrupa Birliği enerji konuları üzerine çalışıyor.

Şimdi Sayın Cebeci'ye söz vereceğim evvela ve yine ilk oturumda olduğu gibi 20'şer dakika süremiz var. Buyurun.

Doç. Dr. Münevver Cebeci

Ok, I am going to talk about the EU response to the Arab Spring. So much probably, I will have some overlapping topics with the morning session as well. But mainly, what I think is that the Arab Spring was rather seen as an opportunity by many in Europe when it first started. After the first

hesitation, then people actually thought that this could be an opportunity for the EU to appear as an actor and transform those countries or help them to have their democratic transformations. But unfortunately, the EU could live up to the challenges. It was caught rather unprepared and was hesitant in the beginning and some Member States even offered help to the existing regimes back then, like France offering help to Tunisia, to help with overcoming the protest in the beginning.

But then EU response ranged from humanitarian assistance, to long-term programmes and sanctions and the thing is that all these remained rather limited. So what I argue is that basically the EU does not have any problem with producing outputs. It produces a lot. A lot of declarations, a lot of new initiatives, a lot of mechanisms, procedures, processes whatever, but the point is that when it comes to the outcome, well, the EU's acts still remain rather invisible. So that is EU's basic problem not only with regard to the Mediterranean, but also with regard to its foreign policy in general.

So if we start by looking at the EU's policies in general with regard to the Mediterranean, what we see is that the EU had twofold approach to the Mediterranean, and it had two basic assumptions. They wanted to have regime stability in the Neighboring Countries, so in order to bring security not only to the region, but also to Europe. Secondly they thought that economic reform would bring about democratic transformation as well. They had two major policy frameworks to tackle the Mediterranean. The first one is the Mediterranean Partnership, followed by the Union for the Mediterranean as well as European Neighborhood Policy.

When we look at Mediterranean Partnership; we see that it was rather normative in its intentions. It had a region building approach, it was one-size fits all, it means that all the partner countries were treated equally through a multilateral inclusive and comprehensive framework and it had also bilateral aspects through association agreements to be signed with Mediterranean partners.

When we look at the problems we actually see that the EU saw the Mediterranean mainly as a political and security framework whereas its partners referred to it rather as an economic framework and on the other hand, political elites in the receiving countries, the partner countries were rather reluctant in going on with political reform and they rather legitimize their acts basing them on the threat of political Islam or fundamentalism. EU Member States also refrained from pushing partners for more political reform with the same concern over political Islam and actually fundamentalism and fear of immigration, illegal immigration etc. Some EU

Member States were also pursuing their own national interests through their special ties, colonial ties with the countries in the region.

When we look at the European Neighborhood Policy, we see a policy shift in the sense that now it was based on bilateral relations, it was no longer solely pursuing normative intentions but they were retreading EU interests in each and every text on European Neighborhood Policy, saying that it is in the European interest to build a ring of well-governed countries around EU for example. It had more differentiated and flexible approach, approaching each country according to their own situation, economic, social and their own progress through the action plans and that is why it was regarded as a tailor made initiative. Then it had this principle of joined ownership where the partner countries would also have a say about the policy but they conclude that later that this joint ownership principle was never put into practice in a full-fledged manner.

The problems with regard to Neighborhood Policy was that signed bilateral framework was actually damaged the Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships even handed approach to the partner countries, and also it was prioritizing EU interest rather than the specific needs of the partner countries and offering a stake in the internal market was rather vague, not very realistic because the EU went on applying strict quotas to Mediterranean partners especially in the sectors of textiles, agriculture and then there was this year of illegal immigration which caused problems with regard to mobility and also without any decision making rights further integration into the EU internal market would be rather costly for the partners, in case it was implemented one day.

The Union for the Mediterranean, on the other hand was totally different in its creation. That was a French initiative but then you know in its last version, we can say that it was about co-ownership this time and a political mobilization at the highest level was envisaged through the meetings with the heads of state and government. Co-ownership was important because they invented mechanisms for this like co-presidency or a permanent secretariat and it was rather project based such as environmental issues, pollution in the Mediterranean etc., as well as civil protection, transport and education. However, it also had some problems because co-ownership still remains rhetorical, as I said before, with regard to ENP as well. Then the number of partners increased and this caused concerns with regard to diluting the decision-making of the regional dimension. Then there is too much emphasis on intergovernmental structures and preference of national interest over democracy and human rights. So it was criticized for aiming at, preserving the status quo, mainly.

So these were the major frameworks which brought EU to the Arab Spring and actually the EU responded to the Arab Spring after a period of hesitance, as I told before for example France just offering help to the existing regime, to overcome the protest etc. But then, you know, the EU's immediate response was this initiative over partnership for democracy and shared prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean, supporting democracy, improving mobility of the persons and promoting inclusive economic development, three M's: money, markets and mobility. In that regard, three principles of this policy, we also see it in the new policy to European Neighborhood as well. And there was Spring Programme with the aim of supporting democratic transition and funds were also distributed up to more than 400 million Euros in the year 2013. And then there is another framework which is the European Neighborhood Policy framework, a new response to the changing neighborhood which had a special title on the Arab Spring as well, the Mediterranean partners actually. So it was about managed mobility, encouraging legal immigration, rather than illegal immigration to Europe. Through different frameworks like Erasmus, and then the principle of deep democracy supported by the Endowment for Democracy or Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes, but they were all programmes initially prepared for the Eastern Partnership and then they were also adjusted to the Mediterranean. I think this is rather problematic in the sense that, Mediterranean's needs are totally different from Eastern partnership so there might be problems in that regard as well, adjusting these structures to the Mediterranean.

And then we see inclusive economic development again, as well as strengthening the regional dimension, and also the problems with the sub-regions as well. And it was based on principles of mutual accountability, in the sense that, you know, the EU wanted to make sure that the receiving governments would use the funds for the right purposes and the principle of more or less, which is actually the same with differentiation deep and comprehensive free trade areas were offered as well as an advanced status to the partners. Also support for civil society through a civil society facility. The title within this new response to the neighborhood for the Southern Mediterranean, specifically also made reference to the same issues, sub-regional cooperation here, meaning, especially dealing with the Maghreb.

And when we have a look at the overall assessment of the EU's response what I can say is that, in its foreign policy the EU has a general problem which is that, it usually presents itself as the ideal form which just acts vis-à-vis its imperfect others and always with the view that the others, imperfect others, need its help. So I see that rather problematic. And this

leads to an asymmetrical approach to those countries. That is why the EU's approach is rather technocratic, although the EU in the latest text on the Neighborhood Policy refers to the principle that there are not underlining a specific model for democratization, you know, this is new in the EU text, because beforehand the EU was offering its own model for promotion of its own values and norms when it comes to democracy and human rights and rule of law, but now it says that it is not offering a specific model. But despite this rhetoric, what we see is that the EU offers its expertise and best practices. So actually, it is the same.

On the other hand, the EU is always almost selective in its policy treating some partners differently, despite human rights abuses, so this is the case with Morocco for example, although Morocco had effectively dealt with the protests there and could bring some political reforms still they are not sufficient. And because the EU's main interlocutors are the governments it has a limited impact in that regard getting information on the ground and also conveying its own way of interpretation is limited. And also its attempts to support civil society also remains rather limited because it only corresponds with professionalized civil society rather than grass-roots agency. So there is a problem there, because many civil society organizations cannot have any reach to the EU because first, they might not have the funds to prepare projects etc. and then there might be other practical problems as well. Joint ownership as I told you before never really means deciding together on substance and content but the partners are only given a chance to decide on the pace of reforms. Then, there is mutual accountability which never really means the EU is held accountable for its acts, so there is a problem there as well.

So my conclusion is that, the EU actually does not know or does not have a different way of relating with its neighborhood other than its asymmetrical approach and it sets the rules and expects the others to follow suit. I think this is rather problematic. It could not go beyond protecting its own interests. But this time at least it accepts that, you know, Neighborhood Policy is oriented towards meeting EU's interests as well. So I saw that an important thing because rather than the rhetoric of normative power, Europe, this works better much probably. And the main assumption was wrong, preference of stability over democracy, and EU's impassive policies which can only work in a stable environment but obviously the Arab States are, with the exception of very few, like Tunisia, are still in turmoil and that is why the EU's approach which rather offers long-term solutions is not well suited to respond to the rapidly changing environment in the Arab States in that regard. It is still going on, designing long-term policies and there are

only a few short-term policies as you mentioned before. Also the EU does not take into account the impact of other actors, especially Arab States, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and also, to a certain extent, Turkey's impact in the region. But today, you know, it is quite different, Turkey's involvement. In that regard, those countries offer funds, financial assistance but without any conditionality. So their offer is better for the Arab States, especially those who do not want to go into political reform actually.

So finally what I can say is that the EU's policy after the Arab Spring, is not very different from its policy before the Arab Spring. Actually, the rhetoric has changed and it has produced a lot of declarations, initiatives as I told before, all kinds of processes, procedures invented for tackling this issue. But the thing is that, still turning rhetoric into practice remains the most problematic issue for the EU, especially because of lack of political will on the part of the Member States.

Thank you for your patience.

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

Münevver Hoca'ya bu sunuşu için çok teşekkür ediyoruz. Şimdi, Marmara Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi Sayın Esra Hatipoğlu sunuşunu gerçekleştirecek.

Prof. Dr. Esra Hatipoğlu

Thank you President. I am very happy to be here and honored. I also like to thank both ATAUM and Konrad Adaneur Stiftung for inviting us and we are very happy to be here.

I slightly change my topic in order to cover most of the key issues in current EU-Middle East relations. My topic was "Weapons of Mass Destructions" before, now I try to include many issues at all and give a much broader perspective for EU's Middle East relations. We talked several aspects of Middle East-EU relations but I just want to somehow technically summarize what we did until now, and just what are the key issues in current EU-Middle East relations, just very briefly.

While we are talking about EU's Middle East policy, we are talking about basically four dimensions. We already did the European Neighborhood Policy, Union for the Mediterranean part and we little bit talked about Middle East peace process but we skipped until now the relations with Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and when we are talking about EU's Middle East policy, we should also include the relations with the

countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is also important from energy point of view, I think.

So every relation has its own issues and every relation has its own dynamics and parameters, that is very important in this sense. We talked about European Neighborhood Policy in the first session; we talked about financial support, economic integration, easier travel to the EU, technical and policy support and joint initiatives. We also talked about Union for the Mediterranean and again there are some issue areas like environment, culture, migration, health, economy and energy. So all are included in the Middle East policy of the EU and every part has its own different dynamics.

The other one which we mentioned in the morning about EU's involvement in the Middle East peace process, again I also wrote here several actors and several historical turn points and, this is also important, it has its own dynamics as well. While we are talking about Middle East peace process, we always talk about EU's official position on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, EU's position on the borders, on the Israeli settlements, Jerusalem, *Palestinian* refugees and security issues. So, we are all dealing with these issues within the Middle East process, as we mentioned earlier, we saw that EU is a part of quartet so EU is involved in the Middle East process as well. Again, this problem has its own dynamics and EU has its own different instruments in dealing with Palestine-Israel conflict including, while it is taking into account the affects of other actors as well.

Again, I put it here as EU relations with Gulf Cooperation Council, I really give great importance to it because of energy issues but I am just leaving energy issues to my colleague. She will talk about it in great detail but again they are all oil-rich countries and the source of approximately 200% of EU's energy need. So Arab Spring, and the things that are happening, the specific role of Qatar etc. are all involved in EU relations with Gulf Cooperation Council. It was some sort of an organization which was established in 1981 and it includes all these countries that you know on the map. So this is another issue.

The other thing which we have to mention here as well as an issue, I think its EU's relations with Yemen. It has its own dynamics again, it has its own agenda but at the same time we should mention that EU's relations with Yemen also may have some specific effects, both around Yemen and also in the greater Middle East, but whatever we can say, we talk about EU's cooperation agreements and again EU's economic involvement in the sense, trade, development, cooperation, culture, communication, environment, political dialogue.

Why I put all these things here? Just to show that EU has basic common elements in dealing with different countries, but at the same time EU differentiates in using some of the instruments in this sense. Again, we saw EU in Yemen since 1978, and while we are talking about common issues one of them is humanitarian assistance, humanitarian relief so this is also again valid for Yemen and EU is a source of development assistance to Yemen as well. There is EU's Yemen strategy paper, it means that EU may have different strategy papers for different countries, and again humanitarian assistance is very important in these countries when it concerns Yemen and there are also food security and some assistance to the people faced with armed clashes. So EU is playing a role in this sense and there are also some short-term emergency reconstruction projects in which EU is involved. So this is how the relations are going on with Yemen.

Again another very important and key issue, in the region is Iraq, so we should also include Iraq in our discussions. And we know that EU and Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation. Energy is, again, a very important component of these relations. We also know there are some clashes there but we really do not know who the actors are. So this is another important thing. We know that there is one partnership and cooperation agreement which was concluded in 2012 but now everything is more or less changing. So this is the cooperation and partnership agreement having even some political aspects, plus human rights issues as well.

The same team is valid for EU, good governance, sustainable economic development or growth, investment in human capital. All these countries, they are also related with democratization process and they are also related with the soft power of the EU itself. There is also a country strategy paper for Iraq as well about water management all these cooperation priorities etc. Again good governance is one of the key elements in this sense.

The other issue is relations with Iran, I think, especially, EU's relations with Iran is important especially in terms of developments of western powers also Iran in this sense and we all know that relations with Iran are restricted and there are lots of discussions about nuclear programme and we know that there is no representation of EU in Tehran but they are acting with close cooperation with the Member States' embassies as well. This is important because things are developing there for the finalization of the agreement. They extended the period, so EU acted accordingly and extended a freeze on certain sanctions against Iran very recently. I mean a few days ago or weeks.

Another issue which will be a number one issue, maybe not number one, number one issue is changing all the time, but Afghanistan will be

another important element in the discussions. Because 2014 is the very key year, security responsibility will be transferred to Afghan National Security Forces. EU has been present in Afghanistan since the mid 1980s, they are much more involved in Afghanistan after 2001 and they also appoint an EU special representative, opened a delegation in Kabul and they also have some joint declarations and also an action plan for Afghanistan. The most important thing here I think, if you are talking about current relations we should specify that, EU confirmed that it will remain committed to Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO-led troops. Throughout the transformation decade, and their understanding of transformation decade is 2015-2024. So EU committed itself to be there in this sense. We all saw EU election assessment team, which was there in the presidential and provincial council elections of April 2014, this is some sort of a democratization. I mean one part of, or aspect of, democratization process as well.

While we are talking about all these regions, we can also specify some important thematic issues in current EU-Middle East relations, one of them is terror, the other one is migration, and the other one is energy, we can also talk about weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian relief and you know democratization process, plus post-Arab Spring. I mean we also discussed in the morning but whether it is a spring or not, but anyway. So it is also important just to focus on these issues in this sense.

While we are talking about terrorism, again it is a part of global terror, and it also, as we all know, has entered European treat perceptions with the attacks of Madrid and London. And then, I mean, they really try hard just to underline their sense of vulnerability and also they really understand and specify that the core role of Middle East is very important in EU's security calculations. So issue of terrorism is one of the main things that we have to consider in current EU-Middle East relations and we also have to talk about that it is not only important just to deal with terrorism itself but it is also important to foster a dialogue between civilizations and culture and condemnation of all sorts of terrorism, more effective counter-terrorism policies, deeper cooperation, so all of them are in EU's agenda in dealing with terrorism.

Another very important issue is, maybe we are looking to the things from EU's perspective, but it is also important to look every issue from Middle Eastern perspective as well. But now we are making some generalizations anyway. While we are talking about terrorism, we should also specify that, EU really tried hard to specify and underline that it is very dangerous to associate any religion or culture with terrorism. This is very

important from Middle Eastern point of view as well. And this is one of the big issues in Middle East-EU relations related with terrorism I think. It is not only terrorism itself, but it is also important to jointly be against any type of racism, respect for all religions and you know, rejecting all types of extremist views, plus joining together to be able to have a common understanding of everything. Terrorism and all this stuff have a very difficult position in this sense because even if we look at the situations in Member Countries we really understand that it is even more difficult to define the terrorism itself. It is also valid for UN discussions as well.

There are lots of things to be said for each issue but I am just trying to be as short as possible. The other very important issue which was also mentioned in the morning is the migration for the EU. I just started to hear more and more about migration and also, I mean, migration being somehow regarded as a security issue and just migration is tried to be associated with terrorism and counter-terrorism etc. but while we are talking about EU's migration policy, there are different issues which are involved in the discussions especially related with Middle East. It was again at the beginning, just before September 11, it was an issue of culture and social basket but now we are talking about migration issues and terrorism coming together and trying to be tackled together.

While we are talking about migration, we may just differentiate between different types of migrants, asylum seekers etc. They have different types of instruments in dealing with. We are talking about illegal migration mostly however we started to talk about labor migration to Europe as well. And it is not only security-driven approach to migration from EU itself but also we are talking about, the most important part is how to deal with social inclusion and integration process. So it is not only dealing with migration or illegal migration itself but also it is very important to apply EU's most important principles of prevention, protection and solidarity. So, this is one of the mottos. So it is not only migration but it is also accompanied with minors, victims of trafficking and smuggled migrants. Germany, Spain, UK and France are the most important targets for the migration.

I am just keeping energy issue at all in this sense. I am sure my colleague will talk about it in great detail later but energy is one of the key issues really, I mean this is very important, especially diversification of supply and EU energy security.

The other thing which I definitely will not go into detail is the democratization process. EU is just working hard for the democratization process. I am just using it code and code because working hard, what do we

mean by working hard? Just spending money or just trying to financing some projects? Anyway EU's approach or EU's response to Arab Spring was already very well explained by my colleague so I will not go into detail. But this is an issue really that we have to deal with EU-Middle East relations.

About weapons of mass destruction, this is again becoming one of the most important issue, in this sense, EU has some documents, one of them is the strategy for non-proliferation of weapons of destruction 2003, and we also have EU's new alliance for action 2008, and we also have the recent European Parliament resolution but the most important element that EU's approach to weapons of mass destruction is somehow related with the effective multilateralism, close cooperation with key partners and other third countries, effective and complimentary with all available instruments, financial resources, strengthening of international system and also strict implementation. This is also very important, if we just take into consideration the things that are happening in Syria etc. etc. So we may say a lot of things about weapons of mass destruction as well, because I prepared anyway my first paper on this issue, but we can say that this is one of the most important issues in this sense, because here, we can also talk about chemical weapons, comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty so EU is just working closely with various institutions or organizations dealing with this issue as well.

The other one, the other issue is humanitarian relief, and again, we are talking about humanitarian and food aid civil protection and emergencies and as we already mentioned, EU or Europe is the world's largest donor to the international response to the crisis. We have the European Commission's humanitarian and civil protection which is ECHO, and coordinating all these humanitarian activities, they have humanitarian funding, medical emergency relief, protection, food, nutritional assistance and water. Again, sanitation is another one, hygiene is another area for dealing with this thing and the latest issue is the things that are happening around Syrian border. So there are some funding of some projects or even just some life saving assistance, to some of the people coming and going, or had to leave their country. Again, related with health, food, shelter and water, sanitation, protection etc. We also see several Member States like Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Slovakia, just provided some in-kind assistance, through European Emergency Coordination Center, so in 2014, we saw EU in Iraq in this sense. EU started to increase its humanitarian funding as well to response to the urgent needs of these affected areas.

While we are talking about all these humanitarian relief, we are talking about emergency aid, food aid, aid for refugees and displaced people. There are lots of discussions, with both pros and cons concerning EU's role in humanitarian relief but this should be regarded as an issue in this sense.

I try to be as short as possible. I must say that the things that we discussed already, we always talk about EU as an important player in the Middle East, eastern matters, especially in trade and development assistance. We mentioned economic power, we mentioned soft-power, we almost started to mention the smart power of the EU etc. because it is if you just try to combine hard power and soft power smartly then we also talk about, you know, trade aspects and for Middle East EU is important. We again talked about largest foreign direct investor, I mean EU as the largest foreign direct investor, largest provider of financial assistance to the region. But, even if we say all these positive things about the EU, because of several reasons, because of the reasons not only from the EU's side but also from the region itself, we can say that, EU has all of these, but at the same time, if you just look at the effects, the effect or influence of EU in the Middle Eastern affairs, we can really say that EU is not that visible in this sense and politically is not very involved in as a decisive actor in the region. Starting from the very beginning we are talking about EU, EU, EU and I am just talking about EU's relation with Yemen, I am talking about 28 countries relations with these countries. So even if having such differences, we may just say that, it is very difficult just to have one common voice from 28 different countries having different priorities, different perspectives, projections. So if we come to Middle East peace process, different member states have different aims, different expectations, and another thing was the fragmented nature of the EU decision making, maybe we should also specify that different institutions more or less doing the same things. Even Lisbon Treaty did not really or could not manage to change the situation. There are some important Member States that are just trying to act alone in some issues and sometimes EU has to be much more realistic in acting in the region. So we should also specify another thing, maybe European crisis. Again if we are talking that much of money, economic assistance, then we should also specify then European economic crisis or Eurozone crisis as well. So we know that, we are talking about Middle East but we are talking about numerous types of different actors there so it is not very easy to have a very important things but I have so many issues to cover so I am just finishing.

So this is the case, this is how the things are going on between EU and Middle East.

So I just thank to everyone for patience to listening to me. And I also once again thank the organizer for this very excellent organization, thank you very much.

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

Çok teşekkür ediyorum ben de. Gerçekten çok yönlü, çok geniş bir konuyu kendisine ayrılan kısa süre içerisinde detaylı olarak bize aktarmayı sağladı Sayın Hatipoğlu.

Şimdi Dr. Antje Nötzold'a vereceğim sözü, o da Esra Hoca'nın da ifade ettiği gibi enerji boyutuyla ilgili sunuşunu yapacak. Buyurun.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

Thank you very much. What I am going to address is, as the topic of the whole conference is the European Neighborhood Policy, I will focus on the energy relations of the EU with its southern and eastern partners on the Mediterranean. I will not include in my presentation broader Middle East as the Gulf countries or Iran, but if you are interested in, I am more than happy to answer your questions in the Q&A session afterwards on these topics too.

So what I want to do with you now with my presentation is having a look on the energy trance in the EU and EU neighborhood countries, on very broad brief view on it and then talking about cooperation projects within the European Neighborhood Policy. First of all, giving an overview of progress with the European point view, with the perspective of the European Union and then having a closer look on this new rhetoric idea that is on the table: The EU-Mediterranean Energy Community, which is mentioned more and more often within the last year. So have a look on these, elaborating what is behind these words or these label of the European Union as a cooperation project and with challenges it might face and then to conclude if it will become a vital project within the next years.

Just to be brief, you might be aware that the European Union is very dependent on import of energy. And dependency on the import of energy has grown steadily within the last years reaching over 54% within the whole European Union. And also this trend is projected to continue, even with improvements regarding energy efficiency and the promotion to develop more renewable energies.

Current projections still see the EU relying on energy imports in the future. Of over 90% of its total oil consumption, and over 70% of its gas consumption. Although the EU is quite a diverse entity regarding supply security and every one of these 28 Member States are characterized by

different energy mix and by different import needs. We can say that the import dependency although concerns every Member State. Already in 2009, 22 Member States of the European Union were characterized by oil import dependency over 90% and also 22 EU Member States needed to import over 80% of their natural gas demand.

So, however we have these aspects, 10 years ago import diversification and supply security was not very high on the political agenda of many European countries. Until large part of the EU witnessed supply disruptions in their natural gas supply in 2006, and especially 2009, due to conflicts between Russia and Ukraine about prices and gas transfer to Europe. So without a doubt there have been enormous dynamics with regard to common EU approach on energy policy in reference to supply security afterwards. And especially after the last dispute in 2009 and maybe you are also unaware that there had been a supply disruption from Russia to Ukraine on natural gas, from over for 6 months this year, so there had been again huge discussions and the European Commission tried to negotiate between Russia and Ukraine to conclude on a new framework for gas transits.

This all leads on more thinking in the European Union in supply security and what can be done. Here you see the EU energy security strategy and the way forward and what I want to focus your attention on are these aspects: building a fully integrated internal energy market regards to electricity and gas, developing energy technologies, also with regard to renewable energy, so new technologies, new forms of producing energy and electricity and also promote supply source diversification. And these aspects are also relevant for the EU relations with its neighbors.

And here the EU also looks to itself, and you see, I included Libya in my analysis although it is not an official ENP country due to the tense relations with Europe and Qaddafi. Nevertheless, the EU now aims to include Libya in its regional cooperation activities. So that is why I incorporated it here in my analysis too. And what we see in this graph, on this table is that North Africa has an important area for production of fossil fuels. Although the reserves are not comparable with those in the Middle East, they are still significant. Besides the North African countries, only Syria holds a noteworthy reserve when we look to the Mediterranean countries in the east until now. Over 60% of oil exports and 85% oil exports of these countries already now go to Europe, most of them via pipeline.

When we look to the energy production, we see that Libya, Algeria and Egypt play a leading role as producing states and their net energy exporters

of these countries. Libya represents the only country in the region, with noteworthy oil and gas reserves, although as I mentioned, they are comparatively low with regard to those of the Gulf countries. Due to new discoveries of gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Israel and Lebanon might become also considerable producers within the next decade.

We already now have different connections, pipeline connections between the Northern African countries and the European countries. We have 3 export gas pipelines from Algeria carrying natural gas to Spain and to Italy and we also have a green stream which carries natural gas towards Italy from Libya. Also Algeria is planning to develop two more additional transcontinental export pipelines which should transport natural gas to Italy. Algeria also exports liquefied natural gas counting for over 5% world's total energy supplies in 2011.

Nevertheless, production regarding energy when oil and gas in the Middle East faced serious challenges due to the upheavals we talked about several times today already. What we see here, is that the oil production in Libya was disrupted in 2011 and again, in 2013 as a result of the civil war and the political turmoil. Although Libya is believed to have the opportunity to significantly increase its reserves because the majority of the country remains unexploited. However, if it is really able to raise its potential, it is at least questionable; the latest news already mentions the Islamic State, trying to get hold on energy resources especially in the Eastern part of Libya. We also see that the impact on the gas, the attack on the Algerian gas facility in January 2013, had impacts on their productions although the turmoil in Egypt. Especially in Syria, production of oil and gas dropped significantly in the last years. 44% with regard to the gas and even 85% with regard to oil production and it is unlikely to recover soon. This have, many effects, or impacts the export capabilities meaning the available energy resources for export. But besides, this decreases domestic production due to political instability and crisis and also the inland consumption of energy is dominated by oil and gas within these countries and increased notably within the last decade. This trend is also going to continue as regional energy demand is growing rapidly in the south and east for domestic and industrial use.

It also reflects the demographic and economic expansion. Especially the demand for electricity is increasing in all countries of the region, and tripled in 2013 in the North African countries. So the energy system will consequently need to be significant and also long term investment for development and maybe also for transformation.

A positive aspect had been new discoveries of gas in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, so in 2010, the US government estimated that around

3.500 trillion cubic meters gas and 1,7 billion barrels of oil are discovered in the offshore parts of the eastern Mediterranean Sea. This has opened a new perspective to this eastern Mediterranean region could possibly be allowed to some of the countries to turn from net importers to net exporters of gas.

However, until now the Eastern Mediterranean countries have no direct connection to Europe with regard to exporting gas. And although they might become gas exporters, it is unlikely that they will reserve the European market, due to the resource guarantee until now, and an import needs so far so that the production reserves first and foremost the domestic and regional demand. However in the mid-term they can emerge as new suppliers full conventional fossil fuels, so on the top priority on this area lies in the energy terminal in Cyprus, the project and also the pipeline could run from Cyprus to Greece. But due to regional and domestic political instability in all those regions it includes a lot of risks, if they able to raise this potential. So we have Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Gaza Strip and we also have the conflicts between the Northern and Southern part of Cyprus, and this all have impact on the possible development and possible production of gas in this region.

Besides these fossil fuels, the ENP countries also have a huge potential with regard to renewable energies. Projects like Desertec, I think you all heard of it, promote the generation of electricity in an interconnected system in Northern Africa, in the Middle East and Europe, using renewable energy sources especially solar power plants to develop a connected, European-Mediterranean Network. And you see here the potential for renewable energies in the Mediterranean and you see that the potential for solar energy is especially high in the Northern African countries and not very high in Europe, not a surprise I would say.

So due to these raising concerns, in the EU with regard to security of supply as well as the EU plans to increase the share of renewable and move towards a less carbon intensive energy system, the EU also look to itself. And also in cooperation with partner countries and neighbors, energy issues taken are more often into account. When we now have a look on the overview of progress, the EU sees in regard of cooperation on energy issues with their southern ENP neighbor countries, from the European point of view, point of view of the European Commission, I have to say, yeah, that is not too bad what they have reached so far.

In 2008, they developed the Mediterranean solar plant which should develop renewable energy production on the southern side of the Mediterranean, so the main objective here is on a one side to encourage local production in order to satisfy the raising electricity demand in the region and

on the other side to increase exports of fossil fuels because you do not need so much fossil fuels for your own electricity generation but also direct exports of electricity to Europe, to satisfy European energy consumers and also diversify European imports.

However, there had been many obstacles for the realization of these large scale project Desertec, which was, everybody talked about Desertec, but lately it is getting quite calm in this regard. And also some investors are more skeptical with regard to Desertec, however there had been some although smaller noteworthy projects, which are developing, and it also however very much depended on the attitude of southern Mediterranean countries towards the development of renewable energies and this largely depends on their own energy resources.

So, besides this Mediterranean solar plant, European Union also raised a proposal in 2011, after the upheavals so when they changed their European Neighborhood Policy, their strategic documents in regards to reaction to the new situations in the region. They mentioned to create a regional EU Mediterranean energy partnership, which should focus on electricity and renewable energy so again it included the idea of the Mediterranean solar plant.

However, such a multilateral energy framework remains a long-term objective when you think about the very different situation within the countries of northern Mediterranean. On bilateral level, the EU mentioned as success to have a Memorandum of Understanding with Algeria since July 2013. They also supported projects and power generation and transmission through various financial instruments. With regard to the discoveries of natural gas in the off-shore in the eastern Mediterranean, they established an energy dialogue with Israel and also they try to play an important role, trying to provide technical support and capacity building with regard to Lebanon so that Lebanon could start to produce their natural gas resources. The EU also supported a wide range of investment in the energy sector so it contributed 150 million to finance investment grants of technical assistance through the Neighborhood investment facility. It also enabled European financing institutions to loan about 2 billion Euros and it provided technical assistance and promote regional energy cooperation through programmes like Innogate for example.

However, it might be some progress in some areas, some bilateral areas, the whole multilateral idea of energy cooperation is still, I would say, kind of deadlocked and nevertheless EU mentioned for the first time a Euro

Southern Mediterranean Energy Community in 2011. It should be a new partnership approach as always when the EU mentions opening up new instrument, based on a common vision of regional energy challenges and the desire to divide strategies that generate added value on both sides so leading to new Euro Mediterranean Energy Community. What is interesting here is the name refers to the energy community that the Europe already had established with its eastern neighbors, the European Energy Community Treaty.

You see that the current member states and observer states here, contracting parties besides the European member states are yellow and orange you see in the observer countries. And in 2006, the Energy Community Treaty was established aiming to create an integrated market of energy, natural gas and electricity between the EU, the Balkan countries and this time Bulgaria and Romania. Even today it has a kind of light motive behind it and it is the import of EU energy policy to non-EU member countries, meaning the enlargement of the EU Single Market for gas and electricity to its neighbors. But if we want to or if Europe wants to establish also an energy community with the Mediterranean, it also faces many challenges.

First of all, the Mediterranean energy market can be geographically divided into western, eastern and central Mediterranean regions, energy regions. So the challenges ahead will be to formulate a policy towards a coherent and increasingly coordinated approach in the Mediterranean regions, to provide a shared vision on the medium and long-term foreign investment in energy infrastructure. Mapping the regulation of infrastructure of national interest so analyze which are the bottlenecks, which are the constraints, where the EU and neighbors should start to change their energy policy. The stabilization and transformation of energy markets of its designed organization so a major part will be the regulation, regulation to integrate those energy markets and it is also necessary to implement common energy policies so the harmonization of technical roots for electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply. This also means that it has to be a pragmatic bottom-up approach you cannot come as EU and establish European energy market within your southern neighbors. The EU tries hard since I do not know, over 10 years now, 10-15 years to establish a well functioning internal energy market for gas and electricity. So we are already facing, still face a lot of challenges and obstacles within the EU and so now we try to even enlarge it to the southern Mediterranean states.

Nevertheless it has an interesting long term policy. Political and institutional perspective but to establish this energy market, there are several

challenges the EU faces and several things they have to address which I put on this slide, you already see, there are a lot of things that EU have to address. To coordinate a strategy that brings together northern and the southern part, having public policies which are stable, predictable and transparent in all parts. That is also something that EU needs to manage in its own energy market, to attract long-term investment, to cover also financial assistance, to cover risks, also including those of political instability which is also an interesting aspect and it has to be taken into account. As I mention, with the regulation aspect they have to converge standards and they could or they should increase south, north and also triangular cooperation among universities, research institutions, private sector, and civil society to get everybody behind this idea of European Mediterranean Energy Community.

To conclude and I hope you have energy left for 1,5 more minute, the project or I would even say just an idea, for me it is just an idea of the European Mediterranean Energy Community can open a win-win opportunity for both sides of the Mediterranean. On the one side, the European neighborhood countries need to attract investment in order to meet their increasing demand and on the other side the EU still needs, the states need to rethink the energy import and market structure. Since the establishment of European Neighborhood Policy, energy is increasingly highlighted as an area of deeper regional cooperation and integration and should become an idea that is promoting a new partnership. So by gradually building up a Euro Mediterranean Energy Community, energy could become a driving force of the Euro Mediterranean economy. However, it will be only something that can be realized in the very long-term, I would say. It needs to start on a local level, it needs to start not on the whole region as one integrated energy market, so it needs to start that for European Union itself, finalizes its integrated energy market and to promote cooperation between also some of the neighboring countries, so that in long-term it might become one energy market. But it could also in the long-run redefine energy relations in the Euro Mediterranean region and redraw the map of energy dependence because not only European Union is depended on energy imports also lot of the ENP member countries which have not their own resources, depended on energy imports while they have a raising demand.

I already mentioned the big obstacles with regard to technical issues that this common energy community is facing. But on the other side, this stability of the countries and the region as a whole is important, and especially, or as well as, the political will on the both sides of the Mediterranean. However, at least in the last presentation today, I like to end

with a more positive outlook. So, nevertheless the energy community treaty can establish a dynamic and the western Mediterranean countries appear to be the most suitable geographical area to launch this first phase of the Euro Mediterranean Energy Community. Actions could be decided into a group of countries, like the 5+5 dialogue, to cooperate first of all really the countries that are just around Mediterranean and gradually building it up into a complete Euro Mediterranean Energy Community. Then the energy will act as a driving force for Euro Mediterranean economic integration.

Thank you very much.

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

Evet, bu sunuřlardan sonra řimdi masamız çok dolu. Çünkü Avrupa Birlięi'nin Akdeniz ülkeleriyle ilişkilerinin idari ve siyasi yönlerinden göçmenlere, kitle imha silahlarına, enerjiye kadar pek çok konuyu çok değerli konuşmacılarımız bizlere sundular. Elbette kısa süre içerisinde böyle kapsamlı sunuřlar yapıldığında akıllarımızda da bazı yeni sorular uyanıyor. Vaktimiz var. řimdi hem sabahki oturumlar için, hem de özellikle de bu oturum için sorularınız varsa lütfen sorularınızı sorun, ya da katkı yapmak isteyen varsa, o katkılarınızı da yapabilirsiniz. Sorunuzu kime sorduğunuzu da söylerseniz çok seviniriz. Katkı, řu yönüyle de bakılabilir vs. diyecek olanınız varsa onların da katkılarını ayrıca bekliyoruz. Buyurun.

Katılımcı

I have a question for Ms. Nötzold. Which one is the priority of EU? The unification of South and North of Cyprus or a new energy corridor for EU? As we all know, the meetings for the unification of island stopped because of the energy research of South Cyprus with Israel. So I wonder about the priority of EU.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

That is a tough question because I would say within the different areas of the agenda. So, first of all, the whole North and South Cyprus issue is quite complicated. South Cyprus is a member state of the European Union. We could say that the interest of a member country of the European Union is the interest of the European Union. Meaning that, for sure in the interest of the European Union, I would not say reunification but a peaceful settlement of the dispute, of the issue. So European Union is not saying North Cyprus and South Cyprus have to be unified. They are just saying these issues need to be settled and that both parties of the conflict need find a consensus and a peaceful solution.

From the European perspective, energy policy and energy resources are an area of economics. So from their point of view, trading energy is something not related to geopolitical terms or to political terms, it is a good for trading. So as far as it is not disputed area of the Sea, European investors would support Cyprus in developing these resources. And Cyprus already agreed with Israel on the borders of their exclusive economic zones. You saw it in the presentation that they already agreed which gas field belongs to Cyprus and which belongs to Israel.

There are still disputes in regard of which gas fields belong to Lebanon and which belongs to Israel and especially what are the borders of the exclusive zone of Gaza. As long as Israel is not recognizing Gaza as a country, or the Palestinians as a country, it is hard to have a contract on the distribution of energy sources in this area. So, but the energy sources closer to Cyprus here they settled which one belong to which country and so Israel already started producing gas in the Tamar, they are both Israel and Cyprus, they are both preparing to start producing in other gas fields in this area.

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

May I just add some words on this? Cyprus and Egypt also concluded a demarcation of exclusive zone, economic zone in Mediterranean. That means there is a quartet now, it is emerging and it is there. It is South Cyprus and Israel and Lebanon and Egypt. You can add also maybe to this quartet, Greece somehow. Because Dr. Nötzold already showed us that there is a probable or theoretical approach that a pipeline could be built from Cyprus to Crete and then to mainland Greece and then to Europe. Therefore, it is not, as many Turkish politicians say, it is not the only option to use Turkey to make a connection of Cyprus gas to Europe. We always ignore that the reality that in the North Africa as well, there are some constructed and possibly construct pipelines. Of course, the political change in Libya is quite difficult to build there something but in a few years maybe everything will change. Therefore, I think Turkey is a little bit late to take steps in this eastern Mediterranean area.

Cyprus made its first legal steps forward in the early years of 2000, applied to United Nations and they did everything through 1983 International Maritime Law Convention. Do not forget this, Turkey is not a signatory. And everything they did approved by United Nations. They first proclaimed their exclusive economic zone, then they started to make negotiations for demarcation of the area with these three respective countries, then these three countries signed agreements, and recently you know Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, they also concluded another agreement, they opened a bid, an international bid, an American company, Noble Oil went

there, they built their platform, they started to dig and now they have a natural gas, they produce it as Israelis produce in Leviathan and Tamar. Now it is the final stage, how to transport this gas to international markets. Are we going to make it LLG or are we just pump it through the pipeline? And as Dr. Nötzold said, in each progress report, particularly since 2011 European Union's side underlines that, whatever Cyprus does on this area is legal. European Union supports these policies and asks Turkey to refrain to take any steps to make the tensions grow. Therefore the only option that Turkey can do is to change its policy in the region.

If it would be 5-6 years ago, Turkey would conclude a same sort of agreement with Israel and Syria at the same time, and Lebanon and would block South Cyprus. We did not do this. So now it is all gone. Now we have our exploratory ship, Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa, in the region, accompanied by a number of fleets, ships, navy ships I mean, 6 I think. They are making some maneuvers there. But I do not think so any concrete results will be reached, unfortunately. Of course, if there will be a settlement, a peaceful settlement on Cyprus Island, then the wealth could be shared with Northern Cypriots as well. And Turkish Prime Minister Davutoğlu offered that a new pipeline, parallel to Turkish water pipeline could be built and when Turkey will give water to the island, gas could pass from the second pipeline. I do not know, maybe, if there would be settlement, then we can reach this solution. But in this current situation, I am afraid Turkey is not on the side of the winners now.

Katılmacı

Thank you, I have a question for Dr. Hatipoğlu and also I would like to see the opinion of Dr. Cebeci. Because you mentioned also briefly as a part of your analysis, the problem of democratization in southern shore of Mediterranean, I would like to ask your opinion, how can progress, or if there is any hope in insisting on this programme or question of democratization. We put a lot of energy from the Barcelona declaration; if it was a failure then we should ask why it was failure. Why we had after Arab Spring, no democracy with that small exception of Tunisia. I would like to hear your opinion as a Turkish, as a Muslim, might understand better the Arab. I am as a European I might think that democracy is a product of Western, better culture and as such cannot be applied to a different culture, at the Arab culture. But this would be the end, so is there any possibility, any instrument, any hope to go on or better we give up our effort on democratization and insist on other field where developments might be more promising. Because as you mention, you criticize, and ask to Dr. Cebeci, the

asymmetric approach of Europe. Yes, but our asymmetric approach is the product of what we have done, we were 6, we are 28, has been a long process of construction and enlargement, a long process of modernization. And this look of process of accession is a model of modernization processes also accepted in Turkey. So what should we offer? We offer what we had, we are convinced a good, high quality we are not starting to ship goods. What we can do? But best, I agree with you that in a different context, in a different culture, these goods may not be accepted or evaluated. Thank you.

Doç. Dr. Münevver Cebeci

I was actually when I was listening to you, I was just paying attention to the words that you use. You used different culture, modernization and most probably you mentioned incompatibility of Islam with democracy. But this is exactly the EU's problem. It uses the same language. So the thing is that, yes, the EU's asymmetrical approach is problematic. Because for example, it built the same asymmetrical approach with China or Russia. So that is the thing! If it is promoting democracy then how about Russia or China? So the problem with adopting democratic values is not about culture. And the thing is that the Arab uprisings were not a result of EU or EU impact. They come from grass roots and that is the point. So what EU can do is rather than going on with this asymmetrical approach and imposing its own best practices, if the EU can understand the grass roots better and this means that EU should not only establish relation with civil society that it promotes itself in those countries, but it should also care grass roots agency more and if the EU can do that, then perhaps it can understand the dynamics in the Middle East better and propose better policies. But if you are asking for a recipe from me, well I do not know the recipe because each and every society has its own political, socio-economic dynamics and the problem with EU approach is the de-politicization of the recipe on societies and imposing its own way of understanding of democracy and human rights etc. So that would be my answer, I hope I could answer you.

Prof. Dr. Esra Hatipoğlu

I mean you are just asking very difficult question. But anyway, I would say, adding to my colleague, the thing that was said. Maybe, I think, we should also be critical about what we are doing. Because now, I mean as we all know that, international relations and more or less political science, we just try to understand all the things that are happening around the world through western type of international relations theories and all these stuff

and we do not know much about the not the other but, also the things that are happening here. So they have their different type of understanding. Maybe the solution is not just to give up anything that is going on but to work for universal values. I mean, we talk about western values more often now, and maybe we should also talk about human civilization. It is not civilizations of various types of, you know different parts of the world. So what we can really contribute to the creation of human civilization? So maybe instead of just distributing civilizations even to various compartments, it is just much more think in a different way, just to try to create some universal values. We are talking about universal values but mostly talking about western values. It is not only important to just have them but it is important to how code and code the others perceive all these things. So as you know, I mean much better than me, there are different types of democratizations and even the definition of democracy is depending, I mean, what about Russian type of democracy? Manual democracy, that kind of even we have different type of labeling of our democracies here in our country. So it means whether democracies should be imposed whether inside something or grass root something, but we should work for much more universal values and to understand that there is one human civilization and everybody is just somehow contributing to the creation of this civilization. Thank you.

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

Başka soru var mı?

I think Dr. Nötzold has a question.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

Actually I want to address this aspect of universal values again which came up in the first session and here again. I think it is quite interesting and I would like to ask, as you mentioned universal values again, what would be the difference between universal values and European values? Which European values are not universal values? Also do we have the universal values with the Charter of the United Nations?

Prof. Dr. Esra Hatipoğlu

Maybe sometimes wording matters. If you really think that universal values about democratization, rule of law etc., if you just look at the situation from the other side it maybe regarded as something which is imposed by whoever it is. But the problem is just having universal values maybe at least as a wording; just make the others that they also contribute to this formulation of these rules.

Dr. Antje Nötzold

I know that the term of democracy is very hot iron as you can say, it is already hard to use it but you can say transfer everything that democracy, from a European point of view stands for in other values. For example, participation of the population, civil rights, the rule of law. I think that's all universal value. Protection of life, protection of minorities. That is all democratization as a European term stands for. But you can use the other, it is hard to use democratization, I know. It is always a problem because democracy can be different types. I would not say there is Russian type of democracy. Russia has a democracy, at this time, today. I would see no difference, except of democracy between universal values; we also have in the Charter of United Nations. And the European value, stand for, maybe the term is a problematic aspect. I agree.

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan

It is not today's issue, if you go back to 1975 in Helsinki when this 50 states of Europe and North America signed this final Helsinki Act, the third basket of this security and cooperation conference was democracy and human rights. And one of the signatories was Leonid Brezhnev, you now he was USSR leader. He defended that his country perceives or embraces democracy more than capitalist countries does. And today we have a country and its name is Korea Democratic Republic. The only democracy is in its name, there is no democracy at all in this country. So it really differs from country to country. But when it comes to universality of democracy, and the sense and the values, yes it is a common heritage of all humanity if we may so.

When we go to, another mention maybe we should made, to United States' approach, Clinton for instance in 1996, when he launched his National Security Strategy, Mr. Clinton, Bill Clinton, he described globalization. And in his description, official description of globalization, he said, more and more people in the world started to embrace democracy, human rights, free market economy and all other American values, more and more. So he once all of a sudden, he just equips universal values to American values. So from north to south, to east, to west, everybody, and this is a free world of course, they are free to how to comment and evaluate the term "democracy".

But if I come back to what I have said in the morning, the term democracy disturbs the Saudi king and all the other kings in the region. Do not tell them anything about democracy or human rights because there is no

election there. If you ask a Saudi king how you become a king? He would say, okay my father was a king, this is the difference. So this was a really childish expectation for everyone that this Arab Spring would just erupt a big wave of democratization in all Arab world. It did not do so.

I would like to thank to all our participants, our speakers, our sponsors, our partner Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Derneđi.

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